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No. 78-1007

Cert to CA2 (Oakes,
Blumenfeld[dj] & Mehrtens[dj])

FULLILOVE

v.
KREPS (Secy of Commerce)

Timely

Federal/Civil

1. SUMMARY: Petrs seek review of the CA's affirmance of the
d.ct's denial of their requests for

i~junctive

and declaratory

relief against implementation of §103 (f) (2) of the Public Works

--

Employment Act of . 1977~ 42

u.s.c.

§6705(f) (2).!/

The

!/Section 103(f) (2) provides in relevant part as follows:
(N]o grant shall be made under this Act for any local
public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended
for minority business enterpreses ...• [T]he term "minority
business enterprise" means a business at least 50 percent
of which is owned by minority groups ...• For the purposes of
the preceeding sentence, minority group members are
citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, r sk' os and Aleuts.
Fk - ros-"5._
j'V~ .

c..

.

~J
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provision at issue conditions all local public works grants on
an assurance that at least 10 per cent of the grant will be
expended for "minority business enterprises," whith are defined
in the provision.

Petrs argue that the Act constitutes an

invidious racial discrimination and as such violates the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and Title VI of the Civil Right·s Act
of 1964.
2. FACTS: Petrs are various individuals and contractor
groups which perform both general contracting and specialty
\

subcontracting work on construction projects.

They filed suit

in d.ct for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secy
of Commerce and various state .agencies charged with
implementing the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.

They

argued that the Act's 10% set-aside for minority business
enterprises deprived them of business on the basis of their

.'"-

race in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
Title VI.
The provision at issue was added to the general public
works statute as a floor amendment.

Thus, there is no

discussion in any of the congressional reports accompanying the
general statute as to why the provision was added.

There were

a couple of comments about the provision during the floor
debates and they will be discussed below.
After a hearing the d.ct (Werker, J.) found the provision
constitutional.

In reaching this conclusion the ct used a

"compelling state interest" standard because the provision

..

employed racial

classi~ications

receive public grants.

in determining who should

/
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In applying the test the ct found a compelling state

~ -·

interest in Congress' desire to eliminate the vestiges of
present and/or past discrimination.

While the d.ct recognized

that Congress did not express an intention to assist minorities
as opposed to economically disadvantaged groups in general, · the
ct felt that the intent was fairly inferable.
The ct pointed to remarks by Representative Mitchell when
he introduced the amendment.

The congressman stated that

although the present assistance programs to minority
contractors permit them to be "viable entities" they are "cut
off" when contracts are awarded.

He added that "the only way

that we are going to get the minority enterprises into our
system" is by the amendment he proposed. 123 Cong. Rec. H. 1437
(daily ed. 2/24/77).

Three other remarks by various

legislators were also cited by the d.ct: "minority contractors
and businessmen who are trying to enter the bidding
process •.. get the 'works' almost every time" (Rep. Conyers);
"Nation's record with respect to providing opportunities for
minority businesses is a sorry one" (Rep Biaggi);
"noninvolvement of minority business exists despite
legislation, executive orders and regulations"(paraphrase from
a comment by Sen. Brooke).
The d.ct conceded that these comments did not expressly
attribute the difficulties encountered by minority businesses
to racial discrimination, but the ct nonetheless felt that such
a finding could be supported by reference to "available
empirical data."

It then cited some statistics from the Office

of Minority Business Enterprise, U.S. Dept of Commerce,
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Minority Business Opportunity Handbook which showed that
minority businesses received very few government contracts.
The ct also cited general comments in a Report of the House
Subcommittee on Small Business Administration Oversight and
Minority Enterprise that "because of past overt social and
economic discrimination [the present business system] is
operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past inequities."
The ct putting all of this material together concluded that
"Congress could reasonably believe that prior racial
discrimination was the cause" of the statistical disparities it
cited and thus this must have been its purpose it passing the
amendment.
The d.ct then addressed the issue of whether the 10%
set-aside was the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing
the compelling state interest of eliminating the effects of
past discrimination.

The ct found that the amount of money

involved in the set-aside was not too great compared with all
monies available.

Second, it concluded that less restrictive

measures such as direct assistance to minority enterprises had
been tried and failed.

Thus, it was "necessary" for Congress

to act as it did.
On appeal the CA in part adopted the analysis of the d.ct
and in part considered a different theory.

TheCA, however,

had the benefit of our decision in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (June 28, 1978), to guide
its reasoning.

It agreed with the d.ct that a "compelling

state interest" standard was required.

The CA first looked to

Congress' purpose which it found to be to eliminate the effects
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of past discrimination.

c

It also found nothing explicit to

support that conclusion, but, like the d.ct, felt such a
purpose was inferable.
On the question of past discrimination, the CA noted the
following language in Justice Powell's opn in Bakke: "We have
previously recognized the special competence of Congress to
make findings with respect to the effects of identified past
discrimination and its discretionary authority to take
appropriate remedial measures."

The CA then relied upon the

same congressional and noncongressional sources cited by the
d.ct to establish "a 'perceived' basis for congressional action.
The CA did not consider explicitly the issue of "least
restrictive means."

Instead, it considered whether the

legislative remedy adopted to eliminate the social evil was
\ ..........,

"fundamentally fair."
balancing test.

In this regard the CA adopted a

The ct did not believe that the amount of

money set aside for minority enterprises was a sufficient sum
to be "fundamentally unfair" to the plaintiff contractors and
thus concluded that the provision was constitutional.
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs and the Equal Employment Advisory
Council as amicus in support of the petn first point out that
the decision below conflicts with a decision of the D.Ct for
the Central District of Calf. in Associated General Contractors
of Calif. v. Secy of Commerce, decided Oct. 20, 1978, appeals
docketed with this Ct in Nos. 78-1107, 1108 & 1114.

It also

conflicts with a District of Montana decision, Montana
Contractors' Ass'n v. Secy of Commerce, No. CV77-62-M (Nov. 24,
1978).

Thus, petrs and amicus assert that the issue is an

- 6
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important one that requires an immediate decision by this Ct.
Second, petrs and amicus assert that the decision below
conflicts with our decision in Bakke in two respects.

First,

they argue that the CA's "least restrictive means" analysis,
i.e., whether the legislative remedy is "fundamentally fair,"
does not require any "precise tailoring" such as the Ct
requires when dealing with racial classifications.
Second, petrs argue that Justice Powell's opn laid great
stress on the importance of clear legislative findings of prior
discrimination in any analysis of whether the statute satisfies
a "compelling state interest" test.

They assert that the scant

legislattve record in this case in no way satisfies Bakke.
4. DISCUSSION: The analysis of the d.ct and the CA seem to
me to be seriously flawed.

While purporting to apply a

compelling state interest test, their reasoning sounds at times
almost like a mere "rational relationship" standard.
First, the cts are willing to presume Congress' purpose in
passing the statute.

Second, they all but create "findings" of

past discrimination to support the legislative remedy in this
provision.

It is clear that there are no findings of past

discrimination in the legislative record.

Justice Powell in

Bakke said that "[w]ithout such findings of constitutional or
statutory violations, it cannot be said that the government has
any greater interest in helping one individual than in
refraining from harming another.

Thus the government has no

compelling justification for inflicting such harm." 46 U.S.L.W.
at 4906-07.

I read that comment as generally requiring much

more substantial findings of legislative fact than are present
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here.
There, however, are several problems with this whole
issue.

First, an attack on this statute was before the Ct in

Associated General Contractors of Calif. v. Secy of Commerce,
441 F.Supp. 955 {C.D.Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S.Ct
3132.

There the SG informed the Ct that all of the funds for

the grants under the 1977 amendments had been distributed and
thus the issue might be moot.

On remand, the d.ct rejected the

suggestion of mootness and reinstated its holding that the
statute is unconstitutional.
Presumably the issue of mootness is still a substantial one
that might preclude deciding this case on the merits.

Since

there is no response here as yet, we do not know whether the SG
still feels the issue is moot.
Second, there are three appeals from the other d.ct
decision.

The time for filing a motion to dismiss or affirm

runs until April 14.

It would seem wasteful not to consider

this case with those appeals.

Thus, the best course of action

to take on this petn is first call for a response and then to
relist this case to be decided with the appeals from the Calif.
d.ct decision.
There is no response, but there is an amicus brief in
support of the petn.
2/21/79

\
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IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
October Term 1979

H. EARL FULLILOVE, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

JUANITA KREPS, Secretary of Commerce
of the United States of America,
et al.,
Respondents.

No. 78-1007

)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO DIVIDE ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rules 35 and 45 of the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.,
the General Building Contractors of New York State, Inc., New
York State Building Chapter, Associated

Ge~~ial

Contractors of

America, respectfully files this request for special permission
for the undersigned, Robert J. Hickey, to present oral argument
on its behalf in this case.

As a basis for this request, Peti-

tioner states the following:
1.

There are several Petitioners in this case.

Some are

represented, as notified to the Supreme Court on August 6,
1979, by Mr. Robert Benisch of Berman, Paley, Goldstein &
Berman, 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY, 10036.

The above

is represented by Mr. Robert J. Hickey.
2.

A separate brief on the merits was filed by Mr. Benisch

on behalf of the Petitioners he represents, and a separate
brief was filed on behalf of the above by Mr. Hickey.
3.

It is the intent of Petitioner represented by Mr. Hickey

to file a separate Reply Brief in this matter, which is due
three days prior to the schedule of oral arguments.

-2-

4.

The interest of Petitioners differs, which, in part, was

the result of the original notification to the Court of the
split in Petitioners on August 6, 1979.
5.

The undersigned has had extensive experience with the

issues in this case since he has, in effect, either been
"of counsel" or counsel of record in most of the cases
raising the issue of the constitutionality of the MBE 10
percent set aside provision instituted since the passage
of the Act in 1977.
Consequently, the undersigned believes, both with respect to the
separate interest of each of the Petitioners as well as the benefit to the Court of the undersign's experience in matters pertaining to the issues in this case, that special permission
should be granted for the undersigned to participate in oral
arguments.

The Court is respectfully requested to make an

expedited determination of this Motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for General Building
Contractors of New York State,
Inc., New York State Building
Chapter, Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc.

PROOF OF SERVICE
Pursuant to United States Supreme Court Rule 35, 28 U.S.C.,
the undersigned states that a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Divide Oral Argument was served by first-class, certified return
receipt mail, upon the following parties of record:

Brian K. Landsberg, Esq.
Department of Justice
Washington, DC
20530
Robert Abrams, Atty. General
for the State of New York
Two World Trade Center
New York, NY
10047
Robert Benisch, Esq.
Berman, Paley, Goldstein & Berman
500 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY
10036
this 5th day of November, 1979.
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the

Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Legislative

History.

The

Public

Works

1977 (the Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701-6736,

Employment

appropriated$

4 billion for public works projects. The Act, designed primarily

:.J

to

help

alleviate

. $4.-~

nationwide

unemployment

in

the

construction

'H.,..~~.-&.~ .... 4....~ ~~

~ (<.~!! . .;.-4 ..... ~~4"'

............... ~)

~

.......

,
~ ~

A.-...........,~.f.I.... .. .,.~ ..... -.J.y,......_~~ .. 4rl..-·'1~~·- .... ~~~.4o~~

'

2.

industry, provides federal funds to state and local governments.
The

state

and

loclal

governments,

contracts to private businessmen.

in

turn,

Section

let

construction

~03(f)(~)

of the Act

provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this chapter
for
n
cal
ubl ic
works
chapter
unless
the
applicant
gives
satisficatory
asssurance
to
the
Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10 per centum of
the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority
business enterprises.
For purposes of this paragraph,
the
term
"minority
business
enterprise"
means
a
business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by
minority group members or, in the case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of
which is owned by minority group members.
For the
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group
members are citizens of the United States who are
V Negroes , .; Spanish-speaking, Or ie.ntals, Indians," Eskimos,
and v[:(leuts.
1

t

vt,..'·

42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(f) (2).

~ t.Jt

.

Section 103(f)(2) originated in an amendment introduced
on

the

floor

of

Representative
form

the

the

Mitchell's

----

major

by

House
remarks

legislative

in

history

Representative

Mitchell.

support of

amendment

behind

his

section

103(f) (2).

Mitchell said that his amendment provides minority businesses a
"fair
He

share of

commended

the

the

action"

Act

from

generally

"target" minority enterprises.

the
but

public works
stated

that

legislation.
it

failed

to

Mitchell said that a great deal

of federal money is spent strengthening minority business, yet
the government denies those businesses contracts.
one
His

per

cent

amendment

situation."

of

government
provided

contracts

the

are

opportunity

He noted that

minority
"to

contracts.

remedy

this

3.

Representative Mitchell anticipated possible objections
to the amendment.

He said that the set-as ide was "the only way

we are going to get minority enterprises into the system."
he

explained

why

a

competitive

system

sufficient access to minority businesses:

11

would

not

And

?rovide

We are so new on the

scene, we are so relatively small that every time we go out for
a competitive bid, the larger, older, more established companies
are always going to be successful in underbidding us. That is an
absolute

truism."

"[t]his is

In

sum,

Representative

the only sensible way for

Mitchell

said

that

us to begin to develop a

viable economic system for minorities in this country, with the
ultimate result being that we are going to eventually be able to
end certain programs which are merely support survival systems
for people which do not

contribute to

the economy."

123 Cong.

Rec. H 1436-37 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).
During subsequent debate, Representative Conyers stated
that minority businesses attempting to navigate the intricacies
of

the

time,"

construction
with

the

bidding

result

that

system

"get

the

'works'

"small businessmen

every

through no

fault of their own simply have not been able to get their foot
in the door."
The

123 Cong. Rec.

remainder of

provision

now

the

H 1440 (daily ed.

House debate

incorporated

in

the

centered
first

Feb.

around

sentence

24,

1977).

the

waiver

of

section

103(f)(2). The waiver provision was added to calm the

fears of

some

even

representatives

that

funds

would

be

denied

if

4.

minority business enterprises could not be found in some areas
of the nation.

The Mitchell amendment was adopted by the House.

Senator Edward Brooke introduced a similar amendment in

~

the

••

provision consist solely of the remarks made by Senator Brooke

_.l.AA

,. . V

~

in

Senate.

The

Senate

debate

support~ the ame~ent.

necessary
percent

"because
of

the

legislation,
affirmative
Federal
will

contracts

to

businesses

orders
include

pool."

merits

sa~at

contract

Executive
efforts

the

'Brooke

minority

Federal

on

have

dollar,

a

minority

set-aside

the amendment was
only

received

repeated

despite

regulations

and

mandating

contractors

And Brooke stated

aid minority employment

of

in

the

that the program

"because minority business'

work

forces are principally drawn from residents of communities with
severe

and

chronic

With

unemployment.

more

firms can hire even more minority citizens."
3910.

business,
123 Cong.

these
Rec.

S

The Brooke amendment was adopted by the Senate.
Subsequently,

the

Conference

Committee

agreed

to

the

House version, which was adopted by both houses. See H. Rep. 95230 (1977);

123 Cong. Rec. S 6755-57 (daily ed. April 29, 1977);
Rec.

H 3920-35

(daily

ed.

May

3,

Section

1977).

was ..._..
not mentioned either in the Conference re :gort or
<:::

-----

"'

preceeding final Easssage of the Act.
~

Petrs

here,

.......

plaintiffs

below, are several associations of construction contractors and
a firm engaged in construction work.

Petrs seek declaratory and

5.

injunctive relief to prevent the Secretary of Commerce and the
State

l)

~

of

district

New

York

court

enforcing

rejected

~unconstitutional.
~

from

their

section

claim

that

103(f)(2).
the

section

In a decision handed down before this

judgment

in Regents

(Bakke),

438

U.S.

of
154

The
is

C~rt's

University of California ::!...:. Bakke

the

(1978),

the

district

court

applied

a

strict scrutiny analysis to hold the section constitutional.
First,

the

section 103(f) (2)

district

court

found

----____....

that

enactment

of

served a compelling state purpose because it
~

........

court suggested that the brief debate prior to enactment of the
section was a result of Congress' general awareness of the need
for

legislation to redress

against

minority

minority

groups

the

effect of

businesses.
account

for

Then,
less

prior discrimination

the

than

court

one

noted

percent

that

of

the

national gross business receipts and control about four percent
of

businesses,

even

though

they

country' population.

Further,

than one percent of

federal

other

court

evidence,

the

comprise

17

percent

of

the

minority businesses receive less
contracts.

concluded

In

that

light of
there

was

this
an

and

ample

basis for Congress to have concluded that the present shortage
of minority business enterprises was a result of their historic
exclusion

from

the

mainstream

economy.

Therefore,

the

court

concluded that Congress could find a compelling state interest.
Second,

the

district

court

-----..._..

found

that

Congress

had

6.

I<.

employed

narrowly

interest.

The

drawn

court

L'

means

to

rejected

serve

the

the

compelling

contention

that

state

the

same

purposes could be fulfilled by means of preferences given to all

sm~ll busin~ss.:.:_~~d

{

~s

by

economical.lY.~r

or through cash grants.

preference programs had been

social}y

disadva~taged

The court concluded that such

inffective,

and

that

cash grants

failed to insure that minority enterprises gained the experience
necessary

to

compete

Further,

effectively.

the

court

stated

that expansion of the section to all economically disadvanta~ed
groups would be would not serve Congress'
the

present

economy

all

construction

purposes, because in

firms

are

economically

disadvantaged.
The
figure

court

concluded

was reasonable,

continuing
rejected

supervision

that

and noted
over

the

the

use

of

a

ten

that Congress would
program.

Finally,

percent
exercise

the

court

the claim that Title VI mandates a different outcome

than does the Constitution.
CA2
affirmed.
____..___

crt-z..

. :-::~J·
funadts thien

~

~t-. f

accordance

The court noted that Congress must spend
with

Constitutional

guarentees,

but

held

section passes muster even under the strict scrutiny
test.

~rve
remedy

First,

CA2

,ass:m~he

a compelling state
past

interest

discrimination,

and

::tlon could
if

(b)

(a)

Congress intended

congressional

based upon sufficient evidence that discrimination
occurred.

~ fou~d
action

7.

CA2 stated that the standard of review of Congress is

I

mo~~
-n_i_e_n_
t_t_h_a_n__
t~ew of-; s_!:at~ s~tute.

U.S.

at 302 n.

Wong,

u.s.

legislation

t P. z.,.

~
lf1)-

426

41

(Opinion of Powell, J.):

88,

103

enacted

(1976).

during

~
f./· ..-1/

Hampton~

M~

Sun

In light of the comprehensive

the

for

the

CA2 concluded

that

fifteen

last

benefit of victims of past discrimination,

~~any

See Bakke, 438

years

purpose Congress might have had other than to remedy the

ef;E cts of past discirmination is difficult to imagine."
court's
sufficient

evidence

of

past

that

finding

Then,

Congress

discrimination.

CA2

acted
relied

upon the floor remarks of Representatives Mitchell and Conyers,
the

statistical evidence discussed

the

conclusion

minorities

of

have

a

House

committee

~ ~

Second, CA2 stated that it

determine

whether

adopted

traditionally

been

construe~ industry.

C. fl. Z- ~~~

by the district court,

the

excluded

m~st

apply a

remedy

~ ~

fundame~~-v. Bow~

vjr~ .~

424

·r

.

·:w-;~
~· ~~

~~

~
u.s.

747,

784-86

in

(1976)&f'Powell,

and

1976

that

from

the

~nci;Eg_t;est

the

of

Transportation Co.,

J. ,

and

concurring

dissenting).

CA2 found that the set-aside excluded non-minority

contractors,

who

relatively

minor

constituted
portion

of

96%
the

of
$

the
170

industry,
billion

construction spent in the United States in 1977.
the

set-aside

section is constitutional.

from
spent

Finding
...

a
on

that

8.

3. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES.
A.

-

Petitioners.

Petrs present arguments

that are

so

similar that both briefs will be treated together.
Petrs argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment

embodies

Washington v.
are

the

Davis,

presumptively

principle

426 U.S.

229,

unconstitutional

the strict scrutiny standard.
is

a

compelling

state

of

equal

239

protection.

See

Racial quotas

(1976).

and must be measured

under

Redress of racial discrimination

interest,

but

in

this

case

legislative

history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to enact a
remedial

statute,

discrimination.
J. ) .

or

that

it

made

detailed

See Bakke at 302 n.41,

Representative

findings

past

307 (Opinion of Powell,
that

conclusion

Mitchell's

of

minority

business' were underutilized is not supported by evidence in the
legislative record. CA2 therefore errred in looking outside the
record or in speculating about the Congress' state of knowledge.
In

effect,

CA2

discrimination exist.
the existence of

a

This was error,

compelling

state

of

findings

that

prior

for evidence to support

interest

has

to be

found

within the legislative history of the section under review.
Furthermore,
support
court
contractors

the district court's statistical analysis

the

section

failed

(34.28%)

and

to

103(f) (2).

note
dollar

the

In

particular,

increase

receipts

businesses (84.45%) between 1969 and 1972.

of

in

the

minority

minority

owned

Also, gross receipts

9.

of minority firms with paid employees increased 60% during the
same

period

although

receipts

for

increased only 60% from 1967-72.

all

construction

Moreover,

firms

the district court

did not suggest that Congress was aware of the statistical data
upon which it relied.

Accordingly, the government has failed to

demonstrate the existence of a compelling state interest.

---------Even

mandatory

~-~-------~~--------------if a compelling state interest exists,

set-aside

is

not

precisely

tailored

to

the

serve

___________________,-- '~----~----------~----------------------purpose of section 13(f) (2). See Bakke at 308 (Opinion

Powell, J.).
group

~~------------~----~----------------------

eligible

problems

facing

capital,

a

for

set-aside

minority

problem

diffculty

paperwork,

of

The section fails to determine that each minority
has

contracts

experienced

Indeed,

ants,

the

are

be

through

that

the

solved

in obtaining
problems

and

Additionally,

contractors

reality

bonding,

with
of

the

the major

insufficient working
direct

financial

problems with
bid

competitive
construction

federal

procedure.

business means

that small speciality contracters will bear a disproportionate
burden of the set-aside.
In lieu of the mandated quota, Congress could have used
means

for

in

construction

the

fulfilling

for

industry.

remedying

past

Congress

could

(1) a racially neutral program whose goal is to create
practicable

opportunity

disadvantaged

persons.

for
See

socially
15

U.S.C.A.

and
§

'

'

..

'•

.

10

0

Q)
637(d) (providing

that

"it

is

the

policy of

the United States

that small business concerns, and small business concerns owned
and

controlled

individuals,

by

socially

and

economically

disadvantaged

shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to

participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal
agency."); @joint ventures between minority and non-minority

~ technical,

contractors;
assistance

to

minority

financial,

contractors;~

a

and

educational

pool

of

trained

workers to lend assistance to minority contractors.

~er

Petrs also contend that the set-aside is invalid even
the

more

lenient standard proposed by

four Justices

in

1~
~Bakke. See Bakke at 360-61 (Opinion of Brennan, J., White, J.,
yV-'~ Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.). Those Justices stated that a
VV 1~ racial classification is proper if it is substantially related

~~~

to the achievemant of important governmental objectives, and if

~Jl' fJ.v

1·

~w
1'.-1/

*.

t

does

not

stigmatize

represented

in

contractors

who

minorities
stigmatized

who

the
are

anl

group

political
denied

receive

work

or

single

process.

work

without

regardless

by jsection 103(f) (2).

out

Petrs
regard
of

Further,

least

argue

that

to merit

and

merit

are

their
the

those

program hurts

economically and socially disadvantaged non-minority contractors
who are isolated from the political process.
~

Finally, petrs argue that the section violates Title VI

~
~ th Civil Rights Act of 1964.
~

1v~
~

Petrs suggest that the Court

reconsider its decision in Bakke that the term "discrimination"

11.

Even if the Court does

encompasses a constitutional standard.
not

reconsider

decide

the

that

scope

holding,

of

the

petrs

langugage

argue
that

that
no

Bakke

person

did

not

shall

be

"excluded from participation in, [or] be denied the benefits of"
any program receiving federal assistance on the ground of race.
See

42

history

U.S.C.
of

provision

VI

--

.....

between

contend

demonstrates

to be color-blind.

conflict

I

Title

Petr

2000d.

~

Title

VI

that

Congress had

section

section

of

5

the

Fourteenth

L.

the

~

should

103(f)(2)

the

be

,.

power

tf~yt>arties.

I 4'"""

of

Amendment

and

of

Katzenbach

pursuant to

v

section

of

2

the

The powers of Congress are greater than

states,
adm~strative
____......,

agencies,

See Hampton~ Mow Sun Wong, 426

cordingly,
review

The State argues that

the power to enact section 103(f} (2)

Thirteenth Amendment.

~
v

intended

resolved in favor of Title VI.

~
V'1

legislative

petrs contend that any

B. Respondent State of New York.

~·

the

Congress

Finally,
and

that

u.s.

or ----;rivate

88, 100 (1976).

this Court should display marked restraint in its
the

program.

See

Bakke,

438

U.S.

at

302

n.41;

384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).

~Morgan,

Section 103(f)(2) serves the compelling state interest
of

overcoming

business

the

effects

enterprises.

of

discrimination

Congressional

findings

upon
with

minority

respect

the set-aside requirement are implicit in the statute.

to

Even in

the absence of designated findings, Congress is presumed to have
acted with full knowledge of the area affected by its actions.

1 2.

See Katzenbach

~Morgan,

384 U.S. at 655-56.

In this instance,

Congress can be presumed to have known of the many instances of
racial discrimination in the construction industry.

Against the

backdrop of statistical evidence, the remarks of Representatives
Mitchell
minority
that

the

and

Conyers

business
specific

point

out

enterprises

in

the

of

racial

obstacles

country.

this

'-------·

cause

real

fact

the

And

discrimination

facing

cannot

be

·-~---~

traced to specific persons and institutions does not invalidate
Congress'

action.

Accordingly, the lower courts had sufficient

evidence to find that Congress passed section 103(f)(2) in order
to further a compelling state interest.
Furthermore, the ten percent set-aside is an effective
yet

narrowly

Other

drawn means

methods

of

to

increasingly

construction

industry have

not

minority

supply

-------

achei vement.

the

minority

legislative

purpose.

particiaption

in

the

been effective because they do
,'
enterprises with
a
track record of

not

-

~

........

acheive

Further,

those minority groups designated in the

section have historically suffered the effect of discrimination.
The

effect of

contractors

the

statute,

is minimal.

as

noted

The set-aside

by

Cl\2,

is

on

thus

non-minority

an appropriate

remedy of limited duration.
The
petrs'
have

Title VI
stated

standard.
..:::::.

state

argues

that

this

contention because

that

See Bakke,

Title
at

VI
287

Court

should

five members

incorporates

a

(Opinion of Powell,

of

reject
the

the

Court

constitutional
J.);

348-350

13.

J., White,

(Opinion of Brennan,

J., Marshall, J.,

& Blackmun,

J. )

C. The Solicitor General.

SV

~thority

. ~ -~e
~
s~/

uv~
~~

of Congress to enact

spending

power,

the

past

twenty

~~ ra~ially-conscious
Carey,

~a)

U.S.

~~

the

set-aside

provision.

enforcement

sections

Both

of

against the continuing effects of past discrimination.

~ l~ur~~nti-discrimination

t

the

the

Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments allow the Congress to move

in

~

and

The SG first establishes the

430 U.S.

40 5,

435

years,

the

Congress

has

Indeed,

enacted

numerous

statutes, some of which involve the use of
remedies. See United Jewish Organizations v.

144

Albemarle Paper Co.

( 1977),

( 197 5).

Congress may generalize

~

in

Moody,

422

identifying

he victims of discrimination when individual determinations are
impossible, see Teamsters v. United States, 431

u.s.

324, 357-62

(1977), and the impact of remedial measures need not b limited
solely

to

proven

dscriminators,

u.s.

Transportation Co., 424
Duke

Power

posesses

1

\

Co.,

the

competence

discriminated
See

Bakke,

Katzenbach

u.s.

401

against,

438

U.S.

~Morgan,

to

430

(1971).

identify
what

at

302

384

u.s.

what

remedial

n.41

In

sum,

groups

measure

(Opinion

of

Bowman

Griggs~

747, 774-75, 777 (1976);
424,

and

v.

Franks

see

Congress

have
are

been

proper.

Powell,

J.);

641 (1966).

The SG next meets the argument that Congress' adoption
of

a

remedial

legislative

measure

findings

of

cannot
a

be

sustained

constitutional

absent

violation

detailed
and

the

1 4.

/reasons

~ ~. /

for

its

action.

This

argument

fundamental nature of the legislative process.

~~with

Sf}:

the

Congress deals

general, not particular, problems, and it deals with them

~ , on the basis of information acquired from

Z

misperceives

Unlike

a

court

or

to

limit

obligation

an

its

~-----~

nor

must

administrative

it

--

-

decisions

~

a

create

innumerable sources.

agency,

has

appearing

facts

to

record

Congress

no

in

a

~------------------~
to withstand judicial

considers the constitutionality
action may look at the materials generally used
the

intent
its
statutes,

legislative

and

other

history,

material

its

that

langauge

relationsip

explain

the

of

the

with other

congressional

decision.
The indicia of legislative intent demonstrate that the
The legislative

set-aside was designed as a remedial measure.

history of the set-aside shows that Congress knew that minority
unemployment was disproportionately high, and that unemployment
among
See

minority

123

Brooke);
Stokes) .

Cong.

construction
Rec.

123 Cong.

S3910
Rec.

Moreover,

workers

(daily

H1423

ed.

was

particularly

March

(daily ed.

10,

Feb.

severe.

1977)(Senator
24,

1977)(Rep.

the congressional action was taken against
with

existence
enterprises

of

discrimination.

received

contract dollar,

less

than

Congress
one

knew

percent

that
of

the

the

minority
federal

see 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. March 10,

IJe

1977)(Senator

Brooke),

discrimination
H.R.

Rep.

and

continued

94-468,

that

to

the

effect

94th Cong.,

past

effects

minority

1st Sess.

1-2

of

racial

businesses.

See

Congress

(1975).

knew that minority businesses were excluded from opportunities
in

the

construction

forces.

The

industry

difficulty

of

by

subtle,

obtaining

but

loans

discriminatory

and

bonding,

and

their lack of experience hinder minority business enterprises in
obtaining

c.~ )com~ee ~
~ ~
~

construction ( ;:rk_.M

---

concluded in 1977 that:

:

Currently, we •.• encounter a business system which is
racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt
social
and
economic
discrimination
is
presently
operating,
in
effect,
to
perpetuate
these
past
inequities.
Minorities,
unt i 1
recently
have
not
participated to any measureable extent, in our total
business system generally, or in the construction
( industry, in particular.
---------------

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th Cong .. , 2d Sess. 182-83 (1977).
the

face

against

of

such

minority

congressional
contractors,

recognition
and

with

of

In

discrimination

consideration

of

the

statements made during the debate on the set-aside, see pp. 2-4
supra,

it is obvious that section 103(f) (2) was designed as a

remedy.
Finally,

the

SG

argues

that

the

set-aside

is

a

constitutionally permissible means for Congress to eliminate the
effects
Congress

of
is

discrimination
uniquely

suited

in
to

the

construction

create

a

remedy

industry.
for

past

discrimination.

Its ability to gather and evaluate a wide-range

of

and

information,

its

role

as

the

representative

branch of

10.

government
competing

makes

it

interests.

an

appropriate

Thus,

a

forum

statutory

for

racial

balacncing

classification

should be sustained if Congress has reason to believe that such
a measure is necessary to accomplish the legislative goal,
if

the statute

the

is designed

classsification on

and

to moderate the adverse effects of

persons

arguably

not

involved

in

past

discrimination.
The

implementation

of

a

set-aside

was

necessary

to

ensure that the effects of dsicrimination would not be carried
forward in projects funded under the Act.

Previous legislative

efforts had not succeeded in eliminating discrimination, and the
public

works

Congress was

were

to ensure

---....._,_

distributed

funds

to

that

be

spent

the

funds

quickly.
under

Therefore,

if

the Act would

be

in a manner untainted by the continuing effects of

past discrimination, it had little choice except to enact a set-

-----

aside

provision.

remedy,

The SG argues

that

the general

nature of a

possibily benefiting some persons who had not suffered

~ discrimination, was an inevitable by-product of Congress' need
~ ;ft act quickly and broadly. Further, the set-aside has only a
~ ~~inimal

~

may

adverse effect on nonminority contractors.

have

some

nonminor i ties.

effect
In

on

this case,

the

legitimate

the burden

and implementation of the remedy,

u~e
----

-

in Bakke,

does

not

foreclose

consideration for a contract.

~---------------------

Every remedy
interests

of

is spread very thin,
the admissions program
.... .--wo"".ws

nonminori ty contractors
In any particular case,

from a
a prime

1 7.

contractor

is

free

subcontractor,
aside

so

to

long

requirement.

passed

no

appropriated

the

contract

total

award

to

a

satisfies
lost

have

nonminority

no

the

set-

legitimate

of the set-aside, because Congress could

public

ten

provision.

as

a

Nonminorites

expectation by virtue
have

give

funds

percent

Moreover,

act

less

the

at

money

presence

all,

or

without

of

the

could
a

have

set-aside

waiver

provision

ensures flexibility.

Thus, the short-term nature of the public

works

lack

program,

the

of

total

exclusion

of

nonminority

'-------

-------------The SG disputes

cntractors from competition for any particular con!Eact, and the
~

.._.

............

..

waiver provision distinguishes
~

~
Ymeasures
(#'__. _'{

1.~/

~~--

~

~
v

argument that less drastic

could have been used to aid minority business.
would

have

to

use

racial

Any

lines of

.sort~th::d p::gu:am:o:~: 1 :e bei n:::st i;::::;:b~:lyfr::ca::: :::~

would deprive other people, rather than nonminority contractors,
of

~

the

possbile

benefit of

federal

funds.

The

SG recognizes

that s;ction 8(d) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.

Vt.
~~

the petrs'

program aimed at minorties

::::e

this case from Bakke •

ut,ilizes
,

all

a~~ ~i:hre~';!n~al

disa~vantage~ou~,

~ispanics,
section

while

8(d)

is

an

acceptable

long-term

Congress could have concluded that
persons

within

the

set-aside

637(d)

treatm_:nt by- aiding

presuming

and Indians are disadvantaged.

§

that

blacks,

The SG argues

that

solution,

that

but

including all disadvantaged

would

not

erase

the

continuing

1 8.

effects of discrimination
short

period

of

time

from

that

affecting contracts let in the

the

public

works

program

was

in

effect.
On the Title VI issue, the SG argues that the set-aside
preference and
not

the non-discriminatory command of Title VI

incompatible,

and

that,

even

if

they

were,

the

are
more

specific, later statute would govern.
4.
adopted

in

ANALYSIS:
your

Due · Process.
Bakke

Pursuant

opinion,

section

to

the

standard

103(f) (2)

is

1 on 1 y 1. f{E?
. a proper reme d y<:Vdes1gne
.
d t o serve a
.
cons t 1. t u t 1ona
1t 1s

---------------------

compelling
state interest.
...
__.......,
instant case raises

Application of this standard to the

serious questions of

separation of powers

and the proper allocation of responsibility between the federal
judiciary and the Congress.

These issues are all raised because

section 103(f)(2), unlike the Davis admissions plan, is an Act

--~------------~

.

of Congress .
A.

M~
~~
~

analyzes

Compelling

whether

State

any of

four

Interest.
state

Your

interests

Bakke
are

opinion

compelling.

e,

Examination of the analysis of these four interests illustrates
the proper analytical framework for this case.

the use

of a racial classifications simply to prefer members of certain
minority

groups

is

facially

interest

i~ facilitating

the

invalid.

~ the

provision

of

health

State's
care

to

communities was not supported by evidence demonstrating that the
admission

program was

needed or geared

to promote

that goal.

1 9.

~

the

attainment

of

a

diverse

constitutionally permissible goal
learning.

the

insubstantial,

interest

student

for an

State

body

was

a

institution of higher

had

in amerliorating

but

legitimate,

a

the disabling

effects

SfJ;L!1 ~'--~ ~ ~

~~

of past discrimination.

14-

.

~ ~~~

(~ ~)~ pcc.,.l'.c-., S tr( ~

The state interest in remedying past discrimination is
not

substantial

~
violations.

without

findings

Once

such

judicial,
of

administrative,

or

constitutional

or

have been made,

the extent of

findings

the injury and scope of the remedy may be defined.

statutory

The Regents

of the University of California neither made, nor were competent
to

make,

findings

discrimination.

of

specific

of

instances

racial

In order to make such findings, "a governmental

body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the
record,

that

the

-

discrimination."

classification
Absent

is

responsive

justification

to

of

identified

the

racial

classification, the Regents could not impose disadvantages upon
persons

not

reponsible

for

whatever harm the beneficiaries of

the admissions program have suffered.
, be

to

convert

legal rights

a

remedy

"To hold otherwise would

---

--------

heretofore reservd for violations of
....
into a privilege that all institutions throughout

the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are
perceived as victims of societal discrimination."
Only the fourth interest was found not to be compelling
because

it

was

In

insubstantial.

'

:

other

words,

the

fourth

interest could be compelling, unlike the first interest which is
facially
fourth

invalid.
interest

Unlike
was

the

second or

rejected

because

third
the

interests,

state

University

support

~
~,~

the

was

not asked

conjfusion

to proffer specific

that

its

diversity actually existed, instead

failed

interest

findings

in

to

educational

~opinion assumed that, as

~~a ~stitution o~her-learning, the~

~

to

Significantly,

establish the existence of the state interest.
the

the

School

actually attempted to attain a diverse student body.

~

The emphasis on substantiality, that is the requirement

~J

that

an

institution

legitimate

and

that

prove
it

both

actually

that
exists,

a

state

was

not

interest

is

developed

in

this Court's equal equal protection cases prior to Bakke.

Yet

the requirement is vital, for it distinguishes the existence of

~
U,..f' ~
~

if~ 'I
wtrJ

fourth interest, amerliorating the disabling effects of
• '. d~f.
d d.
. .
. -:.,,:---f---h--f-.--.------f-.
1 ent1 1e
lSCrlmlnatlon, rom t . e
1rst Interest, pre er1ng a
the

racial

group.

racial

preference

Without

the

could be

requirement

of

substantiality any

justified simply by

labeling

it

a

remedy for past instances of discrimination.
Your Bakke opinion concludes that the state's interest
in

remedying

past discrimination

is

insubstantial because

the

Regents were not competent to make, and did not made, findings
of

past discrimination.

requirement,

therefore,

The

existence of

the

substantiality

demands that this Court decide whether

congressional action in enacting section 103(f)(2)

satisfies~

21 •

requirements: (1) that the institution be competent to find past
instances of discrimination,

and

that the

(2)

instutition have

established in the record that the classificiation is responsive
to identified discrimination.
1.

Two
Congress

commentators

is

an

have

appropriate

addressed

body

to

the

make

issue

findings

discrimination pursuant to your Bakke opinion.

whether

of

racial

One asserts that

a "legislature that makes such a declaration and then authorizes
a

program

choice,

to

prefer

clear

on

the

political

process,

another."

R.

Thoughts,
has

minorities
public

to

O'Neil,

67 Cal.

asserted

L.

the

record

has

and

one

group

Bakke

in

Balance:

143,

made

a

conscious

accountable

favor

Rev.

more

surely

at

the

to

expense

Some

the
of

Preliminary

158 (1979). Another commentator

restrictive

view

that

only

Congress

pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or section 2
of

the

Fifteenth

violation.

R.

Amendment

Posner,

Affirmative Action,
contends
authority
remedy

that
of

unlawful

Bakke

67 Cal. L. Rev.

"[i] f
any

The

Justice

legislature or

legislative

and

the

Future

171, 178-79 (1979).

Powell

discrimination,

loophole .•.. Since

Case

constitutional

a

"find"

can

intended

its delegate
this

would

to

create

factfindings

are

Posner

recognize

to

of

the

identify and
an

enormous

essentially

~----------------~~---------------------autorize

reverse

discirmination

could

subject

institutions

to

22.

ostensibly
culpable

'remedial'

sction by making

discrimination

probative

evidence."

legislatures

are

on

their

part

Accordingly,

not

an

conclusory
wothou

-

Posner

appropriate

findings

any

basis

concludes

body

under

of
in

--

that

state

your

Bakke

opinion.

1~ L)tongress J~:ti:: ::::::ia::ta:::: ::enfi::e aco::::::::ti::::
~!)~·violation.
~~(1966)
'-...-

(Harlan

~stice
~M.
~- ~ongress

has

.~ ~Amendment

~ lll"
'~ ~.5 Although
~

J.,

Harlan

~
-

See Katzenbach v. Morgan,

he

facts

determination,

sought

that

recognized

Justice

whether
to

the

deal

Constitution."

a

can

of

Congress

argued

that

truth
Harlan

"it

which

an

to

exists.

to
a

is

that

Fourteenth

violation

helpful

with

the

666

joined).

position

5 of

be

condition

Justice

section

641,

J.,

majority's

expertise

in

Stewart

constitutional

Harlan

is

whom

the

under

the

that

with

from

authority

decide

legislative

question

dissented

the

to

dissenting

u.s.

384

develop
judicial

a

judicial

Congress

has

thus

infringement

of

the

feared

that

the

majority's

position would allow Congress to enact statutes "so as in effect
to

dilute

Court."

equal

Id.

protection and due

at 668:

(1970)(Stewart,

J.,

part) ( "Katzenbach
the power
state

to

v.

see

concurring

for

what

are

equal

Mitchell,

in

Morgan ... does

determine

interests'

Oregon~

process

part

what

protection

400

u.s.

this

112,

295

dissenting

in

that Congress

has

and

not hold

and

arguments of

are

not

'compelling

purposes.")

The

23.

~atzenbach

~:tating

that

~guarentees

f'O

/

majority

replied

Congress

of

the

to

may

Justice

enforce,

Fourteenth

Harlan's

but

Amendment.

critic ism

not
See

by

dilute,

the

Katzenbach

v.

Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).

~t-" ~

~to

I

believe that Congress is an appropriate

determine

exist.
broad

whether

statutory

or

constitutional

institution
violations

Unlike the Regents of the University of California,
mission

is

"the

formulation

Bakke at 309 (Opinion of Powell, J.).
imposition of remedies

. . . . . ~ --=--= ,......,_ --

of. .. legislative

policy."

This Court has upheld the

founded on congressional determinations

diqcrimination
exists.
A~that
racial
1~ Or_g_a_n_i _z_a_t_i_o_n_ s _ v- . ---.:C
....._
a_r _e_y....,- -4-3- 0- -U- .- s- . - 1 4 4 ,

United

See

Jewish

(1977)(plurality

155-56

opinion); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
Carolina~~

its

(1966); South

Katzenbach, 383 u.s. 307, 309 (1966). And your Bakke

opinion cites a

case in which Congress

adopted

a valid gender

preference to support the proposition that a governmental body
that

identifies racial discrimination must have

the capability

to establish in the record that a classification is responsive
to identified descrimination. See Califano
313, 316-21

congressional
violation will

action

this Court has recognized the validity of
establishing

trigger

race

a

':-'

.,

.

u.s.

324,

.

T1tle

'"IDI
VI

standard

whose

conscious remedies even without a

showing of purposeful discrimination.
431

Webster, 430 U.S.

(1977).

Furthermore,

States,

v~

335-36 n.

See Teamsters v.

United

15, 349 (1977); Griggs v.

Duke

~~

I

24.

Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 43 -32 (1971).
non-constitutional
use

of

the

race-conscious

remedies,

If Congress may enact a

violation of which
then

is

----------~-~-~------~-------------m~-- "~d"
a constitutional

-

Congress

Congress
exists,

could not d/ecide whether

a

allows

unimportant
violation.

the

whether
Even

if

constitutional violation

it could justify imposition of a race conscious remedy

merely by passing a

statute declaring the same practice to be

unlawful.
The conclusion that Congress is an appropriate body to
assert

the

existence

ameliorate

the

of

the

compelling

state

interest

to

effects of past racial discrimination does not

mean that the judiciary is incapable of overseeing congressional
action.

Justice Harlan's fear of congressional dilution of the

-

Fourteenth Amendment can be assauged by careful judicial review

-

of the legitimacy of the congressional determination in order to
enforce

the

principle

preferences.

The

------

Congress

~--~
~~ -

but

~

2.

can

what

that

remedies

critical

conclude

"findings"

that

not

merely

becomes

not

whether

constitutional violation

exists,

issue
a

Congress

are

then

must

proffer

~.~ ion b'(a.- ~. ~

to

racial

support

its

Your Bakke opinion cited three areas of congressional
action

in

imposition

which
of

a

sufficient
remedy

findings

based

on

race

were
or

made
gender.

to

support
Congress

considered "overwhelming" testimony demonstrating the existence

25.

of

employment

discrimination

when

it

enacted

Title

Bakke at 308-09 n. 44 (Opinion of Powell, J.).

VI I,

see

Similarly, when

it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, each house of Congress
conducted nine days of hearings, the House engaged in three full
days of debate, and the Senate debated the measure over a 26 day
period.

The

legislative

considerable detail"

history

the

factual

of

the

support

Act
for

documented
Congress•

"in

belief

that discriminatory practices had infringed the right to vote in
some areas of the country.
383

u.s.

See South Carolina v.

Katzenbach,

301, 308-09 (1966).
When Congress decided to adopt a lower Social Security

retirement
basis

of

age
some,

suffered

for
but

employment

Califano~

women

than men,

however,

not overwhelming,

evidence

discrimination.

u.s.

Webster, 430

it

This

moved

on

the

that women had

Court's

opinion

in

314, 319-20 (1977) relies on only

two pieces of legislative history to establish the proposition
that

Congress deliberately

acted

compensa~e

to

economic disabilities sufered by women.
committee
showing
openings
second

report

that

age

for
was

that
limits

women
a

relied

and

upon

were
that

statement

a

applied
the

made

age
by

a

for

particular

The first was a House
Labor
more
1 imi ts

Department
frequently
were

congressman

study
to

lower.
after

job
The
the

eligibility distinction had been passed to the effect that women
have less employment opportunities than men and live longer.
is possible to distinguish Califano

v~

It

Webster, however, on the

26.

basis that classifications on the basis of gender are subject to
less strict scrutiny than classifications on the basis of race.
See Bakke at 302.
support of

the

~

But your citation of Califano

Webster in

proposition that a governmental body must have

the capability and authority to establish in the record that a
classification is responsive to identified d iscr imi nation,
Bakke at 309,

see

suggests approval of the congressional action in

that case.
Assuming

that

the

action

of

the question becomes whether the minimum quantum of
present

in

·~

.

this

-

case.

A

a

above

violation,
is

of

the

illustrates

proof

proof

in

situations

l-

sufficient

Congress

constitutional

subsidiary

question

is

whether the proof must appear in legislative history or whether
courts may presume that Congress is acquainted with a field of

(
social activity.
The

C(.t

~

:J..

~-

legislative

~~·

opinion

knowledge

in

relies

.

t]

rests.
measure,

In finding
CA2

heavily

establishing

the enactment of section 103(f) (2)

fly
rrv ..... . ,_.. - remed1al
.
('\ J-1"- "

CA2

both

and the

a
the

presumption
purpose

factual

of

behind

basis upon

that Congress intended to adopt a

believed

that

it

is

"'enough that

rt h e

perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a
that'"

the

(quoting Katzenbach

~

section
Morgan,

remedied
384 U.S.

past

discrimination.

at 656.).

----

CA2 decided

that, given the comprehensive legislation enacted by Congress to
benefit

-----------------~----------'-------------------------------~
victims of past discrimination, it was difficult to

27.

imagine that Congress had any purpose other than to remedy past

----------------------

'------------'-~----~,
~
discrimination.
CA2 relied upon
the remarks of Representatives

_____,

Mitchell

and Conyers,

and

considered by Congress,
"that

Congress

statistical

evidence

not explicitly

to uphold the district judge's finding

acted

upon

evidence

sufficient

of

past

discrimination."
I
Katzenbach
\

Rights

Act

believe
~

that

Morgan.

of

1965

CA2

misunderstood

That case involved
which

provides

§

that

the

command

of

4(e) of the Voting
no

person

who

has

successfully completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rico shall be
denied the right to vote

in any stateside election because of

his inability to understand English.
step

process

determined

to

that

uphold
§

4 (e)

the
was

The Court engaged in a two

standard.

enacted

First,

under

section

the
5

Court
of

the

In determining whether Congress properly
Fourteenth Amendment.
,.
exercised
its powers
under section 5 of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court stated that it is enough that a court might
perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment
that its actions would move against unconstitutional activity.
384 U.S. at 652-56.

Second, the Court determined whether

§

4(e)

itself constituted a violation of equal protection by failing to
extend the protections of the Voting Rights Act to non-English
speaking
Court did

persons
not

not

educated

in

Puerto

apply strict scrutiny

Rican

schools.

The

because "the distinction

challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a

28.

reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the
exercise of the franchise." Applying the familiar principle that
reform may take place one step at a time,
the

classification

protection.

Id.

formed

at

by

356-57.

4(e)

§

Thus,

the Court held that

did

not

violate

the Katzenbach

equal

Court

first

concluded that Congress had the power to enact a classification,
then concluded that the classification was constitutional.
CA2 employed the standard appropriate for resolving the
first
the

issue, whether the Congress has power to act, to resolve

second

issue,

equal protection.

whether

the

congressional

action

violates

The first issue is not present in this case,

for no party has argued that Congress lacks the power to enact
section

103(f)(2).

violates
CA2

the

should

whether

The

sole

Constitution.
have

applied

Congress

issue
Even

is whether

under

traditional

intended

to

enact

that

Katzenbach,
standards

a

therefore,

to

remedial

enactment

determine

statute

and

whether prior discrimination existed in fact.
In

applying

the

rational

basis standard of review in

equal protection cases, this Court will uphold a classification
.......

7

-

--

if there is a conceivable basis upon which a legislature could

')

have acted

constitutionally.

u.s.

522,

test

demands

which
U.S.

530

( 1961).
a

Congress
314

more

(1977).

fI

~

Bowers, 358

But application of the strict scrutiny
searching

acted.

See Allied Stores

See

look

at

the

actual

generally Califano

v.

believe that this Court must

basis

Webster,

upon
4 30

focus on the

j

29.

~~~

,?L,~. ~~
~4~~~~---~
~h-.f.-w~~ ~ ..&-t_ ~k
~~
actual
between

basis

for

congressional

impermissible

..

conscious

remedies
....,

racial

lie

action,

else

preferences

completely

permissible

and

within

difference

the

the

abilities

litigants to imagine reasons for legislative action.
At the outset, however,

I believe that it is important

recognize

same

concept of

Congress

is

"recordness"

presumed

legislation.
remain

implicates

actions

These

mindful

appropriate

~
~orm

to

principles

of

the

to a

.

expertise

suggest

traditional

that

court.
field

in

a

the

Court

methods

that

should

Congress

operates. If, for example, Congress has legislated repeatedly in

--~-----------~---------------

one area of legislation,

J;
~

~
~-vtut

~·

obviates

-

the

reappears.

-

s~

to

legislative

congressional
materials

never

courts

extensive

~----------------debate

when

the

matter

I believe that courts should not look
history

of

the

particular

act

under

---------------~-------------------------Rather,
courts may examine the history of similar

review.

~~e

for

Consequently,

action.

that

~~congressional

~·

need

its members may form an expertise that

were

Courts
never

contained

not,
in

the

however,
record

examine
of

any

action, nor should they search for rationales that

mentione~he

can

should

review /\apply

halls of Congress.
the

'

'

strict

In this manner,

scrutiny

test

while

.~

30.

recognizing "the special competence of Congress to make findings
with regard to the effects of identified past discrimination and
its

discretionary

authority

to

take

appropriate

remedial

measures." Bakke at 302 n.41.

!:";~&)
vr

~~

~

103{f){2)

It

is

clear

that

the

sheds 1 it tle 1 igh t

Nonetheless,

legislative

on

history of

section

its purpose or factual

basis.

I~

there are some allusions to the difficulties that

minorites face competing in the construction industry, and there
is explicit recognition that only 1% of federal
enterprises.

-

contracts are

Moreover,

a

house

( l-~o F C,-., .. ,. •• ll6::; ¢; if:,....
~ t= ~ )t;PW:If>i;C <: )
over the years, there has developed a business system
which has traditionally excluded measureable minority
participation.
In the past more than the present, this
system of conducting business transactions overtly
precluded miniori ty input.
Currently, we more often
face a business system which is racially neutral on its
face, but because of past overt social and economic
discrimination is presently operating, in effect, tp
perpetuate these past inequities.
Minorities, until
recently have not participated to any measurable
extent, in our total business sytem generally, or in
the con~truction industry, in particular.
However,
inroads are now oe1ng %ade and minority contractros are
attempting to "break-into" a mode of doing things, a
system, with which they are empirically unfamiliar and
which is historically unfamiliar with them.
I

were
against minorities.

..

on

extensive

evidence

of

31.

Based

on

this

evidence

existing

solely

within

the

records of congressional action, I believe that this Court could
a

principled
in
in

.._....~-----------------

conclusion

--

order

to

that

remedy

past

--------""'C::

that

Congress

enacted

discrimination

section

against

----------'-----------------~------construction
industry, and that Congress

the

statutory

and

-

constitutional

violations

had

to the small percentage of federal contracts awarded
to minority contractors.

In sum,

I

believe that a

compelling

~ interest
-- state
........._.,_,., exists to remedy the continuing effects of past

...

B~

~

Justification of the 10%

L~

Set~Aside.

The second part of the strict scrutiny test employed in

-

Bakke demands that a racial

ac~ievement

of

the

I

~~stand

judicial

~1

cl~sification,be

compelling

review.

state

This

necessary to the

interest

requirement

in

was

order

to

applied

to

( ~ ·· .J&JStrike down the Davis program in spite of the compelling state

!_ '~v-

~-

~

~
~l
~

interest

in diversity of

student bodies.

Instead,

your Bakke

opinion held that a less restrictive means to achieve the same
end

was

available

.~~

~r-·

.

Accordingly,

the

Davis

program

could

not

a..~~~~~
~~/$#~~

A novel difficult

arises, however,~ the compelling

..........~~state interest sought to be advanced is the amelioration of past

.

~,discrimination.

According

to

your

Bakke

opinion

the

remedy

cannot stand unless it is necessary to the accomplishment of the
interest. At the same time, your opinion recognized the ability

32.

of

the

federal

courts

prejerence

as

remedies

violations.

Bakke at 301.

Franks ~ Bowman,
)

to

fashion

various

types
or

of

racial

statutory

for

constitutional

And,

as CA2 noted, your opinion in

424 U.S. 747, 794 (1976) emphasized that the

selection
of remedies ~1:.!,!1~ "is
.....
_-----...__-

a

balancing

process

left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to
the

sound

discretion of

Mcklenburg
courts

may

County,
not

u.s.

402

order

the

trial
1,

remedies
~

constitutional violation,

court."

25

(1971).

that

exceed

See

also

Swann

Although
the

Dayton v. Brinkman,

scope

v.

federal
of

the

433 U.S.

406

(1977); Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429

u.s.

990, 991

(Powell, J., concurring), their discretion has not

I

been limited solely to remedies that are the least restrictive
~-

~

means of redressing a constitutional or statutory violation.

A

serious tension arises if Congress can give district courts more
fexibility in remedying staututory or constitutional violations
then it can exercise itself.
Consideration
Congress
remedy

should have
as

does

a

of
at

separation

of

powers

suggests

least as much discretion to

federal

district

therefore, that the "necessary"

judge.

It

is

that

choose

a

possible,

test should only be applied to

compelling state interests other than remedy of a constitutional
or statutory violation.
appropriately

used

to

Thus, in Bakke the "necessary" test was
measure

the

validity

of

an

admissions

program designed to insure diversity of the student body.
~

Once

W{..;t- ~ ~...., ____, ~ « ~~...- ~ ~

~~ ~~--~~~ ~ "? (~t~?j

33.

a

constitutional or statutory violation has

been established,

however, some appropriate remedy is necessary, and the remaining
inquiry becomes simply whether, under normal judicial doctrine,
the chosen remedy is appropriate.
If
~

(

percent

~;; ~}o:;ld

the

"necessary"

set-aside

just

as

would

test

fail.

easily--:::t

is

As

a

applied,

the

program

use

of

petrs

note,

similar

to

set

goals

a

Congress

15

U. S.C.

·~· . ~~

637(d),

~

empl~yment of the soc~lly and economically disadvantaged.

~·

r

·~
~

which

instructs

It~

equitable.

a

The

t::..

~ ~knowledged

contractors

closer
set-aside

question
does

to

whether

serve

the

directly

!!:ft.t

the~

for

10%
to

ten

-~c

........

~~

~~

plan
remedy

difficulty for minority contractors--their lack

an

~

.n

I b -r-o

o~

minori t~
~
contractors enables them to build a track record that will al~
experience.

them

to

The

compete

assistance.

But

also be noted.
minimal,

insurance

in
the

of

the

certain

future

impact

on

contracts

without

non-minority

need

for

of

fed~

contractors

1-e.J-?

must

Although the impact on contractors generally is

the impact on any particular non-minority contractor,
_ ________
.....-----..,

...._. ......,. ..._..._.,---.

........ tw==

deprived of an opportunity to bid on a job without refere ce to

I

his race, may be substantial.

~

~

As you have noted,

imposition of

equitable remedies

~emands

innocent parties.

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424

recognition of the burdens placed on

u.s.

at 790.

,, .

34.

Your Bakke opinion cites a series of lower court cases
to illustrate th e type of racial preferences that have been used
to remedy identified race-based injuries.
02.

A review of

bounds of
upheld
.....__
remedy

these

remedial

the

cases offers

action.

imposition of

In

a

I

See 438 U.S. at 301-

insight

all

four

into

cases

the

circuit courts

conscious

--

uota"'" as

I

race

charted

hiring

-------~

for

past

discrimination.

See

Associated

General

Contractors of Massachusetts Inc; v; Altshuler, 490 F.2d
19 7 3 )

cer L

4 1 6 U• s .

den i e d

9 57

( 197 4 ) ;

Br i d g e port

v.

Gallagher,

452

F.2d

327

~ Cir.

9~

GWJr d ian s

Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 ~Cir.
Carter

a

1973);

1972)(en bane);

Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania

~

Labor, 442 F.2d 159 @ c i r . ) cert; denied 404

u.s.

Secretary of
854 (1971).

The Associated General Contractors case is particularly

I

interesting.

The First Circuit considered the constitutionality

of a state-imposed condition in certain building contracts that
-

contractors
population

"""""'\

--:?

working

___ __

employ
....
~

in

an

at
_...... least

area
20%

of

with

minority

a

large

workers.

minority
The

court

noted reasons to allow the use of racial criteria only where a
compelling need for remedial action can be shown:

(1) government

preferences may be inherently divisive and reinforce prejudice,
(2)

"benign" preferences may become malevolent preferences, and

(3)

racial

preference

for

one

minority

group

may

result

in

discrimination other minorities who are disproportionately overrepresented.

3 5.

The court found a compelling state interest to remedy
serious

imbalance

in

areas

where

were

minorities

underrepresented in the construction trades and where there was
a

long

history

compelling
chosen

must

of

state

interest,

the

-reasonably

Havinq

discrimination.
court

stated

that

found
the

a

means

related to the desired end.
In
....
particular, the court noted that hiring goals would be too high
...

be

racial

~--

if they could not be filled, or if they could be filled only by
hiring
given

unqualified
a

workers.

constitutionally

Largely

adequate

because

contractors were

opportunity

insuff iciE!nt minority workers were available,

to

show

that

the court upheld

the choice of a 20% quota.
~1

lt

four cases sugge.st ~at a race conscious remedy

c~

---

-

be imposed by the judiciary without use of the "necessar~' test,
.....
:
and all four support Congress' choice of a remedy in this case.
First, mathematics may be properly used as a starting point for
a

remedy.

Second,

See

the

Swann

choice

v~

of

a

Mecklenburg
ten

County,

percent

goal

402
is

u.s.

below

at

25.

the

17%

percent of minorites in our population. Third, section 103(f)(a)
expressly provides for a wavier of its requirement if sufficient
minority
that

contractors

10% of

federal

are

not

available.

contracts

under

Fourth,

a

guarentee

the Act go to minorities

will provide minority contractors with the practical experience
and

track record

experience

in

of

the

performance
bidding

that will

process,

to

allow them to gain
obtain

more

working

36.

capital,

and to be bonded.

Fifth,

the set-aside provision was

effective only for contracts let during a short period of time.
Thus, section 103(f) (2) does not threaten to become a permanent
preference and Congress has an ample opportunity to oversee the
effects of the program.
5.

ANALYSIS:

Title · VI.

Because

this

Court

has

held

that Title VI incorporates a constitutional standard, resolution
of the constitutional question is both necessary and conclusive
of this issue.
6.

10%

SUMMARY.

minority

The

set-aside

construction projects.

issue

in

an

is the constitutionality of a
Act

granting

funds

for

The set-aside is constitutional if it is

a proper means of serving a compelling state interest.

-----

asserted

state

interest

is

public

interest

le(t,timate,

is
but

When the

the redress of d iscr imina tion,
it must

also

be

substantial.

the
In
......

this case,

the 1nterest is substantial because (a) Congress is
c----an appropriate body to determine
that constitutional
and
statutory violations exist, and (b) the history of congressional
action

directed

demonstrates

at

that

discrimination.

the
minority

Th~emedy

of

eradication

is

contrastors

discrimination

Although

proper.

suffered

have
it

is

necessary to attainment of the compelling state interest,
remedy for past discrimination is proper.
of

remedial

cases

cited

in

Bakke,

not
some

Applying the analysis

choice

of

this

particular

remedy would be within the discretion of a lower federal
and thus is within the discretion of Congress.

judge,

)~

JS

11/26/79

SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Kreps

I. The Legislative Record
In my Bench Memorandum at 29-31,

I suggested that the

CA2 judgment should be upheld if sufficient evidence existed in
the history of congressional debate on PWEA and other measures
to

support

remedy

the

past

proposition
constitutional

that

the

set-aside was enacted

violations

affecting

to

minority

contractors. This Supplemental Bench Memorandum will sketch more
fully three specific areas of congressional action which support
the

belief

that minority

discriminatory action.

contractors

suffered

the

effects

of

2.

A.

Congressional

Oversight

of

the

Small

Business

Administration
When

Senator Brooke

introduced

the

Senate version of

the set-aside, he noted that the concept of set-asides had been
used

under

(SBA)

section

Act,

SBA may

8(a)

15 U.S.C.

enter

into

of

the

637(a).

§

Small

Business

Section 8(a)

contracts with

the

Administration

provides that the

federal

government

sub-contract them out to small-business concerns.
SBA

was

administering

enterprises.

That

section

term

was

8(a)

to

defined

aid

to

By 1972,

minority

include

and
the

business

the

minority

groups included with the PWEA set-aside.
The operation of section 8(a) was specifically reviewed
by congressional committees between 1975 and 1977. In 1975,

the

Subcommittee

the

Committee

on

on

SBA

Oversight

Small

Business

and

Minority

conducted

Enterprise

hearings

report reviewinq the operation of section 8(a).
of

the

must

hearings

pledge

remedial

issued

to

will

be

the

ideal

taken

of

to

assuring

guarentee

a

At the outset

Subcommittee Chairman Addabbo stated

ouselve

action

and

of

that

that

"we

effective

opportunities

for

full economic participation to those members of society who have
traditionally encountered impediments and obstacles to entering
the

mainstream

of

business

similar circumstances."
Subcommittee
Mitchell,

heard

the

H.R.

resulting
Rep.

No.

testimony

from

discrimination

94-468 at

of

sponsor of the PWEA set-aside,

1

(1975).

Representative

or
The

Parren

that both the federal

3.

government

and

private

industry

resisted

section 8(a).

And

United

Commission on Civil

States

minority groups

implementation

the Subcommittee considered a

were

having

Rights

difficulty

that

of

report of the
suggested

in obtaining

that

contracts

both at the federal and state level. See Minorities and Women as
Government

Contractors

(May

1975).

The

Subcommittee

heard

testimony from a series of other witnesses who stated that the
section
economic
H.R.

8(a)

No.

testimony,

The

had

partici?ation

Rep.

minority

program

the

94-468

been

of

minority

at

presumption must

was

After

concluded
"not

be made

in

business

11-16.

Subcommittee

participation

ineffective

the

that

result

increasinq

the

enterprises.

See

considering
the
of

low
random

this

level

of

chance.

that past discriminatory systems

have resulted in present economic inequities."

Id.

at 2.

The

Subcommittee stated that Congress had enacted remedial programs
designed to allow disadvantaged persons to participate "in the
business mainstream of our economy." Id.
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business
held

a

hearing

on

section

8(a).

Senator

Javits

noted

that

minority businesses received less than 1% of federal contracts,
and

that

section

8 (a)

was designed

minority business enterprises.

to

aid

the development of

Senator Javits stated that the

goal of that program was to ensure "equal opprtunity and access
for all citizens to our free enterprise system."
In

1977,

the

full

House

Committee

on

Small

Business

4.

reviewed the section 8(a) program. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977).
The

Committee

repeated

the

Subcommittee's conclusion

that

the

low percentage of business done by minority businesses was an
effect of societal discrimination.

Id.

at 124.

The Commit tee

further concluded that
over the years, there has developed a business system
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority
participation.
In the past more than the present, this
system of conducting business transactions overtly
precluded minority input.
Currently, we more often
enounter a business system which is racially neutral on
its face, but because of past overt social and economic
discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to
perpetuate these past inequities. Minorities, until
recently, have not participated to any measureable
extent in our total business system generally, or in
the construction industry in particular.
However,
inroads are now being made and minority contractors are
attempting to "break-into" a mode of doing things, a
system, with which they are empirically unfamiliar and
which is historically unfamiliar with them.
Id.
than

at 182-83.

This report was issued on January 3, 1977, less

two months

before

Representative

Mitchell

introduced

the

PWEA set-aside provision into the House.
B. The Railroad Revitalization Act
In his statement introducing the PWEA set-aside in the
Senate, Senator Brooke also referred to the use of the set-aside
concept under the Railroad Revitalization Act.

45 U.S.C.

~

803

prohibits discrimination in any activity funded by the Railroad
Revitalization Act, and 49 U.S.C.
Resource
contracts

Center
and

to
other

assist

~

1657a establishes a Minority

minority

business

businessmen

opportunities

to

related

obtain
to

the

maintenance and rehabilitiation of the nation's railroads.

In

5.

January,

1977,

the

regulations pursuant

Department
to §

803

of

that

Transportation

required

issued

contractors

under

the Railroad Revitalization Act to formulate affirmative action
programs to ensure that minority businesses would receive a fair
proportion of contractual opportunities. 42 Fed. Reg. 4290-91.
These

provisions

were

enacted

by

a

Congress

that

recognized the "established national policy, since at least the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to encourage and assist
in the development of minority business enterprise."
94-499

(Commerce Commitee),

Recognizing

that minorities

disadvantaged

persons,"

"encouragement

for

the

the

1976 U.S.

Cong.

Ad.

&

s.

Rep. No

News at 58.

included "socially or economically
Commerce

Committee

concluded

that

participation of minority business was

appropriate." Id. at 58-59.
C. Congressional Review of the Philadelphia Plan
In

1969,

the

Department

of

Labor

promulgated

Philadelphia Plan pursuant to Executive Order No.

the

11246, which

required that all federal contractors take affirmative action to
ensure

that

applicants

for

discrimination against on
sex or national origin.
exclusionary

practices

employment

the basis of

and

employees

race,

color,

were

not

religion,

The Philadelphia Plan ordered that past
towards

minorities

be

remedied

by

the

implementation of specific hiring goals by federal contractors.
Later that year,

the Senate passed an amendment to an

appropriations bill that would have had the effect of overruling

6.

the

Philadelphia

Plan.

After

the

House

refused

to

accept

the

amendment, 115 Cong. Rec. 40921, the Senate voted to recede from
its

position.

debate,

115

several

Cong.

Rec.

Senators

40749.

In

supported

the

course

implementation

of

that

of

the

Philadelphia Plan as necessary to ensure equal opportunity. See
115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (Sen. Scott); id. at 40741

(Sen. Griffith):

id. at 40744 (Sen. Bayh). Senator Percy argued that the Plan was
needed

to

redress

construction
following

industry,

the

"exceptionally
construction

discrimination
115

Senate

vote,

blatant"

trades

Cong.

and

against

Rec.

at

blacks

40742-43.
Kennedy

Senator

commended

the

Senate • s

the

The

day
the

noted

discrimination

racial

in

the

in

decision

that

"the Philadephia Plan should be a useful and necessary tool for
insuring

equitable

employment

of

minorities."

115

Cong.

Rec.

41072.
D. Conclusion
I believe that these three areas of legislative action
considered by themselves and in conjunction with the broad antidiscrimination legislation of the past two decades demonstrates
that Congress had
contractors

were

discrimination.
program

sufficient

focused

suffering

The
on

reason to conclude that minority
the

congressional
the

business

enterprises,

minority

contractors.

effects

and
In

noted
the

of

continued
review of

the

discrimination

the

specific

Railroad

effects

of

section

B(a)

on minority

difficulties

Revitalization

of

Act,

7.

Congress moved expressly to remedy past discrimination against
minority businesses.

And in rejecting efforts to overturn the

Philadephia

Conqress

Plan,

discrimination
believe

that

"findings"

in
the

the

recognized

construction

the

industry.

legacy

Accordingly,

of
I

history of congressional action supplies the

necessary to uphold the PWEA set-aside as a remedy

for past discrimination.
II. Petitioners' Reply Briefs.
Petrs have filed reply briefs that add little to their
opening

statements.

Contractors of

In

New York

its
State

brief,
argue

the
that

General
Congress

Building
lacks

the

power under the Fourteenth Amendment or Article I to enact the
set-aside.

Because

this

argument

is

based

solely

upon

the

contention that the set-aside is not a proper remedial measure,
petr's

contention

constitutional issue.

is

answered

by

resolution

of

the
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Date:

To:

Jon

From:

L. F. P. , Jr.

No. 78-1007

January 28, 1980

Fullilove v. Kreps

I have now reviewed with care the January 18 draft
of a concurring opinion.

It is an excellent working draft.

Although I have not reread Bakke, I believe the draft
conforms in structure and basic analysis with my Bakke
opinion.

In addition, you have developed some helpful

supplemental analysis.
As you will see, I have done a good deal of editing
that should be considered in preparing the next draft.
will now comment briefly on the various Parts.
I have rewritten, as Rider A, the introductory
paragraph.

Part I

(pp. 2-5)
This is excellent, and summarizes the basic

analysis as follows:
1.

Racial classification is invalid unless

necessary to serve a compelling interest.

I

2.

2.

Government has a compelling interest in

ameliorating the effect of ' identified discrimination.
3.

Such discrimination must be established by

judicial, administrative or legislative findings.

A

legislative interst is not compelling absent such a finding.
4.

Thus, two requirements must be met to insure

that the interst is compelling:

(i) the governmental body

must be authorized to make findings, and (ii) appropriate
findings must be made.
5.

The means selected must be reasonably necessary

to fulfill the governmental purpose.

Apart from my editing, I think Part I is in good
shape.

Part II (pp. 5-19)
Sub-Part A (pp. 5-8) makes clear that Congress is a
competent body, and appropriately emphasizes the Civil War
amendments (p. 7).
Sub-Part B (pp. 9-13) meets the argument that we
may not look beyond the specific legislative history of thP.
Public Works Act.

But the draft over-argues this point, at

l e ast unless it is emphasized effectively in the dissenting
opinion.

I view the argument as almost frivolous with

3•

respect to Congressional action.

Accordingly, at least until

we see the dissent, I would end Sub-Part B at the bottom of
page 10.

The points made on pages 11-13 could be left out

entirel y , o r summarized and added to footnotes.
Sub-Part C (pp. 13-19).

Here, the draft lays out

the legislative history in a most persuasive manner.

YP.t, I

think we can be reasonably confident that the Chief Justice's
opinion will do pretty much the same thing.

The SG's brief,

and other documentation, afford substantial guidance.

I will

not wish to duplicate the Chief's opinion in this respect if
it is reasonably adequate.
Therefore, I suggest that you redraft Sub-Part

c

stating that the opinion of the Court (or by the Chief
Justice) establishes convincingly that Congress, after
extensive consideration, concluded that private and
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible
percentage of public contracts that were awarded minority
contractors.

Then include a paragraph that effects a

transition from Part II to Part III.

Much of the language

you now have from the middle of page 18 to the top of page 19
will be useful in this respect.
As a precaution, I suggest that we prepare
Sub-Part C for use as an Appendix to my opinion.

If the

opinion of the CJ should not be entirely adequate on the

4.

legislative history and findings, I had rather deal with this
in detail in an Appendix than interrupt the textual flow of
my opinion.

We should go ahead and have the Appendix printed

in Chambers Draft form to have it available if needed.

Part III (pp. 19-27)
Generally, and subject to my editing, I think this
is close to being satisfactory.

In this Part, having found

that Congress established a compelling interest, we address
the

n~xt

inquiry:

whether the 10% set aside is a necessary

means of furthering that interest.

Part IV
The essence of IV is satisfactory, but I hope that
between the five of us we can make this an eloquent ending.

*

*

*

I emphasize, Jon, the importance of consistency and
precision in the language used in describing the various
elements of our analysis.

To the extent feasible, we should

use the same language of my Bakke opinion - although refining
it, where necessary, is desirable.
We also need a footnote dealing with the sticky
problem of Chinese and other "minorities" being bracketed

5.

indiscriminately with Negroes.
Finally, I would like to cite a few of the better
Law Review articles.
This case will be one of the most important the
Court has handed down in years.

It is desirable, therefore,

for all five of us in our Chambers to consider with care both
the substance and form of my concurrence.

In doing so, we

must also think in terms of an analysis that can be applied
consistently in future cases.

L. F. P. , Jr.
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78Al887 · Fullilove · v; · Kreps
(Pre-Conference Notes)
On basis of my Bakke opinion, I analyze this case
as follows:
The 10% set-aside is a racial classification. It is,
therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.

To survive strict

scrutiny, the set-aside must (i) serve a legitimate and
substantial state interest and (ii) must be necessary to
further that state interest.
The federal government has a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating or eliminating the
effects of identifiable racial discrimination. Thus to
establish a substantial (or compelling) state interest,
Congress must have acted upon reasonably clear evidence that
the groups to be benefited have, in fact, suffered
discrimination.

In short, there must be a showing of a

constitutional violation.
In deciding whether Congress has presented a
sufficient record to support its finding of racial
discrimination, we must take into account the nature of
congressional action.

Unlike a court or administrative body,

Congress does not require explicit findings in order to enact

2.

legislation. Therefore, it is proper to look to the
legislative history of congressional actions other than
enactment of the set-aside.

And Congress has specific

constitutional power to enforce the guarentees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, Congress is permitted
more leeway to generalize than other governmental bodies.
Although Congress could have made a more explicit record of
its finding of discimination, I conclude that the record of
congressional action viewed as a whole is adequate.
The question remains whether the 10% set-aside is
necessary to further the state interest.

Courts owe great

deference to congressional judgment as to the necessity of a
particular remedy. On this record, we should accept the
judgment of Congress that the set-aside is necessary.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHA M BER S OF

JUST I C E P OTT E R ST EWART

June 2, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klut znick

Dear Chief,
I shall in due course circulate a
dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours,
(

) .. ' .>'

,/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

' -

j5u.pumt QJtturi ttf tlrt ~~ j5taftg
~agfringtlttt.

!9. (!):.

2ilbi~~

CHAMBERS O F

THE C HI EF JU S TI CE

June 5, 1980
Personal

Re:

No. 78-1007 -

Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Lewis:
I have your memo re the above.
Would it not be better to try for a "united front" instead
of a cluster of concurring opinions -- a practice of which I
increasingly receive complaints from judges all over the
country!
With all deference to your right to express views
separately in any way you wish, may I suggest that we may
accomplish a good deal by exchange of memos -- one-on-one
rather than by concurring opinions which tend to get people
"locked in"? After consultation on the points of your concern,
I may well be able to embrace them !
R,e gards,

I

Mr. Justice Powell

...._...
.§u:prcmt Qfaurl of t.q t ~~ ;§taf.tg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 2, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Chief,
I shall in due course circulate a
dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.

f

J;u.pumt ~auri ltf tlrt~~ J;tzdtg
~aglfingtatt. ~ .

<!J.

2!1~'!~

CHAM B ERS OF"

THE CH I EF JUST I CE

June 5, 1980
Personal

Re:

No. 78-1007 -

Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Lewis:
I have your memo re the above.
would it not be better to try for a "united front" instead
of a cluster of concurring opinions -- a practice of which I
increasingly receive complaints from judges all over the
country!
With all deference to your right to express views
separately in any way you wish, may I suggest that we may
accomplish a good deal by exchange of memos -- one-on-one
rather than by concurring opinions which tend to get people
"locked in"? After consultation on the points of your concern,
I may well be able to embrace them !
R,e gards,

I

Mr. Justice Powell

.

'

Re: No. 78-1007 - FullilovG v. Klutznick
Dear Chief:
We have had an opportunity to give a preliminary reading ~o
your careful opinion in this case. We are troubled that the
opinion does not explicitly identify what we think you agree
are the two major questions to be decided. The first is
whether Congress has the enumerated or implied power to enact
the cemedial statute in question. Your opinion fully answers
this question by finding congressional authority in the
Spending Power and in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
agree. Since Congress has general authority to enact the
.,
statute, the crucial question then becomes whether the
enactment is nonetheless unlawful under any constitutional
prohibition. In this case, of course, petitioners argue tha
the statute violates equal protection.

tr j )

We agree with the opinion's implicit recognition that
remedying the present effects of prior discrimination is an
important governmental interest that would justify the limited
and carefully tailored use of racial or ethnic criteria to
accomplish that objective. But we think that the opinion
should make this more explicit. What we find especially
troubling is the absence of any express declaration that the
' enumerated powers of Congress, · such as the Spending Power, are
nonetheless limited by the prohibitions of the equal protGcti n
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
These views are certainly implicit in your present draft;
therefore, no major revisions would be necessary to satisfy our
fundamental concerns. For example, much of our difficulty
could be taken care of by deleting the sentence following the
quote from Justice Jackson on the ninth line of the first full
paragraph of page 28, and substituting the following:
"At the same time, Congress may employ racial or ethnic
classifications in exercising its Spending Power or its
enforcement authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
only if those classifications do not violate the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. We recognize the need for careful judicial
inquiry to assure that governmental programs that employ
racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the important
objective of remedying past discrimination must be narrowly
ta1lored to the achievement of that goal."

/

-2-

There are other parts of the opinion that also concern us.
For example, in order to avoid any implication that the
Spending Power is not subject to constitutional restraints, we
suggest (1) on page 22, lines 7-8, deleting the phrase "ple nar y
within its sphere and"; and (2) on page 23, deleting the first
sentence of th e first full paragraph. In addition, bec a use we
are troubled by reference to the MBE provision as an
"experimental project," we suggest (1) on page 34, line 20,
deleting the word "experimental"; and (2) on page 37, changing
lines 8-16 to read as follows:
"the congressional judgment that this limited program is a
necessary step to effectuat e the mand a te for equality of
economic opportunity. The MBE program is limited in extent
. and duration; this relatively short-t e rm remedial measure
will be . . . • "
It may be that after giving the opinion a more
reading, other aspects of the draft will prove
troublesome. At present, however, the failure to include
explicit mention of the equal protection problem is the major
obstacle to our joining the opinion. If you can make the
chunges that would permit us to join, we will be happy to do
so, although perhaps adding a few words of our own.
comp~ehensive

Sincerely,

WJB, Jr.

TM

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

June 5, 1980
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik
Dear Chief:
At Conference I said that I would apply my Bakke
analysis to this case.

Accordingly, I have prepared a

p .,·--~-6-4.(

concurring opinion thatAwill ~e circulated Friday or Monday.
~this

poi~

peroeiwe tAe

~ame

flew

ifi~our

opinion t:ft.ii.t is notee in the Jetter from Bill aud 'f'hur€fooa_____

$at;'~#-~~~

('(,R'Bvi w of this case involves two distinct inquiries: (i) Does
Congress have the authority to enact§ 103(f)(2), and (ii) Do
the terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the eaual protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. You have answered the first
q~estion

fully. But

9 ~

lr4o~e~l~rn·e~~~·e~~~fi~~

l-td,
the second

4A-/ ~
question~

~~
~.~~- . t::2..L~~ II'~ ~
be a9gx:es.se..c3 expl.ig.l.tl~
u-~J

~§ 103(f)(2)

·· ·

~~~.H )'fJ._;

c

lA/

equal protection# tAer

~ ;c

t

4a

~

,

prop~f -;t~ndard ~f reviewl:~eiAe re- ~ eete. elisb~d. Perhaps
f\~'t

~~

you are now content ;~t'o accept / the intermediate standard of
p

i

·r

.!

. .~,,,..--.- """

review for rae i¥1 class if iccyt ions suggested by Bi_!l,..•-a'ri'Cl
I
l
,,,.,.,.

/"

,.,,.P

~

Thurgood in /~akke. Of cour$e, adoption...,,c •'f' this standard would

I .l"'

~

,.,_ _ ___.,........,..., / '

allow aJ,/1 qovernmental bodies, not just Congress, to impose
I.

/

rac~al

./

/
quotas without strict scrutiny.
My own view is that strict scrutiny must be applied

to all racial_

c~a-ss,:-fi_c_a:ions: _ That

is

J

a racial

.trr"''"'"o<
dl<'f'~"*"'

c1assification is constitutional only if it is a permissible
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case,
' "'
the legislative history behind§ 103(f)(2), as explained in

your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in
redressing the continuing effects of discrimination. I regard
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment as oiving Congress the power to choose an eouitable

I

•.

'>

)

3.

~~~... ,.J

d'1scr1mlnat1on.
I .
.
.
and reasonably necessary means of re d ress1ng

""

In this case, I believe that the set-aside does pass
constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my conclusion that

~J,~o~~-~t.·~

ongre~.s. has be~n special powers to fiqht'\discrimination, my

opinion in this case

WJ<-;,J..-~rl..
~

not give all governmental bodies a

"+ ~'if

,J:;

carte blanche to estjrblish racial classifications.

(

~ recogn~ze that

this case

k~

~~is~i!difflc'~lt

I f' hope to be able to join as much of your opinion as

,

possible. This is certainly a case in which the Court

w~:

pe well served by a united front. Of course, I have not

r c~O

spoken with either Harry or Byron, so I do not know what view
1

- _-

~

......

\they would adopt.
\

--·

Sincerely,

I
,

June 5, 1980
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik
Dear Chief:
At Conference I said that I would apply my Bakke
analysis to this case.

Accordingly, I have prepared a

concurring opinion that probably will be circulated Friday or
Monday.
I write now primarily because of the memorandum to
you from Bill Brennan and Thurgood. I aqree that review of
this case involves two distinct inquiries:

(i) Does Conqress

have the authority to enact§ 103(f)(2), and (ii) Do the
terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment. You have answered the first question
fully. But I view the second question as the critical issue
in this case. Although you answer it qenerally, I would think
it necessary to address the question in terms of established

2.
equal protection analysis.
The

fir~t

step in this analysis is identification

of the proper standard of review.
racial classification.

and

§

103(f)(2) establishes a

Prior to Bakke, I had understood -

I~ read all of the prior decisio~hat the

appropriate standard for a racial classification is strict
scrutiny.

In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the

constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered
to strict scrutiny analysis.
Although not so characterized, it is my view that
the opinion joined by Bill and Thurgood in Bakke essentially
applied the intermediate standard that Thurgood had ur9ed in
his dissent in Rodriguez.

Although I respect their views, I

could not agree with them in Bakke and do not now.

Apart

from turning our back on prior precedents establishing strict
scrutiny as the proper standard for review of racial

3.
classifications, see

-

!E

~Griffiths,

(1973); Loving v. Virqinia,
388
.

~Florida,

u.s.

413
1, 11

u.s.

717, 721-722

(1967); McLauqhlin

379 U.S. 184, 1'9f! (1964), the intermediate

standard inevitably becomes a subjective judgment. In any
event, there have never been five votes (to my knowledge) for
an intermediate standard where the classification is racial.
What concerns me most is that adoption of this
standard presumably would allow all governmental bodies
(including state universi~ies), not just Conqress, to impose
racial quotas without strict scrutiny.
As my concurring opinion will say, a racial
classification is constitutional only if it is a permissible
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case,
the legislative history behind§ 103(f)(2), as explained in
your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in
redressing the continuing effects of discrimination. I regard

..f'

f

'

:

4.
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment as giving Congress the power to choose an equitable
and reasonably necessary means of redressing identified
discrimination. In this case , I believe that the set-aside
does pass constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my
conclusion that Congress has been granted special powers to
fight racial discrimination, my opinion iA Lhi z: eas-e would
not give all governmental bodies a carte blanche to
estasblish racial classifications of any kind.
As my opinion may not be circulated before you
reply to Bill and Thurgood, I want you to know terms - the substance of my views .
Conference.

in general

I voted with you at

But I stated the basis for my vote as

requirin~

J.M_~~~~ M4-~~~
~the

classical standard -.ppli&Q

e.,

"&&:l~eieioll~

to

~

A

liiii. eerimil"let4e~

on ra.ce. Still, I hope to be

able to join as much of your opinion as possible. Tb4e is

s.
/
C<:S)ettainly
a case in which t:fte-Cour.t
I

/;:m<rted front-;
Sincerely,

lfp/ss

6/5/80

Fullilove letter (Rider 3)

As perhaps my opinion will not be circulated before
you reply to Bill and Thurgood, I want you to know ~~
general terms - the substance of my Btlbstance.

you at Conference.

in

I voted with

But I stated the basis for my vote as

requiring the classical standard applied by our decisions to
discriminations based solely on race.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss

6/5/80

Fullilove Letter (rider A, P. 2)

In this analysis - as we all agree - the first step
is identification of the proper standard of review.
dealing here with a racial classification.

We are

Prior to Bakke, I

had understood - and I so read all of the prior decisions the appropriate standard for a racial classification is
strict scrutiny.

In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the

constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered
to strict scrutiny analysis.
Although nJ-so characterized, it is my view - and I
believe also the view of many commentators - that the opinion
joined by Bill and Thurgood applied in essence the
intermediate sta.ndard tha.t Thurgood had urqed in his dissent
in Rodri~~

~~

~!though

I respect their views, I could not agree

with them in Bakke and do not now.

Apart from turninq our

2.

back on prior ?recedents (here, Jon, cite the cases we rely

a-

'few-

,

on), the intermediate standard inevitably becomes more ef a
subjective judgment thal'l" '1iG".;'m\al bcis?~f' m: "strict
scrutiny".

In any event, there have never been five votes

(to my knowledge) for an intermediate standard where the
classification is racial.
What concerns me most is that adoption of this

~

{ lA•4~uJI44"-f ~/.,

standard would allow all qovernmental bodiesA not J'ust

i\

---

,,

.

Congress, to impose racial auotas without strict scrutiny.

June 5, 1980
78-1007, Fullilove
Dear Chief,:
At Conference I said that I would apply my Pa~k~
analysis to this case. Accordingly, I have prepared a
concurring opinion that probably will be circulated Friday or
Monday.
I write now primarily because of the memorandu~ to
you from Bill Brennan and Thurgood. I aqree that review of
this case involves two distinct inquiries: (i) Does Conqress
have the authority to enact f> 103(f)(2), and {ii) Do the
terms of§ 103(f)(2) violate the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amend~ent. You have answered the first auestion
fully. But I view the second question as the critical issue
in this case. Although you answer it generally, I would think
it necessary to address the question in terms of establi~hed
equal protection analysis.
The first step in equal protection analysis is
identification of the proper standard of review. ~ 103(f)(2)
establishes a racial classification. Prior to Bakke, I had
understood - and I read all of the prior decisions to say that the appropriate standard for a racial classification is
strict scrutiny. In Bakke, of the five of us who reached the ,.
constitutional question, I was the only Justice who adhered
to strict scrutiny analysis.
Althouqh not so characterized, it is my view that
the opinion joined by Bill and Thurgood in Bakke essentially
applied the intermediate standard that Thurqood had urged in
his dissent in Rodriguez. Although I respect their views, I
could not agree with the~ in Bakke and do not now. I believe
that our prior precedents establish strict scrutiny as the
proper standard for review of racial clessifications. See In
re Griffiths, 413 u.s. 717, 721-722 (1973h Lovinq v.
Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967)J Mci.auqhlin v. FlorTaa, 379
u.s. 184, 192 (1964). In any event, t~ere have never been
five votes (to my knowledge) for application of an

r.

,:
I

!

2.

intermediate standard where the classification is racial.
What concerns me most is that adoption of this
standard presumably would allow all qovernmental bodies
(including state universities), not just, Conqress, to impose
racial quotas without strict scrutiny.
As my concurrina opinion will say, a racial
classification is constitutional only if it is a permissible
means to achieve a compelling state interest. In this case,
the legislative history behindS 103(f)(2), as explained in
your opinion, establishes the compelling state interest in
redressinq the continuing effects of discrimination. I reqard
the enforcement clauses of the ~hirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment as qiving Conqress the power t.o choose an eauit,able
and reasonably necessary means of redressina identified
discrimination. In this case, I believe that the set-aside
does pass constitutional scrutiny. But, because of my
conclusi.on that Conqr~ss has been qranted special powers to
fiaht racial dincrimination, my opinion would not qive all
aovernrnental bodies a carte blanche to establish racial
classifications on the basis of an intermediate standard of
review ••
I do not read your draft as intending to qo so far.
But as my opinion ~ay not be circulated b~fore you reply to
Bill and Thurqood, r want you to know - in a~neral terms the substance of mv views. I voted with you at Conference.
But I stated the basis for my vote as reauirinq, in
accordance with preced~nt, that we apply the classical
standard to this classification based solely on race. ~till,
I hope to be able to 1oin as much of your opinion as
possible.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

~

,,

'·,

.§utrrrntt <!fou:rl of t~t ~niftb ~taft5
~asfrbtgton. ~.

C!J. 2D.?J!.$

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 6, 1980

Re:

78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Bill and Thurgood:
I do not consider the points you raise as
presenting any insoluble problems.

However, I will

wait other reactions before spending more time on
this case.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmu~
Mr. Justice Powell~

.:§u.prttttr <!Jmtrlllf u1t

1JUtilib jstltftg

'JllliUl frin gtcn, ~. QJ.

2 0 ~.)! .;J

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 9, 1980

Re:

/

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I will defer response to the several memos until the "dust
settles."
't

I do not share the passion expressed by some for stating
"tests." The test is the Constitution. Harry once observed,
accurately, that tests are often announced by us to fit the
result reached in a given case!
More later.
Regards,

I

.;§u:p-rtmt <!Jo-u:rlo-f tlrt ~ j;tlrlt.s'
~fringtttn, ~.

<q.

20'bl~~

CHAMBERS 0 F"

June 9, 1980

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Chief,
I would favor changes in your circulating draft along the lines suggested
by Bill and Thurgood.

I hope not to

write separately.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
erne

,1• 1

.i'~tnu (!fottd

d tl}t' ~tti.U~ j;tattg

Jhti\~ott, ~. QJ. 211~~$
CHAMBERS OF

/
June 9, 1990

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

D ar Cl ief:

have now ha_d an oppn;:' un: ty ,~o ha:.:"'l lilY firot re dh~g of
propose opi.ni.on aG circuJat:.ed .fn printtJ'1 form on. .•_ay o . .
1
!'hia i'":' a c·re.Lct and det.a .U .od opinitHlr ani!, <:.'lbviousJy, you,
I

y~1ur

attempt b.>
~:hn.:.

~1alk

car<.tfully hat.wecn the opposing cotu;lch:raticmt-:t

are suomitt(';d to us hy tho partic:s.

In line it. 1hat I a~;a 1mo is the !;;Ugge~;t · ~n cont:ai~!!Hl in
y. :r: note of June <• to f~ill .... r.nna antl T 1·urgoi.J~1, I gl·ve yr)u
th fe-1 llow g s ~· t: c .. 'ons:
I am som~w 1 ... t hCJl.lblod by hat st::~;•. ~3 t.c t Q :to bf~ t.he
J n the ~;,pill. on of any emmc i.atior: of •. o ~anrard o!
r. ~., hlW to ~ c app'U.n1 tf-l- ~n;-m ~r,;'i.ial r ttCHl1 quota ... r ~v~n t.houg:1 of
a: .U.mlt(~d k.lntl SliC.h e~~ ic 1?t$sont in this cace, endct~d b~·
Cong-res:s.
! l·hit"!lt H<~ Cli:H1t:.('"' ercape the fact that this ts a
quat~
case ,o rar ~a i t go~s, alt1ough, as your orinton

L.

'tl)scm e

thee.

·tr sees,

are

llmi_s

a~d

· at .rial prop'- se by '.JB ar,!('1
age ~f the· r let~,. :.r of ~Tur-e

.~,'t-1
r.:

~xccptionc.

Ne

sug~astcl

a . th
bot•·om of th
• ire.t
dor:_a attc pt to .nuncit.te a

"'tanaar •
2. 1 am not. bl , as you appar .. ntly at·e, b;-. a. void , nd fa l.l
to cite the B:lk · e case. l CAi"~ v~otc +:<::) af f 11· in 'E\tl11J..ove t:.Hi
t 1e ground "tn.a:r- the cbaJ.J.·e nged t;>to·gr!:U!l passes -1he~-·t:est I
ru: o po s ~(~ l n §!.!:d~n.
gem:xa'l agree ont wii:h oth~r c<::-mrnente Bill
urgood hav · mt
i.n thnJ.r joint lr:!tt £ of Jtlfl- 5.
y ngreemen· , f cc 1-: ~~ 1 is ot ..,.urpr ~sing bc~:au ,£> o · the fact,
that ! was wit! t' c. an<i By!: on in t e jo nt O! ir ion in ?a_s._

_.
r ·nna.

Je~i

I

~u1d

m in
-!

,ning at page 324 of 4 B

u.s.

Sln.c·~re l

<1(~

:

'f.l;:; • JJSticc Brer"tniw
.r: • Justic ·. Ihi ... e
.lr • JU .ticc ti rsha:. "!
Mr. Juotice Po e1 /

y.

I

~

I
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6/10/80

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik

Richard

Friedman,

the

Chief's

clerk

on

this

case,

called this morning to "reassure" me that the Chief would take
no further action until he sees your concurrence. I told Richard
that

your

views

would

be

entitled a "Memorandum"

circulated

in

a

day or

so,

and

be

in deference to the Chief's reauest. I

said that you may wish to show a

copy to the Chief prior to

general circulation.
Richard

says

that

major overhaul his opinion,

the
but

Chief

is

that he

not
will

going

to make

redraft

a

several

paragraphs. He will not, however, put a "test" in the opinion.

His hope is that, by avoiding labels, he can get everyone on the
opinion. The impression I
1 ike

to get your

vote,

received

is that he would very much

presumably so

that he can demonstrate

broad-based support.
As near as I can tell, the Chief's hope is to speak for
everyone by saying nothing. This is unlikely to be successful,
but

I

do

think

that

you

should

at

modifications before you state your
opinion.

least

wait

to

unwillingness

to

see

his

join his

At least so lonq as you have not voted definitively,

the Chief will apparently fight off the Brennan bloc's attempt
to

characterize

his

opinion as

an

approach. This would be a good thing.

affirmation of

their Bakke

June 11, 19AO
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik
PERSONAL
Dear Chief:
Enclosed is a memorandum of my views in this case.
As I indicated in my letter of June sixth, I
in accord with

mv

h~ve

applied

Conference vote - the principles of my

Bakke opjnion to the facts of this case.
It is settled by our cases that racial
classifications should be judged under strict scrutiny
analysis
(seep.
..

-

multi-tier model of

, memo).
equ~l

Since the formulation of a

protection, racial classifications

uniformly have been judged under this most searching standard
of iudicial review. This review is appropriate because of the
strong constitutional presumption aqainst the use of racial

•.'

2.
classifications. Where the prohability of illicit
classification i.s less, as in review of strictly economic
requlation, the Court has adopted the far less searchino
"rational basis" standard of review. See !..!.S.:.r McGowan v.
Maryland, 366
Boren, 429

u.s.

u.s.

concurrino).

420, 425-426 (1961 ).

S~e ~'

Craio v.

190, 210-211 n.* (1976)(Powell, J.,

Apart from the foreoqoino, I know of no

analytical framework for iudqinq equal protection cases.
I vlew it as

es~ential

to have such a frarne\o7ork.

If

this Court could decide every eaual protection case brouqht
in the federal system, perhaps we could rely simply on our
overall judqment as to when a clarification is fair.

I miqht

be inclined to aqree. But the value of carefully formulated
standards of review lies in the quidance they offer to
federal and state iudqes who are required to apply our
constitutional precedents. Fy emphaeizinq the

he~vy

burden

3.

that a government must bear to demonstrate the leqitimacv of
a racial classification, this Court can insure that racial
distinctions, so odious to a free society, are not casually
imposed upon our citizens.
I do not think I can join a Court opinion that
endorses - or can be read reasonahly t.o endorse - some
intermediate level of scrutiny for racial classifications.
This is where I departed analytically from the "Brennan
aroup" view in Bakke.

For me at least, this is not a

semantic distinction.

Unless I misconceive the "Brennan

qroup's" view as expressed and applied in their several Bakke
opinions, it is some aeneral intermediate standard similar to
that applied in sex discrimination cases.

I recognize -

indeed admire - their qenuine concern to compensate for the
ill effects of past discrimination.

I simply disagree as to

the proper constitutional standard, and the showina it will

'

~

.

4.

reauire to 1ustifv

preferenti~l

treatment in our

societv.Pressures for preferences can come from

~

aroup.

Indeed, the very statute before us in this case includes
orientals - many of whom have enjoyed fantastic success in
competition with all other seaments of our uniouely
pluralistic society.

I find it difficult to accord them

preferential treatment.

r appreciate vour willinaness to trv to meet
sugaestions for chanaes in your opinion.
fine to have a full Court opinion.
conscience

ab~ndon

It would indeed be

Yet, I cannot in qood

an analvtical aPproach that I view as

reauired by our prior precedents, and as essential to
preserve the essence of the American ideal of eauality before
the law.
I will, of course, await your final chanqes before
makina a decision as to what I can join in your opinion.

In

5.

view, however, of the lateness of the hour, I am inclined to
go ahead and

circulat~

my memorandum so that other members of

the Court - includinq perhaps the Brothers from whom we have
not heard - will have it before them.

Sincerely,

June 11, 1980
No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznik
PERSONAL
Dear Chief:
Enclosed is a memorandum of my views in this case.
As I indicated in my letter of June 6, I have applied - in
accord with my Conference vot~ - the principles of my Bakke
opinion to the facts of this case.
It is settled by our cases that racial
classifications should be iudged under strict scrutiny
analysis (se~ p. 2-3,13, memo). Since the formulation of a
multi-tiPr model of equal protection, racial classifications
uniformly have been iudqed under this most searchinq standard
of judicial review. This review is appropriate because of the
strong constitutional presumption aaainst the use of racial
classifications. Where the probabil it.v of illicit
classification iR less, as in review of strictly economic
regulation, the Court has adopted the far less searchinq
"rational basis" standard of review. See e.q., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 u.s. 420, 425-426 (1961). Ai11Tl-defined level
of scrutiny has been applied in some of our sex
discrimination cases. See e.q., Craia v. Boren, 429 u.s.
190, 210-211 n.* (1976)(Poweif; J., concurring). Apart from
the foregoing, I know of no analytical framework for judqing
equal protection cases. --

">

I view it as essential to have such a framework. If
this Court could decide every equal protection case brouaht
in the federal system, perhaps we could rely simply on our
overall judgment as to when a classification is fair. But the
value of carefully formulated standards of review lies in the
guidance they offer to federal and state judqes who are
reauired to apply our constitutional precedents. By
emphasizing the heavy burden that a qovernment must bear to
demonstrate the legitimacy of a racial classification, this

..

'·

2.

Court can insure that racial distinctions, so odious to a
free society, are not casually imposed upon our citizens.
I do not think I can join a Court opinion that
endorses - or can be read reasonably to endorse - some
intermediate level of scrutiny for racial classifications.
This is where I departed analyt.ical ly from the "Brennan
group" view in Bakke. For me at least, this is not a
semantic distinction. Unless I misconceive the "Brennan
group's" view as expressed and applied in their several Bakke
opinions, it is some qeneral intermediate standard similar to
that applied in sex discrimination cases. I recognize indeed admire - their genuine concern to compensate for the
ill effects of past discrimination. I simply diPaqree as to
t~e proper constitutional standard, and the showing it will
reauire to justify preferential treatment in our society.

~·

:;...,,,

I appreciate your willinqness to try to meet
suggestions for chanqes in your opinion.
It would indeed be
fine to have a full Court opinion. Yet, I cannot in aood
conscience abandon an analytical approach that I view as
reauired by our prior precedents, and as essential to
preserve the essence of the ~merica~ ideal of eauality before
the law.

~

..
.!

'

I will, of course, await vour final changes before
makina a decision as to what I can join in your opinion. In
view, however, of the latPness of the hour, I am inclined to
go aheRd and circulate my memorandum so that other members of
the Court - includinq perhaps the Brothers from whom we have
not heard - will have it before them.
,,

Sincerely,
''

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 12, 1980
PERSONAL
Re:

78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Lewis:
Of course there is much in your memorandum with which I
agree. In fact, each of the arguments you make as to why this
program is constitutional is made in my opinion. My draft
demonstrates that "strict scrutiny" has been given, although I
avoid articulating our action in those words because I fear we
are going astray with all sorts of "tiers of tests." I do not
agree that it is essential to use any ritual of words to
describe the standard of review employed -- so long as it is
clear that the 5th and 14th Amendments are satisfied. These
"tests" assume a talismanic quality that in my view is becoming
increasingly unhelpful. I prefer to decide only this case,
which deals with a Congressional program, strictly hedged in
every respect indicated by the opinion.
I have attached "for your eyes" a draft of changes that I
am willing to make in the opinion. My hope is that you will be
satisfied that, as revised, the opinion is "not inconsistent"
with the views you expressed in Bakke. I will await your
comments on the attached before I circulate any proposed
changes to the Conference.
I intend to stay with the limits expressed by this opinion,
not stray from the narrow holding as some have done in the
past.
(Compare the "straying" from Swann in Milliken I.)

Mr. Justice Powell

~ccr~~~~

~-~~
~~~

JS

6/12/80

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

The substantive changes in the Chief's draft recognize
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to this case, but do
not expressly adopt the strict scrutiny test.
I

The changes on pages 5, 9, 30, 31, 35 are stylistic.
On
"authority"
refers

to

page

22,

the

under

the

General

plenary

power.

Chief

This

has

Welfare
change

described
Clause.
removes

legislative

He

no

longer

slightly

the

implication that the mere grant of power is sufficient to uphold
the program.
On page 23,

he has removed a

sentence that describes

the program as "voluntary" and discusses the

~ad

federal power

to condition receipt of funds. This is a good change. He has not
changed the sentence on page 22 also describing the program as a

,,

"technique to induce" voluntary action. You explicitly criticize
this latter sentence in your Memorandum. Note 13 at 21.
On page 26,
your

view

of

the Chief has added a sentence adopting

Congress'

ability

to

reach

judgments

without

formulating a formal "record."
The
Chief

major

He

evaluation"

in

~----------------

recognizes

question.

change

that

the

recognizes

to

assure

the

case

the

that

opinion
raises

need

is on
an

for

remedial

page

equal

The

protection

"careful

programs

28.

judicial

are

"narrowly

tailored" to meet their goal. The language appears to split the
difference between strict scrutiny and and intermediate review.
The Chief cites no cases that might

illuminate the

"standard"

for a lower court.
On page 34,

the Chief has removed a reference to this

program as "experimental." Similarly, on page 37, the Chief has
deleted a passage emphasizing the "experimental" aspects of the
program.

The

Memorandum,

new
but

beliefs that a

langauge

echoes

emphasizes
statute is

the

some

passages

deference

due

constitutional.

from

your

congressional

Although

you

stress

some deference to Congress, you do not say that constitutional
"doubts

must

be

resolved

in

support

of

the

congressional

judgment."
On

page

38,

the

Chief

has

repaired

the

Jackson

quotation so that he no longer appears to adopt a rational basis
test .

..

(7

II
The Chief's
test;

nor does

changes do not adopt the strict scrutiny

the opinion cite any previous equal protection

cases. Nor has he lessened reliance on Lau v. Nichols, which you
criticize in the Memorandum.
On

the

plus

side,

the

Chief

has

recognized

the

existence of the Due Process Clause.
As

you

said,

the

Chief may be attempting

to get you

aboard quickly in the thief that the Brennan Four will be more
"
amenable than you to joining a standardless opinion. I believe
that

the

best

course

would

be

to

circulate

the

Memorandum

tommorow morning, then tell the Chief privately later in the day
that

you

are

studying

the

his

changes,

and

that

you

will

be

interested in seeing how they are received by other members of
the majority.
There

is probably a

substantial

advantage

for the Brennan group to make the next move.
~ claim

~

will

~ing

If they ioin, and

the Chief has adopted an intermediate standard, then you
have

~~ suggestion.

leverage

to

force

the

Chief

to

disclaim

that

If they do not join the Chief, then you will not be

under any pressure to give
danger

in

in delay

is

that

the Chief a

you

asking the Chief for changes.

let others

second vote.
take

The only

the momentum of

But since you have already told

the Chief your views, and will be the only other member of the
majority to circulate a written opinion for the next few days, I

think

that

there's

not

a

lot

further

to

push

Consequently, I would wait the Brennan group out.

~

.

the

Chief.

lfp/ss

6/13/80
Fullilove

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your letter of June 12.
I agree that there is a fair amount of duplication
in your opinion and my memorandum.

Differences do remain,

including the major one of my reliance on an articulated,
familiar standard of analysis.

I continue to be concerned

that your opinion - even though we come out the same way will be viewed as providing no analytical guide for the
future and thus subject to application according to the "eye
of the beholder".
I suppose it is fair to say that, to some extent,
at least, you are in the "middle" position.

We know from

Bakke that four of our Brothers will sustain the most
explicit type of quota system that can be devised, if it is

2.

perceived to benefit a "minority".

I fought this battle with

them in Bakke when you and three other Justices remained on
the sidelines in the constitutional debate.
At least until there is a Court for what I call the
"Brennan/Marshall" view, I must remain with my Bakke
analysis.

I believe it is strictly in accord with our

precedents, affords a clear cup framework for the resolution
of the future cases that are certain to come, and will serve
the country well - and indeed my Bakke opinion did.

Whatever

anyone thinks of my rationale, the country at large - and
particularly the universities - have been able to live with
Bakke.

It also substantially allayed both the apprehensions

of the white and minority populations.

In short, for reasons

I am sure you will understand, I will remain with a position
that I took only after many weeks of careful thought and
study as far back as the summer of 1977.

3.

Accordingly, I am circulating today my memorandum,
deleting - at least for this circulation - my original
comments on your opinion.

I understand, of course, that the

Brennan/Marshall group will not accept my analysis today any
more than they did in 1978.

I have no idea how the three

dissenting Justices in this case, will analyze the issue
before us.

Potter has never accepted the "tier" precedents

of the Court, relying istead his case-by-case perception of
what constitues invidious discrimination.

As I have said to

Potter this has the advantage of simplicity, but it also has
the disadvantage - as I view it - of affording little
guidance in this nebulous area of eoual protection.

I

believe that WHR and JPS have accepted the "strict scrutiny"
test, and if they should apply it is this case - and you were
also to agree - there would be at least four of us together
on a position supported by the precedents.

\

One may differ as

4.

to the outcome of a case and still apply the appropriate
analysis.

I view the present case as quite close, as it is

certainly a quota system classification.

I can understand

therefore how one can come out with a judgment of invalidity.
I suppose the essence of what I am thinking is that
you have, in effect, three choices:

(i) you could join,

explicitly or implicity the Brennan/Marshall quartet;

(ii)

you could accept an apply traditional strict scrutiny
analysis, leaving you with only my vote but with a Court for
the judgment; or (iii) you could remain clearly and
uncommitted "in the middle".

I view your present opinion as

being somewhere between my view and that of the
Brennan/Marshall view.
The latter has the attraction of resulting in a
"Court opinion".

Yet, I think it is reasonable to expect

Marshall/Brennan to requested changes in your opinion that

5.

will enable them to argue -

in future cases - that you have

joined them in abandoning strict scrutiny where the
classification is "benign".
I certainly do not wish to add to the pressures on
you.

I think your opinion essentially is auite good.

trying to identify what portions of it I can join
with some change.

I am

Possibly

I will get back to you early next week.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss 6/13/80
Fullilove
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I circulate herewith a draft memorandum in which I
have applied, consistent with my Conference vote the strict
scrutiny analysis required by our precedents with respect to
racial classifications.

It brings me out in this case, as it

did in Bakke to sustain the constitutionality of the "set
aside".

This is another quota system case.

Yet, it differs

from Bakke in that the congressional record makes clear - at
least for me - that appropriate findings of racial
discrimination against minority contractors were duly made.
Moreover, as the opinion of the Chief Justice properly
emphasizes, Congress has a unique responsibility under §5 of
the 14th Amendment.
I view the Chief's opinion favorably, although

·~

2.

differences between us remain.

I hope to be able to join

much of his opinion, probably retaining my memorandum and
concurring either in whole or in part.
In view of the shortness of time remaining for
concluding the work of this Term, I am circulating my views
now.

I4. F. P. , Jr.

ss

Thank you for your letter of June 12.
I aqree that there is a fair amount of duplication
in your opinion and my memorandum. Differences do remain,
most notably my reliance on an articulated, familiar standard
of analysis. I continue to be concerned that your opinion even thouqh we come out the same way - will be viewed as
prov id inq no analytical guide for the future and thus subject
to application according to the •eye of the beholder•.
I suppose it is fair to say that, to some extent at
least, you are in the •middle• position. We know from Bakke
that four of our Brothers will sustain the most explicit type
of quota system that ca.n be devised, if it is perceived to
benefit a •minority•. I fouqht this battle with them in
Bakke when you and three other Justices remained on the
sidelines in the constitutional debate.
At least unt.il there is a Court for what I call
•erennan/MarshalJ• view, I must remain with my Bakke
analysis. I believe it is strictly in accord with our
precedents, affords a clear framework for the resolution of
the future cases and will serve the country well - as indeed
my Bakke opinion did. Whatever anyone thinks of my
rationale, the country at large - and particularly the
universities - have been able to live with Bakke. It also
substantially allayed the apprehensions of both the white and
minority populations. In short, for reasons I am sure you
will understand, I must remain with a position that I took
only after many weeks of careful thought and personal study
as far back as the summer of 1977.
Accordingly, I am circulatinq today my memorandum,
deletinq - at least for this circulation - my original
comments on your opinion. I understand, of course, that the
Brennan/Marshall qroup will not accept my analysis today any
more than they did in 1978.
I have no idea how the three dissentinq Justices in
case, will analyze the issue before us. Potter has

2.

never accepted the •tier• precedents of the Court, relyinq
instea.d on his case-by-case perception of what constitues
invidious discrimination. As I have said to Potter, this has
the advantaqe of simplicity, but it also has the disadvantaqe
- as I view it - of affording little guidance in this
nebulous area of equal protection.
I believe that WHR and JPS have accepted the
•strict scrutiny• test, and if they should apply it in this
case - and you were also to agree - there would be at least
four of us together on a position supported by the
precedents. One may differ as to the outcome of a case and
still apply the appropriate ~nalysis. I view the present
case as quite close, as it involves review of a quota system.
I can understand therefore how one can conclu"e that the
statute is invalid.

,
''

You have, in effect, three choices: (i) you could
join, explicitly or implicity, the Brennan/Marshall quartetJ
(ii) you could accept and apply traditional strict scrutiny
analysis, leaving you with only my vote but with a Court for
the judqmentJ or (iii) you could remain ambiguously
uncommitted •in the middle•.
The latter has the attraction of resulting in a
•court opinion•. Yet, r think it is reasonable to expect
Marshall/Brennan to request changes in your opinion that will
enable them to araue - either in concurrence or in future
cases - that you have joined them in abandoninq strict
scrutiny where a racial classification is viewed as •beniqn•.
I do not imply criticism of them. I am suqqestinq what I
would do if I were in their place.
I think your opinion essentially is auite qood.
am tryinq to identify what port ion.s of it I can join,
possibly with some changes. I will qet back to you ~arly
next week.

I

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

•. i

·.

'.

.

',,

13, 1980

, MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I circulate herewith a draft memorandum in which I
have applied, consistent with my Conference vote the strict
scrutiny analysis to the racial classification incorporated
in S103(f)(2). Like Bakke this is a ouota system case. Yet, ~
it differs from Bakke in that the congressional record makes , '
clear - at least for me - that Congress made appropriate
findinas of racial discrimination aqainst minority
contractors.
Moreover, as the opinion of the Chief Justice
properly emphasizes, Congress has a unJaue responsibility
under SS of the 14th Amendment. Accordinqly, I conclude that
the set-aside is constitutional.
I view the Chief's opinion favorably, althouqh
differences between us remain. I hope to be able to join
much of his opinion, probably retaining my memorandum as a
concurrence in whole or in part.

In view of the shortness of time remaining for
concludinq the work of this Term, I am circulating my views

L.F.P., Jr.

,f .•

JS

6/14/80

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

I have reviewed the Chief's opinion with an eye towards
identifying sections that you could join.
Parts I & II set forth the history of this litigation,
the
SBA

legislative history of the
set-aside,

and

a

set-aside,

description

regulations governing operation of§

of

some history of the
the

administrative

103(f}(2). You could join

both parts I & II.

- -·-· --

Part

III

begins

with

four

introductory

paragraphs.

There may be two problems with this introductory section. First,

-------

-----------------------------

the Chief emphasizes deference to Congress to a degree that

you~Lf ~

~

2.

may find disquieting. On the whole, I think such langauge on pp.
20-21

is not objectionale because the Chief also says that the

Court would not

"hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we

determine

Congress

that

has

constitutional power." p.
At the

bot~

overstepped

the

bounds

of

its

21. The second problem is more grave.

21, the Chief states that the analysis in

-

this case proceeds by two steps: "At the outset, we must inqure
whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power
of Congress.

If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited

use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is

a

constitutionally

permissible

congressional objectives."
two-step

~ause

~

~~VV{'

test

unless

it

for

means

I do not

achieving

see how you can

explicitly

mentions

the

join this

Due

Process

of the Fifth Amendment.

Part
Spending

IIIA(1)

discusses

Cl~bably,

this

Congress'
section

power

the

under

--

is

acceptable.

I

am

still bothered by the implict description of the MBE program as
voluntary, but the Chief has removed one offensive sentence on
page

23,

and

he

no

longer

describes

congressional

power

as

plenary. See p.22.
Part

I IIA( 2)

discusses

the

Commerce

Power.

The

Chief

concludes that Congress under the Commerce Power can remedy the
continuing

,,

effects

of

private

discrimination

existing discrimination is not shown.

I

discription

those

is

correct

so

long

as

even

if

pre-

think that the Chief's
continuing

l

the

effects

1

,j.

continue

to

burden

congressional

power to

Clause

not

does

imposition

on

commerce.

interstate
prohibit

answer

innocent

the

private
separate

individuals

Of

action

under

question

of

the

course,

Commerce

whether

remedial

the

obligations

violates the Fifth Amendment.
Part IIIA(3) analyzes congressional power under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
than your own. You use
has

the

power

to

§

find

The discussion

§

5 of

is slightly different

5 to make two points. First, Congress
discrimination.

Second,

Congress

may

exercise some discretion is choosing a remedy.
The Chief approaches the question sightly differently.
After discussing Katzenbach

~

Morgan and Oregon v.

Mitchell,

the Chief concludes that "congressional authority extends beyond
the prohibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state
action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects
of past discrimination.
Katzenbach, 383

u.s.

301

City of Rome supra,

South Carol ina v.

(1966)." pp. 25-26.

It appears that the Chief's use of City of Rome is not ~
contrary to your views.
"[u] nder

~

2 of

the

In the Rome dissent you concluded that

Fifteenth Amendment,

Congress may

impose

such constitutional deprivations only if it is acting to remedy
violations of voting rights."

slip op.

at 8.

But you did

not

reject the contention that Congress' power extends to providing
remedies

as

well

as

prohibiting

unconstitutional

action.

Of

course, you did emphasize that the power to enforce remedies has

4.

recognizble limits.
am,

I

however,

uncomfortable,

discussion of Katzenbach v.

with

Chief's

the

Morgan. As we have discussed, some

people have read Morgan to give Congress to power to define the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as to give Congress
to power to enforce those provisions. The Chief cites to a few
) pages in the Morgan opinion that I fear can be read to support
~that

view.

Although your

concurrence also relies upon Morgan,

you do not cite to the pages in which the Court concludes that
Congress

could

discrimnate
declared

conclude

in

voting

that

a

With

however,

you

think

even

a

literacy

though

literacy

unconstitutional.
I

that

some

the

Court

requirement
minor

could

requirement

change

join

this

discusses

Lau

has

may

be

previously
facially

is

not

or

clarification,

portion of

the

Chief's

opinion.
Part

IIIA(4)

similarity to this case.
did

not

provide

support

v.

Nichols

and

its

In Bakke you specifically argued that
for

the

use

of

racial

quotas

that

deprive some persons of governmental benefits.

Consequently,

would not join this section.

a~~~
2

Part IIIB contains two introductory

cct~/U&AI~
graphs. In the

but

first paragraph, the Chief mentions the Due

-------- -

I

..

fails to specifically employ the strict scrutiny standard. The

i1o.

second

paragraph

aside.

If

you

emphasizes

joined

this

the

remedial

section,

you

aspects
could

of

argue

the
that

setthe

-

r

~.

Chief's formulation

the first paragraph is "not

inconsistent"

But I

with strict

join this ~

.~
that the Brennan group Wlll
~,

section, at least until it
not claim that the same
Part IIIB( 1)

would not

~·

orporates their test.
rejects the

ontention that Congress may

act in a wholly color-blind manner.

generally compatible

with your view that Congress may exercise equitable discretion
in choosing a remedy except for one sentence on pages 31-32. The
Chief

states

that

"It

is

fundamental

that

in

no

organ

of f;? 1

government does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power
than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to advance the general welfare as well
as

to enforce equal

protection guarentees."

Unlike the Chief,

you do not suggest that Congress • power to act

in the general

welfare gives Congress extra discretion. I think the difference
is

important,

have

the

authority

population.
clauses

because

every
to

act

state
in

legislature will
the

general

presumably

welfare

of

its

To keep this decision narrow, only the enforcement

should

be

mentioned.

I

believe

you

could

join

this

section if the Chief would delete the phrase referring to the
general welfare.
Part IIIB(2) discusses the effect of the set-aside on
innocent parties. The first paragraph suggests that "no one has
a constitutional right to be awarded a construction contract."
That is true but,

~

you specifically reject the argument that a

6.

~

~~~
tJp
"

benefit may be conditioned
second

paragraph

burdens on

criteria.

recognizes

that

innocent parties and

remedies

finds

may

impose

The

extra

that the burden in this

case is "relatively light" for the same reasons explained in you
concurrence. The last sentence of the second paragraph suggests
that

Congress

may

act

on

the

assumption

that

nonminority

businesses may have reaped competitive benefits over the years
because of the exclusion of minorities. I believe you could join
this second paragraph, but I do not think you should join this
section so long as the

first paragraph appears to rely upon

a

rights/priveleges distinction.
Part

addresses

IIIB( 3)

the

contention

that

the

set-

aside is underinclusive. The Chief says that Congress may take
o~me

in solving

social problems.

And there has

been no showing that Congress has excluded a minority group that
has

suffered

within
not

a

the

as

much

discrimination

set-aside.

Although

constitutional defect,

v.

Erznoznik

of

Underinclusiveness

is

as

those

underinclusiveness

included

is generally

it may be in some instances.

an

issue

See

u.s.

at

215.

mentioned

in

your

422

Jacksonville,
not

groups

concurrence. I fear that the Chief's treatment of this issue may
be

a

bit

superficial.

I

would

not

join

unless

this

basis

a

dissent

~

specifically
appears
response .

..

that

attacks
the

the

Chief

set-aside on
has

articulated

the

and

best

it

then

possible

I •

Part

IIIB(4)

deals with the contention that the set-

aside is overinclusive because it includes some persons who are
not disadvanaged. I find the Chief's discussion a bit confusing.
At one point, he appears to suggest that the set-aside need not
be

applied

to

aid

any

minority

business

enterprise

that

is

charging a price not attributable to the present effects of past
discrimination. I am not at all sure that this is a fair reading
of the statute.
At one point,

you responded to this point by stating

that the classification of qroups had not been at tacked in the
lower courts.

I have read the constitutional arguments made by

the

petitioners in CA2. They do not attack the inclusion or
....-----__
exlcusion of specific groups within the set-aside. I believe the
best course to take on this issue is to wait to see if a dissent
attacks
footnote

the

selection of minority

that

appeared

in

groups,

earlier

then

Chambers

re-insert

Drafts

of

the
your

concurrence.
Part
some vague

I IIB ( 5)

is

the

Chief • s

conclusion.

language that could be viewed as

It

contains

inconsistent with

strict scrutiny. I would not join.
In sum, I believe that you can safely join Parts I, II
and IIIA ( 1)

&

(

2) ) • With some changes you may be able to join

IIIA (3) and IIIB(1)
yourself
however,

irrevocably

& (2).
to

I do not believe you should commit

join

any

portion

of

the

opinion,

until the Chief has circulated all of his changes and

7

8.

the Brennan group has circulated their concurrence.

JS

6/16/80

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Kreps

The
afternoon.

Chief's

formal

re-circulation

This memo will note

has

arrived

substantive changes made

this
since

his private circulation to you.
P.21. To meet your objections, the Chief has re-phrased
the two-part step by adding an explicit reference to the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause.
P.25. The Chief has changed the citation to Mor9an so
that the reference does

not

include those pages on which

the

Morgan Court suggested that Congress could determine the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2.

P. 26.

As

you

the Chief now cites £l.!:y of

suggested,

Rome with a "cf." signal.
P.31.

The

Chief

has

altered

the

last

paragraph

to

emphasize the unique position of Congress, but has not deleted
reference to Congress' power to advance the general welfare.
P. 32. The Chief has stricken the sentence denying that
any

person

has

a

constitutional

right

to

a

public

works

contract.
P.

39.

The Chief has

added

a

new end inq that quotes

Brandeis on the need for experimentation. More importantly, he
now confronts the lack of a "test" in his opinion and describes
as

essential

the

need

of

these

to

sub~ect

the

set-aside

to

des iqned

to

"probinq

examination."
Each

changes

appears

Chief's opinion more palatable to you.

I

the

you

chanqes will make

it possible

sections of the Chief's opinion.

I

for

make

the

believe that some of

believe,

to

joi.n additional

however,

that you

should make no formal commitment until we see what the Brennan
group does.

In the meantime, I will compose a short memorandum

conpar ing the changes you requested with the changes the Chief
made. And I will recommend which portions of the Chief's opinion
may

n~ be

"joinable."

.,

,.t :_..

-

~t-

------

lfp/ss

(J~

6/16/80

lA

78-1007 Fullilove
Dear Chief:
The changes in your circulated draft

I

•.

•

},

""/-

~
~ '
~~-~

of~a~

are indicated in pen (in the draft your sent only to me) are
helpful.

I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to

comment.

My hope is to be able to join most if not all of

your opinion if I can view it fairly as not incompatible with
the analysis to which I am committed.
I will now go over your draft (assuming that the
changes indicated in pen will be made). I will indicate my
tentative view as to each part and subpart, with changes that
you may consider:
I and II.
III.

I can join.

[Introduction to the analysis (pp. 21,22)].

Make clear in the last paragraph at the bottom of page 21

2

0

that the legislation is being challenged under the eaual
protection component of the Due Process Clause.
in the language you will add on page 28.

You say this

Although not

necessary, it would help to make this clear at the outset.

I

could join the introductory portion of III.
III-A(l)

(p. 22).

Join.

III-A(2)

(p. 23).

Join.

III-A(3)

(p. 24).

I am in accord except for some

of the language you quote from Katzenbach v. Morgan that I
always have thought was erroneous.

I am asking my clerk Jon

Sallet to discuss this with your clerk.

In my view, the

decision in City Qf Rome is a total miscarriage of justice.
I am not sure I can go along with citing it except on a "cf."
basis.

Subject to eliminating some of the Moraan language, I

think I can join.
III-A(4)

...

(p. 27).

You rely on :r;.au y. Nichols.

I

3.

rejected

~

as an authority

primarily because the

remedy did not affect adversely Englist speaking students.
It therefore is materially different from a ouota. I cannot
join this subpart.
III-B (introduction)

(p. 28).

You are adding

language that describes the applicable standard as "careful
judicial evaluation", and require: that the means be "narrowly
tailored".

As you know, I feel strongly that we should

adhere to the precedential standard of "strict scrutiny".
Depending upon any further changes that you may think
necessary to accommodate other Justices, I may be able to
accept your formulation by saying in my concurring opinion
that I take it to mean -

as our precedents would require -

strict scrutiny.
!II-B(l) (p. 30).

You rely here on the

desegregation cases to say that in an appropriate context

.·.~· .

4.

remedies need not be "color blind", but must be tailored to
the violation.

The sentence at the bottom of page 31

overstates, as I view it, the power of Congress as contrasted
with that of administrative agencies to whom congressional
power has been delegated and to the courts.

My primary

concern, however, is that this sentence may be construed to
include the authority of state legislatures as well.

If you

are disposed to eliminate the sentence, I could join this
subpart.
III-B(4)

(p. 34-37).

inclusiveness" at some length.

Here you discuss "over
I have been worried from the

outset by the inclusion of Orientals.

Yet, I have thought

that this claim was not addressed (and may not have been
urged)

in the Court of Appeals.

I would have preferred to

see what the dissenting opinions say about overinclusiveness.

But I will join this subpart.

··,

5.

III-B(5) (p. 37-39).

As my own summary and

conclusion tracks my Bakke analysis, and as this is at least
substantially different in form from your summary, I cannot
join you.
My difficulties with your concluding subsection
(III-B(5)) are several.

The second sentence (p. 37) can be

read as a rather open invitation to Congress "to try new
techniques, such as the limited use of racial and ethnic
criteria to accomplish remedial objectives".

I could approve

such criteria only where they serve a compelling state
interest.

The next sentence refers to "voluntary

cooperation".
appropriate.

If you have Weber in mind, this would be
But I do not view this case as involving such

cooperation.
On page 38, just before the quotation from Justice
Jackson, the reference to "reasonable assurance that the

' ''

6.

program will function within constitutional limitations
sounds too much like the "rational basis" test for me.

Nor

do I like the Jackson reference to what must be done to
prevent "domestic disorder and violence".
can be read - as it has recently in Miami -

This sort of talk
as inviting
~

resort to the streets rather than to the processA of the law.
See TM's dissent in Mobile. I am sure you could not have had
this in mind.

Yet, I am afraid the language might be viewed

in this light by some readers.

* * *
In sum, with relatively minor changes as indicated
above, I believe I can join substantially all of your opinion
with the exception of your concluding paragraphs.

I would

say in my concurrence that I write separately to apply my
Bakke view, and that I do not understand your opinion -

though structured somewhat differently - is inconsistent.
As I indicated in my last letter, you are being
"solicited" from both sides.

I recognize, of course, that

reasonable minds may differ and my comments above are merely
"suggestions".

If you should find them acceptable, and can

resist the anticipated "suggestions" from our Brothers, I
will join as above indicated.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice

June 16, 1980
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEPENCF
78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick
In due course, I shall circulate a Second Draft of
my memorandum in this case. The followinq lanquaqe will be
substituted for the first paraqraph of the First nraft:
Mr. Justice Powell, concurrinq in part and
concurrinq in the judgment.
The auestion in this case is whether
Congress constitutionally may enact the reauirement
inS 103(f)(f) of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal orants for local
public works projects funded by the Act be set aside
for minority business enterprises. For the reasons
stated in Part III-A of the Court's opinion, r aoree
that Conqress has the leqislative authoritv to enact
the set-aside. Because I aqree that enactment of the
set-aside does not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, I also join all but subsections
(1) & (4) of Part III-B of the Court's opinion.
This is the first case since University of
California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265 (197~), to present
the Issue whether a government may establish a
racial classification favoring members of minority
groups. I believe that S 103(f)(2) is justifiable as
a remedy that serves the compellinq state interest
in eradicatinq the continuinq effects of the past
discrimination identified by Conqress. Although the
Court's opinion does not explicitly adopt a standard
for judicial review of racial classifications, I am
satisfied that its analysis is essentially
consistent with the traditional standard discussed
in my Bakke opinion. It is on this understandina
that I join the Court's opinion as noted above. I
write separately to apply the traditional analysis
appropriate to review of racial classifications to
this case.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
~-------------------------

'

. "------~--------------------------

·'

...

<!Jo-url cf t4t 1JUrilib .§taus
~aslyingto-n. l6. <!J. 20,?'!~

~u.prtlllt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 16, 1980

RE:

78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Enclosed is "one last try" which I am prepared to
stay with-provided four or more join .

..

v

T.he chanqes in your circulated draft of r.tay 30
are indicated in pen (in the draft sent only to me) arP
helpful. I appreciate your givinq me the opportunity to
comment. My hope is to join most, if not all, of your
opinion if I fairly can view it as not incompatible with
analysis to which I am committed.
I will now go over your draft (assuming that the
changes indicated in pen will be made). I will indicate my
tentative view as to each part and subpart, with chanqes that
you may wish to consider:
I and II.

I can join.

III. [Introduction to the analysis (pp. 21,22)].
State in t~last paragraph at the bottom of page 21 that the
legislation is beinq challengpd under the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause. You say this in the
language you will add on page 28. With such a change, I
could join the introductory portion of III.
III-A(l) (p. 22).

Join.

III-A(2) (p. 23).

Join.

III-A(3) (p. 24). I am in accord except for some
of the language you quote from Katzenbach v. Morgan that I
always have thought was erroneous. I am asking my clerk Jon
Sallet to discuss this with your clerk. In my view, the
decision in City of Rome is a total miscarriage of justice.
I am not sure I can go along with citing it except on a "cf."
basis. Subject to some changes, I think I can join.

_f. ... •

III-A(4) (p. 27). You rely on Lau v. Nichols. I
rejected Lau as an authority in Rakke primar1ly because the
remedy did not affect adversely Enqllsh spealdnq students.
It therefore is materially different from a quota. I cannot
join this subpart.
·
III-B (introduction) (p. 28). You are add in~
.
lanquaqe that describes the applicable standard as "careful
judicial evaluation", reauirinq that the means be •narrowly
tailored". As you know, I feel stronalv that we should
adhere to the precedential standard of "strict scrutiny•.
Dependinq upon any further chanqes that you may think:
necessary to accommodate other Justices, I may be able to
accept your formulation by sayinq in my concurrinq opinion
that I take it to mean - as our precedents would require strict scrutiny.
TII-B(l) (p. 30).
You rely here on the
desegregation cases to say that in an appropriate context
remedies need not be "color blind", but must bP tailored to
the violation. ThP sentence at the bottom of paae 31
overstates, as I view it, the power of Conqress by referrinq
to its authority to advance the aeneral welfare as well as
its power to enforce the post-Civil rJar Amendments. My
primary concern, however, is that this sentence m~v be
construed to include the authority of state leaislatures as
well. If you are disposed to revise the sentence, I could
join this subpart.

III-B(2) (p.32). In qeneral, I view this discussion
as cowpatible with the ~nalysis on paaes ~0-21 of my
concurrence. I am bothered by the sentence statina that "no
one has a constitutional riqht to be awarded a public works
contract." Al thouqh the statement is clear! y correct a.s a
matter of due process, I do not think Conaress way condition
receipt of a benefit upon unconstitutional considerations.
See n.13, p.21 of my concurrence. With deletion of this
sentence, I can ioin this subpart.
III-B(3) (p.33). I am slightly concerned about the
suggestion that "one step at a time" analysis always defeats
challenaes of underinclusiveness. In some circumstances,
under-inclusiveness may be relevant to a determination that
qovernmental action is unconstitutional. f:ee Erzoznik .Y..:. City
of Jacksonville, 4~2 u.s., at 215. But, because I do not r~ad
your discussion of under-inclusiveness as a holdinq, I could
ioin this subpart.

t,
....

-,

,,
"It--~
i''"

~

ITJ-R(4) (p. 34-37). Here you ~iscuss "over
inclusiveness" at some 1enqt.h. I have been worried froll' the
outset by the inclusion of Orientals. Yet, I have thought
that this claim was not addressed (and may not have been
urqed) in the Court of Appeals. I prefer to see what the
dissenting opinions say about over-inclusiveness. But I may
be willinq to join this subpart.
III-B(5) (p. 37-39). As my own summary and
conclusion tracks my Bakke analysi.s, and as this is at least
substantially different 1n form from your summary, I cannot
join you.
Jllly difficulti.es with your concluc:Hnq subsection
(IJI-B(5)) are several. The second sentence (p. 37) can be
read as a rather open invitation to Conqress "to try new
techniques, such as the 1 imj ted use ·of racial and ethnic
criteria to a~co~plish remedial objectives". I could approve
such criteria only whf"re they se-rve a compE>llinq state
interest. The next sentence rPfers to •voluntary
cooperation". If you have WE'ber in mind, this would be
appropriate. Put I do not view this case as involvinq such
cooperation.

On page 38, just before the ouotati.on from ,Justice
Jackson, the reference to "reasonable assurance that the
proqram will function within constitutional limitations
sounds too much like the •rational basis" test for me. Nor
do I 1 ike the Jackson rf'ference to '"~That must he done to
prevent "domPstic Clisorder and violence". This sort of talk
can be read as invitinq resort to the streets, as recently
happened in Miami, rather than to the process of the law.
See TM's dissent in Mobile. I am sure you could not have had
this in mind. Yet, I am afraid the lanquage miqht be viewed
in this liqht by some readers.

* * *

In sum, with relatively minor changes as indicated
above, I believe I can join substant.ially all of your opinion
with the exception of your concluding paragraphs. I would
say in my concurrence that I write separately to apply my
Bakke view, and that I Clo not understand your opinion t.houqh structured somewhat differently - is inconsistent.
As r ini!icated in my last letter, you are beinq
"solicited" from both sjdes. I recognize, of course, that
reasonable minds may differ and my comments above are merely
"sugqestions". If you should find them acceptable, and can

<:

...

. ,...

4.

resist the anticipated "suqqestions" from our Brothers, I
will join as above indicated.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

...

June 17, 1980
Fullilove
Dear
The changes you have made are very helpful, and they
will enable me to join your opinion with the exception only
of Parts III-B(1) and III-B(4). Some of the lanquage in
these gives me trouble.
I will recirculate my concurrence accordingly, and
will make clear that I view the opinion of the Court as
essentially consistent with my Bakke position. I think the
combination of our two opinions will afford reasonably clear
guidance for the lower courts.

r.f

Of course, my decision to join your opinion is on
the assumption that your draft will remain in its present
state, without substantial chanqe.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

'
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"('J;;

''

'l;,:

•,

t..•·.

-'

.

/
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June 17, 1980
Re:

No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Chief:
We have read your recirculation of June 16 in this case,
and we appreciate your revising the initial draft in response
to the comments and suggestions of Byron, Harry, Lewis, and
ourselves.
For our own part, although your second draft goes a
long way towards satisfying our concerns, we are troubled by
the addition of the concluding paragraph, particularly the
second and third sentences, commencing with "Some have
characterized • • • " and ending with "probing examination." As
we indicated in our original memorandum, we believe that some
standard of review is necessary, and we intend to circulate a
concurring opinion that articulates our view of the correct
standard and explains how that standard is implicit in the
analysis you apply to this case. Would you be willing to
delete these sentences in order to avoid any inconsistency
between your opinion and our concurrence? We do not think
these sentences are necessary to your decision.
If you find it
possible to delete them, and two others agree, we would be
happy to join to put together a Court.

I

I

I
I

i

I

.1

Sincerely,

I
I

WJB, Jr.
TM

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

·'

.:§u.prtntt C!Jaurl af t~t 'J!Utit.cb .:§tws
'JIDaslrhtgtan.lO. C!J. 20~Jl.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 18, 1980

Re:

No. 79-1007 -

Fullilove v. Klutznick

MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE
I will try to respond, but only preliminarily, to Bill's
and Thurgood's June 18 memo and to Lewis' June 17 memo.
At the outset, it seems to me there is a "tempest in a
saucer" aspect as to terms.
I frankly believe that adopting a
magic "word-test" is a serious error and I will neither write
nor join in these "litmus" approaches.
However, we are
supposed to be proficient with words and I will keep trying as
soon as I see the direction of the dissent or dissents.
Of course, each of us. is free to write anything, but I am
not prepared to subscribe to a Court opinion that is undermined
by concurring opinions which undertake to say that the author
of the Court opinion adopts a particular test; I would prefer
to let the fragments fly.
Regards,

0A(!J
f

lfp/ss

6/19/80
Fullilov~

Dear Chief:
As was predictable, the concurrinq opinion Thurqood
has circulated and that probably will be joined by those who
agreed with him in Bakke - devotes a self conscious

~mount

of

effort to a demonstration that your opinion rejects the
strict scrutiny standard heretofore applied to racial
classifications.
I do not fault him for tryinq to brino your into
that orbit.

It does make it necessary, however, for me to be

somewhat more explicit in makinq

cle~r

that I read vour

opinion - as I think you have intended it - to confirm to the
hi9hest level of critical examination that we ever apply.
I therefore plan, subject to any comments you care
to make, to add either in the text or a footnote the enclosed

,;.

.

2.

paraqraphs.
I will not circulate until I hear from you, as it
would be much more preferable - if you couln see your way
clear to do so - if you disassociated yourself from the
interpretation that Thurqood has placed on your opinion.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

lfp/ss

6/19/80

Fullilove

Add a footnote, keyed to page 1, along the following lines:

____!

The several opinions that, together,

constitute a Court for upholding the set-aside, present an
interesting situation.

The lead opinion, written by the

Chief Justice, does not identify in conventional the standard
of scrutiny it applies to this legislation.

The opinion of

Mr. Justice Marshall joins the Court opinion only on the
understanding - several times repeated - that it applies the
intermediate level of "scrutiny" adopted in the separate
opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun in
Bakke, 438

u.s.

265, 324-379.

Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion

takes pains to insist that the Court "does not evaluate the
set-aside provision under the conventional 'strict scrutiny'
standard".

,,

~'

at

Indeed, a significant portion of

2.

his concurrence is devoted to the thesis that the Court's
opinion harmonizes with the Bak§e opinion of which Mr.
Justice Marshall was a co-author.
As indicated above, I read the opinion of the Court
quite differently.

To be sure, it eschews use of

conventional analysis and does not identify in familiar terms
any particular standard.

I join the Court's opinion only

because it is clear both from its reasoning and language that
it does subject the set-aside provision to the exacting
examination that -

in case after case - this Court uniformly

has held to be necessary in reviewing a racial
classification.

There has never been a majority of the Court

that applied the intermediate standard that Mr. Juustice
Marshall,

would read into the opinion that I also join.
While one may have preferred, as

that the Court

speak in the traditional terms, it reviewed the set-aside in

3.

language undistinguishable from that of strict scrutiny:

"We

recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure"
that the racial classification is "narrowly tailored" to
remedy "the present effects of past discrimination."

Ante,

at 28; and in the final paragraph of the Court's opinion:
any "preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a more searching examination • • • " and
further,

it is essential that any "enactment of Congress

which employs racial or ethnic criteria receive[s] probing
examination."
I suggest that no opinion of this Court applying
anything less than · strict scrutiny has ever employed such
unequivocal language.
It may be regretted that this important case comes
down in a posture that may puzzle federal and state courts
confronted with racial classifications.

.. .

But, in the

' '

4.

tradition of this tribunal, each of us must decide and write
in accordance of his own independent best judgment.

.

··~

,t.,

.

June 19, 1980
Re: No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick
Dear Chief:
As I feared would happen, Thurgood and Bill Brennan
claim that your opinion embraces their

intermeoiat~

standard

and reiects the strict scrutiny test.
I understand that you would prefer not to
characterize your analysis as embodying one test or another.
But I cannot join an opinion that rejects strict scrutiny
analysis. Of course, I do have the opportunity to state in my
own concurring opinion that the Court has acted consistent ~
with strict scrutiny. But such a contention, especially in
the face of four concurring Members of the Court who
disagree, will be of little value if the Court's opinion
itself remains silent.
In essence, I do not believe we disagree about this

2.
case. As stated in your letter of 12 June, your "draft
demonstrates that 'strict scrutiny' has been given" to the
set-aside. We must correct the error of our Brothers who have
not so read your opinion.
Sincerely,

..§u.pri'ltlt ~ourl of i~t Jfutiitb .§itait.tT
'JlDaslrmgton. ~. ~· 2ngtn,g
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 20, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

I propose to modify the final paragraph of the opinion
circulated June 16 to read substantially as follows:
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination to make sure that it does not conflict ·
with constitutional guarantees. This case is one
which requires, and which has received, that kind of
examination. This opinion does not adopt, either
expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis
articulated in such cases as University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
However, our
analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would
survive judicial review under either "test"
articulated in the several Bakke opinions cited
above. The MBE provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 does not violate the
Constitution.76/n
I suggest that it is possible to achieve the benefits
of a majority opinion on this important question without
abandonment of any of the views separately expressed in
Bakke.
Regards,
'

June 23, 1980
78-1007 Fullilove
Chief:
In accord with our conversation this afternoon,
have reviewed my separate concurrence for the purpose of
identifyin~ ways that will enable me to join your opinion
full, while still filing my separate opinion.
The sentence running from page 31 to page 32 of
your opinion still refers to the "general welfare" power.
Aqreeinq with this would give me a great deal of difficulty.
Nor do I think it adds anythinq to your reliance upon t.he
Commerce Clause and S5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I hope
you can simply strike this r~ference.
On pages 34-37 (III(B)(4)) you discuss the argument
that Congress has included some groups who may not ha.v e
suffered discrimination. John's dissenting opinion,
"'·
circulated this afternoon, makes a big issue of this. In a
draft opinion that I did not circulate, I included a footnote
&6 that answers John's argument to a considerable extent. I
enclose a copy of my footnote. I would be happy if you
wished to add it to your opinion. If not, I will include it
in mine.
Finally, I enclose a revision of the opening pages
opinion.
I fully understand that we differ as to the need to
identify a specific standard. Although you prefer, in this
case, not to identify a standard, I must do so in view of my
Bakke opinion. Also, I have no doubt that your opinion will
be read as requiring the highest level of judicial
examination.

If the foregoing is acceptable to you, I
you.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

,.
'

••

6/23/80

6 Section 103 (f) (2), 42 U. S. C. A. § 6705 (f) (2) (1978 Supp.) classifies as :l minority business enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum
of which is owned by minority group members or, in the case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 percentum of the stock of which is owned by
minority group members." Minority group members are defined as
"citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." These groups also are classified as
minorities in the regulations implementing the nondiscrimination require~
ments of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976,
45 U.S. C.§ 803, see 42 Feel. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress
relied as precedent for § 103 (f) (2). The House Subcommittee on SBA
Oversight and Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a significant
part in the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2), also recognized that these
·groups were included within the Federal Government's definition of
"minority business enterprise." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 20-21 ( 1975). The specific inclusion of these group in § 103 (f) (2)
demonstrate that Congress believed they were victims of discrimination.
Because the petitioners failed to attack Congress' classification groups in
the courts below, there is no reason for this Court to pass upon the issue
for the first time .

..

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.
Although I would place greater emphasis than the Chief
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review
in conventional
accord

with

terms,

my

own

I view his opinion as substantially in
views.

Accordingly,

I

join

the

Chief

Justice's opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set
forth

u.s.

in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke,
265 (1978)(hereinafter

438

Bakke)~

The question in this case is whether Congress may enact
the

requirement

in

103(f}(2) of the Public Works Employment

§

Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public
work

projects

business

funded

enterprises.

by

the

Act

Section

be

set

aside

103(f)(2)

for

employs

minority
a

racial

classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is
a

necessary

Bakke

at

means

299,

of

305;

advancing

see In

~

a

compelling

Griffths,

413

state

u.s.

interest.

717,

721-722

( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Loving v • Vir g in i a , 3 8 8 U• S • 1 , 1 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; Mc Laugh 1 in v •
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my
Bakke

opinion,

I

consider

adherence

to

this

standard

as

important and consistent with precedent.
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection
component of

the

Due

Process

Clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment,

demand that any classification among groups must be justifiable.

Different

standards

classifications
classifications

of

review

simply
are

applied

illustrate

less

1 ikely

to

the

different

principle

sorts
that

of

some

to be legitimate than others.

Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent
level of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no
relation to individual merit or need,
every

legitimate

Martin, 375

u.s.

are irrelevant to almost

governmental decision.
399, 402-404 (1964).

See e.g.,

Anderson 2:._

In this case, however, I

believe that§ 103(f)(2) is justifiable as a remedy that serves
the

compelling

state

interest

in

eradicating

the

continuing

effects of the past discrimination identified by Congress.1

FOOTNOTE

1.
judicial

Although

scrutiny,

racial
I

do

not

prohibits

all

recognizes

the principle that

our

racial

Constitution,

differently

on

classifications
that

agree

Mr.

classification.

any

I

official

account

of

his

believe

is

action

that

race

or

require
the

strict

Constitution

Justice

Stewart

applicable:

"Under

treats

person

ethnic

a

origin

inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2.
in

narrowly

rebutted. Cf.

defined
Lee~

circumstances,

...

-·~

presumption

may

But,
be

Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)(Black,

Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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JU S TI CE B Y RO N R . W HI T E

Re:

78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klut znick

Dear Chief,
I join your June 16 circulation
as modified by your memorandum of June 20.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
erne

I
~

1

1
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

23, 1980

Re: No. 78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick, Secretary
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your
concurring in the judgment.

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

opinion,

circulated

June

23,

No. 78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.

~~

Although I would place greater emphasis than the

~f

J~~ on

the need to articulate judicial standards of review
~Jv..t'a.-) \.,~
in conventional terms, I view
·
opinion as substantially in

accord

with

my

own

views.

Accordingly,

I

thaAt44@f

join

I'• opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set

·~A

forth

in my opinion

in University of California v.

Bakke,

438
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In these school desPgregation cases we dealt with . the
authority of a federal court 1o formulate a remcc..ly for unconst.i1.utiona1 ra('.illl discrimination. However, the authority of
a court. to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial uecree
also e:xf.~n cJs t.o sts t.u t.ory violations. "'here fed rra l antidiscrimin~tiop laws ha\'e been Yiolated, sm equibble r<:'medy
may in the appropriate case inc:ludt> a r~cial or (.>f.Jmic f::Jctor.
Franks. v. Bowman Tra71Spurlntion Co., 424 1...1. S. 747 (1976);
see lnf.erno.Uonnl Brotlt.erhnod of Te.<Jmst~rs Y. Unit c:d St.ates,
431 U. S. 324 (1 977); A lbemorl.e Pap~r Co. Y. }if oody, 422
U. S. 405 (Hl75). In anoOJer sett.ing, we have held that. a
state may e.mpJo:r racial criteria that are reasonably nece~sary
1.o assure compliance with ftderal voting rights legi~Jation,
even though the state a.ction doe~ not entail the remedy of a
consWutiona1 violation.
United Jewish Oryonizo.tions of
Trillio.msburyh, Inc. v. Co~ey, 430 U. S. ] 44, J47-J 65 (1 977)
(opinion of \YHJTE, J., joined by BHEKN'AJ\\ BLAC:KMVN, and
STEn.::>\'s, JJ.); 1-d., at JSO-JS7 (Bl~ RGER, C. J., dissenting on
other grounds).
V?hen we ])ave cJisc.ussed the remedial powers of a federal
court, we have been alert to the limit.at.ion that "[t]he power
of the federal courts to re~truct.ure the operation of Joca] and
5taie go\'emment.al ent.ities js not. plenary. . . . '[A] federal
court js requjred to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the
nature and ext.ent of the . . . violation." Dayton Board of
Erlu.wtiol1 Y. Brink.1oa.n, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quotjng _Uilliken Y. Bro.dley, 4]8 U.S. 717, 73S (1974)~ and Swann
v. · ClwrloU.e-}ifecklenburq Board o Education_. supra, 402
U. S., at J G).
,~o...s we. ~o ~
Here we deal not ·with the Jimit.ed remedial powers of a
feoeral court. but. with the broad remedial .powers of Congress. It js fundamental that. in no organ of goYE•rnment. ocs
ihere repose a more comprelwnsive rc>meclial power ihan
jn t.he Congress, expressly charged by the C-onstitution with
competence and authorjty t.o aQn~.nc;Q thQ general weHa~e . ~
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to enforc-e c>qunl proledion guarantees. Congress not
only may induce voluntary ad.)on to assure compliance 'dt.h
exisOng federal statutory or constH.ut.ionnl antidisc·.rimination
])rOYisions, Lut nlso, where Collgrcss llRS nufJJOrify 1o cl1·t'h.rc
certain conduct. unlawful, it may, :1s here, m1fhodze :md
jnduce st.atc ar.tion to aYoid ~l)(:h conduct. Supra, atfJii 2"':l._

:'

---,?.J.--.J_V. J
A.

·

· ·

..
-·.

.-

'(2)

A more specific cllallenge to 1.he J\1BE program

js

the

charge that if. jmpermissibly deprives nonminority busines~es
of ~ccess to at least some portion of the govemment contracting opportunities generated by the Act. It. must. be eonceded that by its objective of remedying 1he ]list.orical )mpairment of acc:P.ss, the J\1BE provision can have the effect. of'
a"·arding some con1rar.1s to J\1BEs which 'o therwise might. be
a"·arupu t.o o1her busine~ses, ·who may themselves be jnnoC'ent
of any p6or di~criminafory adions. B~f iH3 ' '" e 1' :::1( c t c,)~
~: 1 p1jgngl r;rH 1o ho ..,,, . ?rrlpF} a w:b?:e- 11€ . L . , , · L·s~Failure of nonminorit.y firms to re(·.eiYe cerf.ain ('.Onf racfs )s, of
course, an incid<"ni.al c.on~quc>nce of the program . not part
of its objective; similarly, pa.st jmpairnwnt. of minority-firm
a<.:c·. ess to public contracting opportunities may have b(·P.n :m
incidc>ntal r.onsequc>nr.e of "businc~s- a.s-u~ual" by ])Ublic con1ract.ing agencies and among prime (·.ont.racfors.
It is not a. constitutional defect in this program that
it may disappoint t.he expect.at.ions of 110nminority firms.
\Vhen effectuat-ing a. hmit.ed and properly tailored remedy
to cure t.he effects of prior discrimination) suc.h "a shadng·
of the burr1en" by innocent part.ies is not jm])crmi~sible.
F1·anks, svpra_. at. 77; see A lur:m(J.rle Paper Co., .<mpra.; U11ited
Je1uish Oru(lniz.n.Uon, !>upra. The ac.tuaJ "burden" shouldered·
by nonminority firms is relatin~)y . light.. in this connection ..
when we consider t.he ~cope of O)is public works prog1:a.m as·
com]Jared with 0\'erall construction contract.ing opport.uni-:
'

·.:..

..

. ..

..

·.
-- · -

·- r

. .

"

.

•
75-10(}, -OPl:\10~
FULLJLO\"E

t.·.

KLFfZ:\lCJ\

...

·This cloC's not. mc>ll.ll tl1at Lhc> dnim of on·dllr:lusi\'C'Ilt'S!
Ss 1•n1 ifli'U tu no con~irle>r,qf .ion ·in the> )"'l'SI'lll t·:\se.
'J'J1c
history of gon·mnH.'llf.'l] 1olt>rnnc·.(_' of prHrtic:r~ using J'a.cial or
etJmi1: lTilt:ris for the piu·po~e or with the r•ffect of imposillg
::1n im·iriious cii~rTilllinntion must slt•rt. tiS t.o the clc!lctcrious
f'lfrc.l~ of <'Yl'll lwnign r:H·iu] ur l'tllllit l'lR!-=!'ifit'lli·ionE= when
tht·y ~!ray frolll n:1rro"· renwrlial ju!'1ifit:~t.ions. EYr'll )n the·
<·on1r·xt of ll. f:tl'inl cl•:.JJl,·nge s11c11 ns i~ pn•:st•n1•·d in this tnse,
the :\J BE pro,·ision 1';1lJilOt p::1s::: )I)U!'kr unlc!-:~. with due ac<·ou••f for if .c ~tlminiqJ·ntin~ p1 ·ugr~m. )1 proYirir·s n J 'P.P.~OlJ<lb]c
:l~~11r:nwe th.Rt :~pplic ·nfion of nwinl or ethnir· eri1r·J·is will be
JimitJ·cl to arc·ompli~hing t.he remeclill.l ubjec:tin•s uf Col•gress
:md fklt misapplications of f .)Jl• pro{!r:lm wiJJ he prL'lllptl:r

,

..

..

·,! ;I'

.

e• ••

...-

:llld :tdt'CJIL'ltdy rcJilt:rlie<l tlnmilli:..;tn:lfin~Jy.
I1 )-:: ':'ignifit':mt ih!.tt 1lw ~r1milli~1rat .ive ~c-llPllH' ·p roYiues for
"· njq~r :HH] e.:-.:cmption.
T\\'o funclaJllt'Jlf.a) c·oJJgwssiunal as!:'•n•lJII i•liiS lllldr•rlir· tlH' .:\fBE prugl'Blll: ( 1) 1hR f. f)JI• )Jl 'f'SI"Ilt
c·lf•·l'f:-: uf p:1st. di~cTilllitlafiun )J:l\'1' imp:tin·d 1ht' c·ompPtit.iYP
j)11~itio11 of 1Jil~ill<•S.<:!'.c;. CJWllt'd ~llcl C'tllltro]Jr•d 1Jy llH'llll><~I'S of
minod1y g1·oups; alld (2) tha1 :.l fnrJll:Jtin' Pffurts to t>Jiminate
h:1rric•n.: 1n· minority-:finn ac:c:C'SS. and io t>Yalu-Hf.c ),ids \\'ith
: "l .in~11JH'IJ1 . for fhC' pr<'~r·nf. Pflc•c : t~ of
1:1~1 di~c.rirllilJStiun
''oulrl :t,.:,..:urt> that ()~,1,. of 1.ht> f<•dPral fund~ gTatlfc•d lllltlt:r
the Public: \Yorks EmpJoymP.nt. Ac't of l !1/7 " ·ould Ut' nee•llllll•·d for by c·ontrilds \\'ith :n·ail11hlt--. qufllifit•tl. htma ficle
mi11orit.r · lmsines~ ~llt.(~rprist~s. Each of tlH·se ~SSIJJllptinlls
)II:J,Y ) , . l't'lllll f,f'd lll thC' 3dmini:::.f rRtin' })I'~HTSS.
ThL' :tcllltinistr<ltive prng1·Rm c·un1ains JIW~~Ilrt'):: to effec:tuate
t11e t·n,,gr•·.~· -.iollal ob,it·c.:th·e of :lssu,·ing Jcgitim:ile p:..~.rtit:ipa
ti•Jll by di~:Hh·anf_;jgf..d ]\JBEs.
Administrative dt~finit.ion
ha::: f ~ghll·•wd ~ome 1<~::;~ definit<~ ::l~pN:1.'3 of tlif' s1 B1utury iclen~n of 1Jw minodty groups f'nc-.ompas:-c·n by 1he prof__!_:!....J
gn1111.~·n~~·n· i~ ~ihninisf1 ·ati\·P ' )::(Tufilly 1u idt'lltify twcl
elillliJJ:·IIr: fn.llJl p::~r·ti<:ip~ tiuu in the )lrogn~lll :\1 BE~ " ·ho m·e
lJot ':bu11:>-fide·· wit.hiu the rt>g:ubtions and guidt•lint>s; fur
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73/ The MBE provision, 42 u.s.c. § 6705(f) (2)
(1976 ed. Supp. I), classifies as a minority business
enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum of
which is owned by minority group members or, in the
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per
centum of the stock of which is owned by minority
group members." Minority group me~bers aie defined
as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and
Aleuts." The administrative definitions are set out
in the Appendix to this opinion, , 3. These
categories also are classified as minorities in the
regulations implementing the nondiscrimination
requirements of the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 U.S.C. § 803, see
42 Fed. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress
relied as precedent for the MBE provision. See 123
Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke).
The House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and
Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a
significant part in the legislative history of the
MBE provision, also recognized that these categories
were included within the Federal Government's
definition of "minority business enterprise." H.R.
Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 20-21 (1975).
The specific
inclusion of these groups in the MBE provision
demonstrates that Congress concluded they were
victims of discrimination. Petitioners did not press
any challenge to Congress' classification categories
in the Court of Appeals; there is no reason for this
Court to pass upon the issue at this time.

'
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I
I
I
I
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June 24,

1980

78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
will revise my concurrence in this case to include
the attached introduction in which I now join the Chief.
I

In addition, I shall be making some minor changes.
In view of the burden on the Print Shop, I do not know when I
will be able to circulate my concurrence with these changes
added. I view them as purely stylistic and conforming
language changes. Clerks from other Chambers will be free to
check them here, or my clerk will bring my marked copy to
your Chambers.

f_ _1.(/
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

;su:prtmt C!J!llill ortlrt ·~hn!tb ,%'iflilis

'J.'ilasi{i.ngton. ;!9. <q.
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CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

June 24, 1980

78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
lfp/ss

June 24, 1980

78-1007, Fullilove v. Klutznick

Dear Chief:
Please ioin me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
lfp/ss

•'

·'

..§u.pumt ·QiltUrl of tqt ~b ..§taltg
~ufringhtn. ~.

"f.

21lpJl.~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

June 24, 1980

PERSONAL
RE:
78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick
Dear Lewis:
I have no problems with your memo of June 23.
Reference to the General Welfare Clause on page 31 '
is deleted. Your suggested footnote as adapted is
attached.
I also suggest references in your concurring
opinion will be stronger if you substitute "plurality"
for "Chief Justice's" opinion since Byron is with us.
See copy.

Mr. Justice Powell

..

,.

j;u.p::rtmt <!Jtturi ttf tqt ~b j;bdtll
,ragfringtlt~ ~.

<If.

2llgt~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 24, 1980

PERSONAL
RE:
78-1007 - Fullilove v. Klutznick
Dear Lewis:
I have no problems with your memo of June 23.
Reference to the General Welfare Clause on page 31
is deleted. Your suggested footnote as adapted is
attached.
I also suggest references in your concurring
opinion will be stronger if you substitute "plurality"
for "Chief Justice's" opinion since Byron is with us.
See copy.

Mr. Justice Powell
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[May -, 1980]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to consider a facial constrtutwnal
challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending program that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used
by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies
from businesses owned and controlled by members of stat,utorily identified minority groups. 441 U. S. 960.

I
In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended
the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment
Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999. The 1977 amend~
ments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for
federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce,
acting through the Economic Development Administration
(EDA), to state and local govemmental entitres for use in
local public works projects. Among the changes made was
the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this
litigation. Section 103 (f) (2) of the 1977 Act, referred to

78-1007-0PINION
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

as the "minority business enterprise" or "MBE" provision»
that: 1
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any
local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended
for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means
a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by
minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned
business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which
is owned by minority group members. For the pur·
poses of the preceding sentence, minority group mem.
bers are citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskomos, and
Aleuts."
In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations
governing administration of the grant program which were
amended two months later. 2 In August 1977, the EDA
issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations
with respect to minority business participation in local public
works grants,3 and in October 1977, the EDA issued a tech·
nical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and infor·
mation to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the
10% MBE requirement.4
~equires

91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) ~ 6705 (f) (2) .
42 Fed. Reg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 FeeL Reg . 35822 (1977 );
13 CFR part 317 (1978) .
3 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local Public Works Program, Round II, Guidelines For 10% Minority
Business Participation In LPW Grants (1977); App. 156a-167a.
4 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Admini~tra
tion, EDA Minority Enterprise (MBE) Technical Bulletin (Additional
Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Contractors
In Meet.ing The 10% MBE Requirement) (1977) ; App. 129a-155a.
t

2
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On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin
enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants
were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administrator, and the State and City of New York, as actual and potential project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of
construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm engaged in heating, ventilation and air conditioning work.
Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic
injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and
that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, aud various statutory antidiscrimination
provisions.G
After a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the
District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order
and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the
merits. On December 19, 1977, the District Court issued a
memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE program and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove .
Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (SDNY 1977) .
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 584 F. 2d 600 (CA2 1978). holding that "even
under the most exacting standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional muster." !d., at 603. Considered in the context of mauy years of governmental efforts
to remedy past racial and ethnic discriminat1011, the court
found it "difficult to imagine" any purpose for the program
other than to remedy such discrimination. !d., at 605. Iu
5

16 Stat. 144, 42 U. S. C. § 1981; 17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ;
12 Stnt. 284, 17 Stat . 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1985; title VI, § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d ; tit!<' VII , § 701 et
seq. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S C.
§ 2000e et seq.
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its view, a llUlllber of factors contributed to the legitimacy
of the MBE provision, most significant of which was the
narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and
administrative program, in size, impact aud duration, id.,
at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other
courts of appeals and district courts that the MBE program
was constitutional, id., at 608-609. 6 It expressly rejected
petitioners' contention that the 10% MBE requirement violated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution .'
584 .
9.

II
A

The MBE proviSIOn was enacted as part of the Public
Works Employrnent Act of 1977, which made various amendments to title I of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was mtended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem
of national unemployment and to stimulate the national
economy by assisting state and local governments to build
6 Ohio Contractors Association v. Economic Development Administration, 580 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1978); Constructors Association v. Kreps, 573
F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (DRI 1978); Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-4218 (Kan. Dec. 19, 1977) ~
Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 442 F. Supp.
392 (SC 1977); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Economic Development Administmtion, 452 F . Supp. 1013 (SD Ohio 1977); Montana Contractors Association v. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (Mont. 1977),
Florida East Coast Cha7Jter v. Secretary of Commerce, No . 77-8351 (SD
Fla. Nov. 3, 1977); but see Associated General Contmctors v. Secretary
of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (CD Cal. 1977), vacated and rcmandrcf
for consideratiou of mootne::>s, 438 U. S. 90<J (1978), on remand 459 F
SttiJp. 766 (CD Cal.), appeal docketed sub 1wrn. Armistead v. Assocwtea
General Contractors of California, No. 78-1107.
• 7 Both the Court of Appeals and the Di~trict Court rejected petitioners•
various statutory argument~ without extended di::;cu::;::;ion 584 F . 2d, at
608, n. 15 ; 443 F. Supp., at 262.
·
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needed public facilities. 8 To accomplish these objectives,
the Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce, acting
through the Economic Development Administration, to make
grants to state and local governments for construction, renovatioll, repair or other improvement of local public works
projects. 0 The 1976 Act placed a nurnber of restrictions
on project eligibilty designed to assure the federal monies
were targeted to accomplish the legislative purposes. 10 It
established criteria to determine grant priorities and to apportion federal funds among political jurisdictions. 11 Those
criteria directed grant funds toward areas of high unemployment.12 The statute authorized the appropriation of up to
$2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; 1 3 this appropriation was soon consumed by grants made under the
program.
Early in 1977, Congress began consideration of expanded
appropriations and amendments to the grant program.
Under administration of the 1976 appropriation, referred to
as "Round I" of the local public works program, applicants
seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2
billion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications, less
than 2,000 were granted.H The results provoked widespread
concern for the fairness of the allocation process.15 Because
s H. R. Rep. No. 94-1077, p. 2 (1976) . The bill discussed in this report

was accepted by the Conference Committee in preference to the Senate
version . S. Conf. Rep . No. 94-939, p. 1 (HJ76) ; H . R. Conf. Rep.
No. 94-1:260, p. 1 (HJ76) .
o 90 Stat. 999, 42 U. S. C. § 6702.
1o 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6705.
11 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6707.
12 90 St<tt. 1001, 42 U.S. C.§ 6707 (c).
1s 90 Stat. 1002, 42 U. S. C. § 6710. The actual appropriatjon of the
full amount aut.horized was made several week::; later. Pub. L. No. 94-447,
90 Stat. 1497.
1 4 123 Co11g. Ilec. 81355 (Jan. 25, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) .
15 See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 11 and related bills before the Subcom~
mittee on Economic Development of the House Committee on Public
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the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an addi~
tiona} $4 billion to fund "Round II" of the grant program/ 6
the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amendments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems
of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the
supplemental appropriation. 17 The result of this attention
was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the allocation criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, however, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into
areas of high unemployment. 18 The 1977 Act also added new
restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal
grants; 1 " among these was the MBE provision.
The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House
version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the
House on Feb. 23, 1977 by Representative Mitchell of Maryland.20 As offered, the amendment provided : 21
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant
shall be made under this Act for any local public works
project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles,
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project
are procured from minority business enterprises. For
purposes of this paragraph, the term 'minority business
enterprise' means a business at least 50 percent of which
is owned by minority group members or, in case or
publicly owned businesses, at least 51 percent of the stock
Works ami Tran~portation, 95th Cong., ht SeJ::J. (1977) ; H R. Rep.
No. 95-20 (1977) ; S. Rep. No . 95-38 (1977) .
1o 91 Stat. 119, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp I) § 6710. The actual
appropriation of the full authorized amount was made the same day. 91
Stat. 123.
17 E. g., Hearings, cited, at n. 14, supra; 123 Cong. Rec. fi1401- l:I146:t
(Feb. 24, 1977) ; 123 Cong. Rec. S3851-S3927 (Mar. 10, 1977).
1s 91 Stat. 117, 42 U . S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6707.
1 0 91 Stat 116, 42 U. S. C. (1H76 ed. Supp.l) § 6705.
20 123 Cong. Rec. H1388 (Feb. 23~ 1977) (remarks of Rep Mitchell) ..
21fd., at Hlggg·,.
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of which is owned by minority group members. For the
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts."
The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment
was to direct funds into the minority business community, a
sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but
which, on the basis of past experience with government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works program as then formulated. 22
He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year
1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was concluded
with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18% of the population. 2 a When the amendment
was put forward during debate on H. R. 11, 21 Rep. Mitchell
reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would
obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of tlm;
government program.25
The amendment was put forward not as a new concept,
but rather one building upon prior administrative practice.
In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal
squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small
~ 2 !d., at H1388-H1389. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ~· 1.
2s !d., at H1389.
24 123 Cong. Rec. H1436 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rt>p. Mitchell) .
As reintrodueed, the first sentence of the amendment wm; modified to
provide:
"Notwith~tanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under
this Act for any local public works project unles::; at least 10 per centum
of the dollar volume of each contract shall be set aside for minority business enterprise and, or, unless at least 10 per centum of the articles,
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project are procured
from minority business enterprises."
25 !d., at H1436-Hl437. Repre;:;enta.tive Mitchell's remark::, are set out,
in part, in the Arpendix to this opinion, , 2.
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Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2 (8), 72 Stat. 389)
which, as will become evident, served as a model for the
administrative program developed to enforce the MBE
provision : 26
"The first point in opposition will be that you cannot
have a set-aside. Well, Madam Chairman, we have been
doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A
set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more
than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and
bona fide. We are doing it in this bill."
Although the proposed MBE provision on its face appeared mandatory, requiring compliance with the 10%· minority participation requirement "[n] otwithstanding auy
other provision of law," its sponsor gave assurances that
existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in
administration if, with respect to a particular project, compliance with the 10o/r requirement proved infeasible.27
Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change
of language expressing the twin intentions ( 1) that the federal
administrator would have discretion to wa.ive the 10% requirement where its application was not feasible, and (2) that the,
grantee would be mandated to achieve at !east 10% participa-tion by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demonstrated.28 He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence
of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted: 2 &"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any
local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per2o

123 Cong. Rec. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell ).

27

!d., at H1437-Hl438. A revealing colloquy between Representative-

Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas is set out in the Appendix
to this opinion, ~ 3.
28 123 Cong. Rec. Hl438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remark8 of Rep. Roe).
%9. ·Jbid~
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cent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for
minority business enterprises."
The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification because it retained the directive that the initial burden of compliance would fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden
was necessary because, as he put it. "every agency of the
Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this
very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up
with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it." 80
Other supporters of the MBE amendment echoed the sponsor's concern that a number of faJ.l..t,ors, difficult to isolate or
quantify, seemed to Impair access b minorit buswesses
to public con racting opportunities. Representative Conyers of New York spoke of the frustration of the existing situation, in which , due to the intricacies of the bidding process
and through no fault of their own, minonty contractors and
businessmen were unable to gain access to government con~
tracting opportunities.81
Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need
for the amendment to "promote a e
of economic e uality
in the Nation." He expresse the view t at without the
amenament, "this legislation may be potentially inequitable
to minority businesses and workers" in that it would perpetuate the historic practices that have precluded minority
businesses from effective participation in public contracting
opportunities. 32 The amendment was accepted by the House.8 8
Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427. its package
of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Develop:~o ! d.

{remark, of R ep. Mitchell ).
31/d., at Hl440 (remarks of Rep. Conyer.;) . R epresenatiw Con ers
remarks arc ~et out , in part, in the Appendix t.o thi:; opinion , ~ 4.
B2 123 Cong. R e<~ . H1440-H1441
(Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Biaggi) . Rcprcsc11ta1ive Biaggi's remarks are 1-id out, in part, iu the
Appendix to thi. opinion, 1[ 5.
es !d., at H l 441.

d:.~4--""~~'""'"'oCA-IL6ol_,.,...........""
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ment and I11Vestment Act of 1976. At that time SenatorBrooke of Massachusetts introduced an MBE amendment,
worded somewhat differently than the House version, but
aimed at achieving the same objectives. 34 His statement
in support of the 10% requirement reiterated and summarized
the various expressions on the House side that the amendment was necessary to ensure that minority businesses were
not deprived of access to the government contracting opportunities generated by the public works program.~ 5
The Senate adopted the amendment without tlebate. 30 The
Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between
the House and Senate versions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the
House for the MBE provision. 37 The Conference Reports
added only the comment, "This provision shall be dependent
on the availability of minority business enterprises located
in the project area." 88
123 Cong. Rec. S3909-S3910 (Ma.r. 10, 1H77) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). The first paragraph of Senator Brooke'~ formulation was identical to the ver,..ion originally offered by Rcpre~entative ~1tchell, quoted
in the t.ext at pp. 6-7, supra. A ~Second paragraph of Senator Brooke's
amendment provided :
"This section :;hall not be interpreted to defund projects with less than 10
percent minority participation in areas with minority population of less
than 5 percent. In that event, the correct level of minority participation
will be predetermined by the Secretary in consultation with EDA and
based upon its lists of qualified minority contractors and its solicitation
of competitive bidi:l from all minority firms on tho~e h~t:> " 120 Coug.
Rec . S3910 (:\lar. 10, 1977).
35 /d., at S3910.
Senator Brooke'i:l principal remarks are :;et out in the
Appendix to this opinion,~ 6.
~ 6 ld., at 83910
87 S. Conf. Rep . No. 95-110, p. 11 (1977), H . R. Conf Rep No 95230, p. 11 (1977) .
38 Ibid.
The Conference Committee bill wa~ agreed to by the Senate,
123 Cong Hec. S6755-86757 (Apr. 29, 1977), and by the Hou~e , 123
Cong Hec. H3920-H3935 (May 3, 1977), and wa:o ~igned into law on
May 3, 1977.
34
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The device of a 10% MBE participation requirement, subject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required
t at to assure minority business participation ; otherwise 1t
was t ought repetition of the prior experience could be expected, with participation by minority business accounting
for an inordinately small percentage of government contracting. The causes of this disparity were perceived as mvolving
the longstandmg existence and maintenance of barriers impairing access by minority enterprises to public contracting
opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct discrimination, but not as relating to ac -as Senator Brooke
put 1tr==r'of capable and qualified minority enterprises who
are ready and willing to work." ao In the words of its sponsor, the MBE provision was "designed to b~gin to redress
------v
this grievauce that has been extant for so long." 40

B
The legislative objectives of the MBE provision must be
considered against the background of ongoiug eft"orts directed
toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of
eco~unity.
The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the
Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing administrative programs promoting minority opportunity in government procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the
Small Business Act of 1958.-11 Section 8 (a) delegates to the
SBA an authority and an obligation "whenever it determines
such action is necessary" to enter into contracts with any
procurement agency of the Federal Government to furnish
required goods or services, and, in tum , to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for the performauce of such
123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen Brooke) .
123 Cong. Rec. Hl440 (Feb 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep Mitchell) .
41 123 Cong. Rec. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell );
123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke}.
80

40

I
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contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Com~
menciug in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the Presi~
dent 42 to develop a program pursuant to its § 8 (a) authority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled
by "socially or economically disadvantaged" persons to achieve
a competitive position in the economy,
At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regulations governing the § 8 (a) program defined "social or economic disadvantage" as follows: 43
uAn applicant concern must be owned and controlled
by one or more persons who have been deprived of the
opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural,
social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or
other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not
limited to, black Americans, American Indians, SpanishAmericans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts. , . /~
The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that
a minority business could not be maintained in the program,
even when owned and controlled by members of the identified
minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been
deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic
disadvantage.u
42 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.) ; Exec. Order
No. 11518, 3 CFR 907 (1966-1970 Comp.).
4 313 CFR § 124.8-1 (c)(1) (1977) .
44 U. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Business Development,
Section 8 (a) Program, Small Business Administration Standard Operatin Procedure 15-16 (1976) ; see H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) (" [T]he
relevant rules and regulations require such applicant to identify with the
disadvantages of his or her racial group generally, and that such disadvantages must have personally affected the applicant's ability to enter
into the mainstret~m of the business community."); U. S. Small Busi·
ness Administration, Office of Minority Small Business and Capital Own-
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As the Congress began consideration of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small
Business issued a lengthy report summarizing its activities,
including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program.45
One chapter of the report, entitled "Minority Enterprise and
Allied Problems of Small Business," summarized a 1975 committee report of the same title dealing with this subject
matter.46 The original report, prepared by the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise,
observed: 47
"The subcommittee is acutely awa.re that the economic
policies of this Nation must function within and be
guided by our constitutional system which guarantees
'equal protection of the laws.' The effects of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained
in the past. The Congress luLs recognized the reality toot
past discriminatory practices have, to some degree,
adversely affected our present economic system.
"While minority persons comprise about 16 percent of
the Nation's population, of the 13 million businesses in
the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0
percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most
recent data from the Department of Commerce also indicates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this country totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only
'16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minority business concerns.
ership Developm£>nt, MSB & COD Programs, Small Busine:s:; Administration Standard Operating Procedure 20 (1979) ("[T]he social disadvantage
of individuals, including tl10~e within the above-named [racial and ethnic]
groups, shall be determined by SBA on a case-by-case bask Member~hip alone in any group is not conclusive that an individual is socially
disadvantaged.") .
45 H . R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977).
46 !d., at 124-149.
47 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 (1975).

,,
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"These statistics are not the result of random chance.
The presumption must be made that past discriminatory
systems have resulted in present economic inequities. I n
order to right this situation, the Congress has formulated
certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially
or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where
they may effectively participate in the business main~
stream of our economy.*
" *For the purposes of this report the term 'minority' shal l include
only such minority individuals as are considered t o be economically
or socially disadvantaged ." .ts (Emphasis added .)

The 1975 report gave particular attention to the§ 8 (a) program, expressing disappointment with its limited effectiveness.49 With specific reference to govemment con struction
contracting, the report concluded, "there are substantial § 8 (a)
opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but .. the
practices of some agencies preclude the realization of that
potential." ~ The subcommittee took "full notice
as
evidence for its consideration" of reports submitted to the
Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the Uo So
0

5

o

•

o

Another chapter of the 1977 Report of the House Committee on
Small Business summarized a review of the SBA's Security Bond Guarantee Program, making specific reference to minority bu si n e~s participation in tho construction indu;,;try :
"The very basic problem disclosed by the t1estimony is t ha t, over the
years, t here has developed a business system which has t raditionally excluded measurable minority participation. In the past more than the
present, this sy:;1:em of conduc ting business transactions bvertly precluded
minority input.. {;urrently, we more often encounter a b usine>~s system
which is racially neutral on it::; face, but because of past overt, social and
economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate
these past inequities. Minorities, until recently, have not participated
to any measurable extent, in our total business sy~t em generally, or in the
construction industry, in particular." H. R. R ep . No. 94-1791, p . 182
(1977), quot ing from H . R. Rep . No. 94-840 , p. 17 (l \J76) o
49 H . R. Rep . No. 94-468, pp. 28-30 (1975) .
The subcommittee 's corn~
ments are set out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, 7.
50 !d., at 29o
48

,r

..
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Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatis~
faction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program." 1 The
Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the
barriers encountered by minority businesses in gaining access
to government contracting opportunities at the federal, state
and local levels. 52 Among the major difficulties confronting
minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an
inadequate "track record," lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection
before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor
minority businesses.58
The subcommittee report also gave consideration to the
operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise
(OMBE), an agency of the Department of Commerce organized pursuant to Executive Orders 54 to formulate and coordinate federal efforts to assist the development of minority
businesses. The report concluded that OMBE efforts were
"totally inadequate" to achieve its policy of increasing opportunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on
public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a "glaring
lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should
be required to achieve," by a "lack of enforcement provisions/ 1
and by a "lack of any meaningful monitoring system." 65
IH !d., at 11; U . S. General Accounting Office, "Questionable Effectiveness of the § 8 (a) Procurement Program" (1975) ; U. S. Commission on
Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Government Contractors" (1975) .
ii 2 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Gov~
ernment Contractors" 16-28, 8&--88 (1975).
sa Ibid .
.? 4 Exec. Order No. 11458, 3 CFR 779 (1966-1970 Comp.) ; Exec. Order
No. 11625, 3 CFR 616 (1971-1975 Comp.) .
.or. H . R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 32 (1975) . For other congressional observations with rcspecL to the effecL of past discrimination on current bu~i
IJess opportuniti!"s for minorities, see, e. g., H . R. Rep. No . 92-1615, p. 3
(1972); H . R. Rep. No. 95-949, p . 8 (1978) ; S. Rep. No. 95-1070, pp. 14-

·'
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Against this backdrop of legislative and administrative pro~
grams, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were
not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and
of the reasons prompting its enactment.

c
Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only
the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a number of
critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited ra.cial
and ethnic preference; the specification of a minimum l(;el
for mmor1ty 'D'USiiiess participation; the identification of the
minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program;
and the provision for an administrative wa.iver where application of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the
administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant
to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an administrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and
objectives.
As required by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into
motion "Round II" of the federal grant program. 56 The
regulations require that construction projects funded under
the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by
competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has
made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a
particular project some other method is in the public interest.
Where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo
the statute's requirement that contracts are to be awarded·
on the basis of the "lowest responsive bid submitted by a
bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility," and they
also restate the MBE requirement.57
15, (1978) ; S. Rep. No. 96-31, pp. 107, 123- 124 (1979) ; see a.lbo, e. g.,
H. R. Doc. No . 92- 169, p. 4 (1971) ; H. R. Doc. No. 92- 194, p. 1 (1972) .
56 91 Stat. 117, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6706 ; 13 CFR part 317
(1978) .
5 7 91 Sta t. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 cd. Supp. I) § 6705 (e) (1 ) ; 13 CFR
§ 317.19 (1978) .
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EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the
administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines out~
line the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available,
qualified, bona fide MBEs, to provide technical assistance
as needed, to lower or waive bonding requiremellts where
feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise, the Small Business Administration or other sources
for assisting MBEs in obtaining required working capital,
and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding
process:58
EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Congress, most local public works projects will entail the award
of a predominant prime contract, with the prime contractor
assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 10%
MBE requirement." 9 The EDA guidelines specify that when
prime contractors are selected through competitve bidding,
bids for the prime contract "shall be considered by the Grantee
to be responsive only if at least 10 percent of the contract
funds are to be expended for MBE's [sic l." uo The administrative program envisions that competitive incentive will
motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obligations under the MBE provision so as to qualify as "responsive"
bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the
lowest responsive bidder, the same h1centive i.s expected to
motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive
of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This
too is consistent with the legislative intention.'11
The EDA guidelines also outline the projected administration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE require~
58 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 2-7; App. 157a-l60a. The relevant portJons
of t.he guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f8.
59 Id ., at 2 ; App. 157a ; see 12:1 Cong. Rec. Hl4:17-Hl438 (Feb. 24·,
1977) (rema,rks of Rep. Mitchell and Rep. Roe) .
60 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 8; App. 161a.
61 See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl437-H1438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep,
Mitchell and Rep. Roe) .
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ment, which may be sought by the grantee either before or
during the bidding process. 62 The technica.I bulletin issued
by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing of waiver
requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines.
It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on
the circumstances, 63 and it illustrates the projected operation
of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with
projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical
is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the
scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the
federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is
confronted with an available, qualified, bona fide minority
business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder,
The hypothetical provides: 64
uQuestion: Should a request for waiver of the 10% requirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an
MBE ever be granted?
uAnswer.' It is possible to imagine situations where an
MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is
unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified.
However, before a waiver request will be honored, the
following determinations will be made :
"a) The MBE's quote is unreasonably priced. This
determination should be based on the nature of the product or service of the subcontractor, the geographic location of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar
products or services in the relevant market a.rea, and general business conditions in the market area. Furthermore, a subcontractor's price should not be considered
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs
because the price results from disadvantage which affects
62 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 13-16 ; App. 165a-167a.
The relevant portions of the guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 9.
63 Technical Bulletin, n. 4, supra, at 5; App. 136a.
o4 I d., at 9-10; App. 143a.

...l;i.

78-1007-0PINION
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

19

the MBE's cost of doing business or results from
discrimination.
"b) The contractor has contacted other MBEs and has
no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high
price."
This announced policy makes clear the administrative understanding that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will
be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business
enterprise at an "unreasonable" price, i. e., a price above competitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority
firm's attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of
disadvantage or discrimination.
This administrative approach is consistent with the legislative intention. It will be recalled that in the report of the
House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise the subcommittee took special care to note that when
using the term "minority" it intended to include "only such
minority individuals as are considered to be economically or
socially disadvantaged." 65 The subcommittee also was cognizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure
that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority
business enterprises be those whose ·competitive position is
impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination.
In its report, the subcommittee expressed its intention that
these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA's
§ 8 (a) program.06 The sponsors of the MBE provision, in
their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that
the term "minority business enterprise" would be given that
same limited application; this even found expression in the
legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the
point: 67
when we are talking about companies held by
~5

Text acromprmying n. 48, supra.
H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) .
41 7 123 Cong. Rec. H1439 (Feb. 24, 1977)
G6

(remark~

of Rep. Roe).
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minority groups . .. [c]erta.inly people of a variety of
backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a
measurement. They are talking about people in the
minority and deprived."
The EDA technical bulletin provides other elaboration of
the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of "minority
group members." 68 It also indicates EDA's intention "to
allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts
in which involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening
the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the
construction and related industries." 69 Finally, the bulletin
outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of
"unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the
MBE program," or of improper administration of the MBE
requirement. 70

III
When we are required to pass on the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress, we assume "the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform."
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of
Holmes, J.) . A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedliiT colrtext,cills for ClOse examination ;
yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by
the Constitution with the power to "provide for the . ..
general Welfare of the United States" and "to enforce by
appropriate legislation" the equal protection guarantees of
~Fourteenth Amendment. Art. I , § 8, cl. 1, Amdt. 14,
~ In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic
68 T~·chnical Bulletin , n. 4, supra, at 1 ; App. 131a-132a.
These definitions are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f 10.
H9 fd ., at 3; App . 135ct.
1 6 ld., at 19 ; App. 155a.
The relevant portion::; of the technical bulletin
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ,f 11.
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National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded
"great weight to the decisions of Congress" even though
the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not different when a congressional program raises ~n
concerns. See, e. (]., Cleland v. National Colle(Je of Bus-mess,
4351J.-s. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181
(1976).
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a
schoo~but onaCoii"s!a&ea_ decision of the Co.n.gress
an~sident. Howev er, in no sense does that render it
imn~ne from j udicial scrutiny and it "is not to say we 'defer'
to the judgment of the Congress . . . on a constitutional question," or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution
should we determine that Congress has overstepped the
bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broadcastin(J,
supra, 412 U. S., at 103.
The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by
our necessarily extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was designed to ensure
that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect
to participate would not employ procurement practices that
Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the
effects of prior discrimination which had imprureo or foreclosed a~ by minority businesses to public contracting
opportunities. The MBE program does not mandate the
allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages
solely based on race or ethnicity.
/A
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. At the outse ~e
mustl i1qmre whe'tlier tfie o bjectiv~f this legislation are
within the power of Congress. If ~ must go on to decide
wlietlier=tr1elmrnea u se of racial and ethnic criteria, in the
context presented, is a constitut~nally _Eerm~means

cO~; :

==e~ional objectiVes.
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A
(1)

In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress
employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers.
The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very nature, is prima.rily an exercise of the S Jendin Power. U. S.
Const., r . , 8, c . . This Court has recognized that the
power to "provide for the . . . general Welfare" is an independent grant of legislative prerogative,-Pienary within its
sphere and distinct from other broad congressional powers.
Buckley v. Yaleo, 424 U.S. 1, 9G-91 (1976); United States v.
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress has frequently
employed the fu~!~!) d~ g Power to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies upou
compliance by the recipient with f€deral statutory and a.dministrative directives.. This Court has repeatedly upheld
against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to
induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563
(1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n,
330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619
(1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937) .
The MBE program is structured within this familiar legislative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public
works grants upon agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will be
devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent
this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access
and by awarding contracts to bona fide MBEs. It is further
conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are
competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced
but for the present effects of prior discrimination. Admittedly, the problems of administering this program with respect to these conditions may be formidable. Although the

,,

r~~

~*::>
~.
''5~
?~"~'

lf

<:1-

4~

~\l

(~
~

~-;:)
s~~r

~·

~

n.-u--

~'5'~
P~?

78-1007-0PINION
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

J

primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation
falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of
the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a general or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority
participation devolve upon the private contracting party;
this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the
prime contract.
The power to condition federal expenditures to induce
volunta.ry a~ion ~ of the least encu~1bered of all
legislative powers. Here we need not explore the outermost
limitations on the objectives attainable through such an application of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending
Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory
powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers,
Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE
program, then it may do so under the Speuding Power. And
we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the
objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce
~ insofar as achievement of the program "()1)jectiv;s
pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and
through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of state and local grantees.
(2)
We turn first to the C{!!!lmerce P~er. U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn
on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime
contractors on federa.Ily funded public works projects.. Katzenbach v. McClu·ng, 379 U. S. '294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The
legislative history of the MBE provision shows that there
was a rational basis for Congress to conclude that the subcontracting practices of prime contractors could perpetuate
the prevailing impaired access by minority businesses to

..
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public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has
an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take
necessary and proper action to remedy the situa,tion. Ibid.
It is not
essary that these rime contractors be shown
res onsible for an vio ation of antidiscrimination aws. Our
cases cleahng w1th app ication of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of
the congressional authority to prohibit practices "challenged
as perpetuating the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination
occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." Franks v.
Bowman Transporation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976) ; see
California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, - - U. S. - , No. 781548 (Feb. 20, 1980); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co .
v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains
to the actions of private prime contractors, the Congress could
have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause.
''rhus, we 'Conclude that the objectives of the MBE provision
are within the scope of the Spending Power.

(3)
In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of
the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and
local governments. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426,
U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate
the procurement practices of state and local grantees of federal funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976) . A
review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the
MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5
"to enforce by appropriate legislati on,, tfie equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Katzenba!d._h J.:.. M o_rgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), we equated
the scope of thisauthonty with the broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §Sf

I·
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d. 18. "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive·gra1it otlegislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U. S ,
at 651. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld § 74 (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, which prohibited application of state English-language literacy requirements to
otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth graile
in an accredited American school in which a language other
than English was the predominant medium of instruction.
To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court
found no prerequisite that application of a literacy requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U.S., at 648649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis
upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment
that application of literacy qualifications within the compass
of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of a{!cess to the ballot
and consequently in terms of access to the provision or
administration of governmental programs. !d. , at 652- 656.
Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U .. S. 112
(1970). we upheld § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a five-year nationwide prohibition on the use of various voter-qualification
tests and devices in federal, state and local elections. The
Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in concluding that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the
use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably
determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of
attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination, even though the use of these tests or devices might have
discriminatory effects only. See yitY_!!l_ Ro!!!.e v. United
States,- U. S. - , No. 78-1840, slip op., at 18-19 (Apr.
22, 1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment,
U. S. Const., Arndt. 15, § 2, confirm that congressional au~
thority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful di - ·

...
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crimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory
impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. City
of Rorne, supra; South Carol'ina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. s:-301
(1966).'
With respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant
evidence from which it could conclude that minority busi~
nesses have been denied effective participation in public
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpe~
uated the effects of prior discrimination. Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked
disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to
minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered
to result not from any lack of capable and qualified minority
businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers
to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic
discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. Although much of this history related to the experience of
minority businesses in the area of federal procurement, there
was direct evidence before the Congress that this pattern of
disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to state
and local construction contracting as well. In relation to the
MBE provision, Congress acted within its competence to
determine that the problem was national in scope.
Although the Act recites no preambulary ~<findings" on the
subject, we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical
basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could
perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Accordingly,
Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to public contracting opportunities generated by the Act was appropriate
to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in federal grants to state and local
governments, which is one aspect of the equal protectio11 of
the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actio11s
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of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its
objectives by use of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives
· of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending
Power.
(4)
There are revelant similarities between the MBE program and the federal spending program reviewed in .L!!:J!:.. v.
Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language barrier
"-effectively foreclosed" non-English-speaking Chinese pupils
from access to the educational opportunities offered by the
San Francisco public school system. ld., at 564-566. It had
not been sho-w11 that this had resulted from any discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts.
Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a federal
regulation applicable to public school systems receiving federal
funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect ... of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the [educational] program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." !d., at 568 (emphasis
added). Moreover, we upheld application to the San Francisco school system, as a recipient of federal funds, of a requiremeu t that " [ w] here inability to speak and understand
the English language excludes national origin-minority group
children from eft'ective participation in t,he educational program oft'cred by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open
its instructional program to these students." lbtd.
It is true that the MBE provision dift'ers from the program
approved in Lau in that the MBE program directly employs
racial and ethnic criteria as a means to accomplish congressional objectives; however, these objectives are essentially the
same as those approved in Lau. Our holding in Lau is
instructive on the exercise of congressional authority by way
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of the MBE provision. The MBE program, like the federal
regulations reviewed in Lau, primarily regulates state action
in the use of federal funds voluntarily sought and accepterl
by the grantees subject to statutory and admiuistrative conditions. The MBE participation requirement is directed at
the utilization of criteria, methods or practices thought by
Congress to have the effect of defeating, or substantially
impairing, access by the minority busilless community to
public funds made available by congressional appropriations.

B
We now turu to the question whether, as a means to
accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives, Congress
may use racial and ethnic criteria, in this limited way, as a
condition attached to a federal grant. We are mindful that
"[i]n no matter should we pay more deference to the opinion
of Congress than in its choice of instrumentalities to perform a
function that is within its power," National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 603 (1949)
(opinion of Jackson, J.). At the same time, we recognize
the need for careful judicial inquiry as to governmental programs that employ" racial or etfinic criteria to accomplish
even constitutional objectives. Again, we stress the limited
scope of our inquiry. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the MBE provision on its face; they have not
sought damages or other specific relief for injury allegedly
flowing from specific applications of the program; nor have
they attempted to show that as applied in identified situations the MBE provision violated the constitutional or statutory rights of any party to this case. 71 In these circum71 In their complaint, in order to est~bli:sh :;tanding to challenge the
validity of the program, petitioner:; alleged as "I s]pecific example:;" of
economic injury three in~tance;:; where one of t.heir number a:<:;ertedly
would have been awarded a public work:; contract but for enforcement. ot
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stances, given a reasonable construction and in light of its
projected administration, if we find the MBE program on its
f~ to b~ree of constj!;utional defects, it must be uph~ld as
within congressional
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760
(1974); Fortson v. Secretary of State of Georgia, 379 U. S.
433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S.
17, 20-24 (1960).
Our review of the regulations and guidelines governing administration of the MBE provision reveals that Congress
enacted the program as a strictly remedial measure; moreover, it is a remedy that functions prospectively, in the
manner of an injunctive decree. Pursuant to the administrative program, grantees and their prime contractors are required to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBEs;
they are required to provide technical assistance as needed, to
lower or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise,
the Small Business Administration or other sources for assisting MBEs to obtain required working capital, and to give
guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. Supra,
at 16--17. The program assumes that grantees who undertake
these efforts in good faith will obtain at least 10% participation by minority business enterprises. It is recognized that,
to achieve this target, contracts will be awarded to available,
qualified, bona fide MBEs even though they are not the lowest competitive bidders, so long as their higher bids, when
challenged, are found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs
inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination. Supra, at 18- 19. There is available to the
grantee a provision authorized by Congress for administrative

pom

the MBE provbion. Petitioners requested only de<'laratory !md injunctive
relief again:;t. continued enforcement of the MBE provi.sion; they did not
seek any remedy for the,.:e .specific instance::; of ws.sertedly unalwful discrimination. App. 12a-13a, 17a-19a.
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waiver on a case-by-case basis should there be a demonstratiod
that, despite affirmative efforts, this level of participation cannot be achieved without departing from the objectives of the
program. Supra, at 17-18. There is also an administrative
mechanism, including a complaint procedure, to ensure that
only bona fide MBEs are encompassed by the remedial program, and to prevent unjust participation in the program by
those minority firms whose access to public contracting opportunities is not impaired by the effects of pdor discrimination. Supra, at 19-20.
(1)

As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in
the remedial context the
must act in a wholly
Swann v. Charlotte-Mec~g
"color-blind" fashion.
Board of Education, 402
, 18-21 1971), we rejected
this argument in considering a court-formulated school de-:
segration remedy on the basis that examination of the racial
composition of student bodies was an unavoidable startmg
point and that racially based attendance assignments were
permissible so long as no absolute racial balance of each
school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 4i
(1971), citing Stpann, we observed that "[i]n this remediai
process, steps will almost invariably require that students be
assigned 'differently because of their race.' . . . Any other
approach would freeze the status quo tha.t is the very target
of all desegregation processes." (Citations omitted.) And
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43
(1971), we invalidated a state law that forbade assignment
of any student on account of race because it foreclosed implementation of desegregation plans that were designed to rem·
edy constitutional violations. We held that "[j]ust as the
tace of students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be
considered in formulating a remedy." 402 u. s., at 46.
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In these school desegregation C.!!,.seS we dealt with the
authority of a fi<ieral court to formulate a remedy for unconstitutional racial discrimination. However, the authority of
a court to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial decree
also extends to statutory violations. Where federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy
may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) ;
see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U. S. 405 (1975). In another setting, we have held that a
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably necessary
to assure compliance with federal voting rights legislation,
even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a
United Jewish Organizations of
constitutional violation.
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147- 165 (1977)
(opinion of WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and
STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 180-187 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting on
other grounds).
When we have discussed the remedial powers of a federal
court, we have been alert to the limitation that "[t]he power
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and
state governmental entities is not plenary. . . . [A] federal
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the
nature and extent of the ... violation." Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974), and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed·ucation, supra, 402
U. S., at 16).
Here we deal not wi h he limited remedial powers of
fe~leral .£_ourt, ut with the broad rem 1a powers o Con ress.
It is fundamental tha m no organ
overnment does
there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than
in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to advance the general welfare as

•
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well as to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with
existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination
provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to declare
certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and
induce state action to avoid such conduct. Supra, at 23- 27.
(2)

A more specific challenge to the MBE program is the
charge that it impermissibly deprives nonminority businesses
of access to at least some portion of the government contracting opportunities generated by the Act. It must be conceded that by its objective of remedying the historical impairment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of'
awarding some contracts to MBEs which otherwise might be
awarded to other businesses, who may themselves be innocent
of any prior discriminatory actions. But no one has a constitutional right to be awarded a public works contract. Failure of nonminority firms to receive certain contracts is, of
course, an incidental consequence of the program, not part
of its objective; similarly, past impairment of minority-firm
access to public contracting opportunities may have been an
incidental consequence of "business-as-usual" by public contracting agencies and among prime contractors.
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that
it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms.
When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy
to cure the effects of prior discrimination , such "a sharing
of the urden" by innocent parties is not impermissible.
Franks, supra, a '17; see Albemarle Paper Co. , supra; United
Je'wish Organization, supra. The actual "burden " shouldered·
by nomninority firms is relatively light in this connection
when we consider the scope of this public works program as'
compared with overall construction contracting opportuni-

A
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ties.72 Moreover, although we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory conduct,
it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some nonminority businesses may
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting
opportunities.
.( 3)
:Another challenge to the validity of the MBE program
is the assertion that it is underinclusive--that it limits its
benefit to specified minority groups rather than extending its
remedial objectives to all businesses whose access to government contracting is impaired by the effects of disadvantage
or discrimination. Such an extention would, of course, be
appropriate for Congress to provide; it is not a function for
the courts.
Even in this context, the well-established concept that a.
legislature may take one step at a time to remedy only part
of a broader problem is not without relevance. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). We are not reviewing a
federal program that seeks to confer a prefetTed status upon a
nondisadvantaged minority or to give special assistance to
only one of several groups established to be similarly disadvantaged minorities. Even in such a setting, the Congress is
not without a certain authority. See, e. g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979) ;
12

The Court of Appeals relied upon Department of Commerce sta-tistics to calculate that the $4.2 billion in federal grants conditioned upon
complinnce with the MBE provision amounted to about 2.5% of the tok'll
of nearly $170 billion spent on construction m the Unitro St.a.tes during
1977. Thus, the 10% minimum minority business participation contemplated by this program would account for only 0.25% of the a.nnua.l
expenditure for construction work in the United States. Fullilove v.
Kreps, 584 F . 2d 600, 607 (CA2 1978) •

..
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Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
The Congress has not sought to give select minority groups
a preferred standing in the construction industry, but has
embarked on a remedial program to place them on a more
equitable footing with respect to public contracting opportunities. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has
inadvertently effected an invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that
has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups
encompassed by the MBE program. It is not inconceivable
that on very special facts a case might be made to challenge
the congressional decision to limit MBE eligibility to the
particular minority groups identified in the Act. See Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and
MARSHALL, JJ.). But on this record we find no basis to hold
that Congress is without authority to undertake the kind of
limited experimental remedial effort represented by the MBE
program. Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social
problems.
(4)

It is also contended that the MBE program is overinclusive-that it bestows a benefit on businesses identified by
racial or ethnic criteria which cannot be justified on the basis
of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the present effects of
identified prior discrimination. It is conceivable that a particular application of the program may have this effect; however, the peculiarities of specific applications are not before
us in this case. We are not presented here with a challenge
involving a specific award of a construction contract or the
denial of a waiver request; such questions of specific application must await future cases.

7I

7
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This does not mean that the claim of overinclusiveness
is entitled to no consideration in the present case. The
history of governmental tolerance of practices using racial or
ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing
an invidious discrimination must alert us to the deleterious
effects of even benign racial or ethnic classifications when
they stray from narrow remedial justifications.. Even in the
context of a facial challenge such as is presented in this case,
the MBE provision cannot pass muster unless, with due account for its administrative program, it provides a reasonable
assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be
limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress
and that misapplications of the program will be promptly
and adequately remedied administratively.
It. is significant that the administrative scheme provides for
waiver and exemption. Two fundamental congressional asSUinptions underlie the MBE program: (1) that the present
efff'<'ts of past discrimination have impaired the competitive
position of businesses owned and controlled by members of
minority groups; and (2) that affirmative efforts to eliminate
barriers to minority-firm access, and to evaluate bids with
adjustm<'llt for the present effects of past discrimination,
would n.f'sure that 10% of the federal funds granted under
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 would be accoullt<'d for by contracts with available, qualified, bona fide
minority business enterprises. Each of these assumptions
may It<' rE'butted in the administrative process.
The administrative program contains measures to effectuate
the congrP:ssional objective of assuring legitimate participation by disadvantaged MBEs. Administrative definition
has tightem·d some less definite aspects of the statutory identification of the minority groups encompassed by the program. Then' is administrative scrutiny to identify and
eliminate from participation in the program MBEs who are
not "bona-fide" within the regulations and guidelines ; for

...

78-1007-0PINION

36

FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

example, spurious minority-front entities can be exposed. A
significant aspect of this surveillallCe is the complaint procedure available for reporting "unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program." Su pra, at 20.
And even as to specific contract awards, waiver is available to
avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to exploit the
remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable
price, i. e., a price not attributable to the present effects of
past discrimination. Supra, at 17-19. We must assume that
Congress intended close scrutiny of false claims and prompt
action on them.
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that
their best efforts will not succeed or have not succeeded in
achieving the statutory 10%· target for minority firm participation within the limitations of the program's remedial objectives. In these circu.mstances a waiver or partial waiver is
available once compliance has been demonstrated. A waiver
may be sought and granted at any time during the contracting process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts
warrant.
Nor is the program defective because a 'vaiver may be
sought only by the grantee and not by prime contractors
who may experience difficulty in fulfilling contract obligations
to assure minority participation. It may be administratively
cumbersome, but the wisdom of concentrating responsibility
at the grantee level is not for us to evaluate; the purpose is
to allow the Economic Development Administration to maintain close supervision of the operation of the MBE provision.
The administrative complaint mechanism allows for grievances of prime contractors who assert that a grantee has failed
to seek a waiver in an appropriate case. Finally, we note
that where private parties, as opposed to governmeutal entities, transgress the limitations inherent in the MBE program, the possibility of constitutional violation is more removed. See United Steelworkers of America v~ 443
u.s. 193, 200 (1979).

L/
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That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised
on assumptions rebuttable in the administrative process gives
reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program
will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives contemplated by Congress and that misapplications of the racial
and ethnic criteria can be remedied. In relation to this facial
challenge to the statute, doubts must be resolved in favor of
the congressional judgment that this limited experiment is a
necessary step to effectuate the mandate for equality of
economic opportunity. As is appropriate for a pilot or experimental project, the MBE program is limited in extent and
duration. This is significant in the sense that the justification for any remedial program lapses when it has accomplished its objectives, has proved unsuccessful, or has
exhausted its appropriation; there is also the consideration
that this relatively short-term remedial measure will be
subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress
prior to any extension or reenactment. 78 Miscarriages of administration could have only a transitory economic impact on
businesses not encompasssed by the program, and would not be
irremediable.
(5)
Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need
to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort
to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. In
this effort, Congress has necessary latitude to try new techniques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria
to accomplish remedial objectives; this especially so in programs where voluntary cooperation with remedial measures
is induced by placing conditions on federal expenditures.
73 Cf. GAO Report to the Congress, Minority Firms on Local Public
Works Projects-Mixed Results, CED-79-9 (Jan. 16, 1979) ; U. S. Dept.
of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local Public Works
Program Interim Report on 10 Percent Minority Business Enterprise
Requirement (Sept. 1978).
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rrhat the program may press the outer limits of congressional
authority affords no basis for striking it down.
Petitioners have mounted a facial challenge to a program
developed by the politically responsive branches of Government . For its part, the Congress must proceed only with
programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives, subj ect
to coutinuing evaluation and reassessment; administration
of the programs must be vigiliant and flexible ; and, when
such a program comes under judicial review, courts must be
satisfied that the legislative objectives and projected administration give reasonable assurance that the program will function within constitutional limitations. But as Justice Jackson observed in 1941: 74
"The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in
its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged most
earnestly by members of the Court itself are humbly and
faithfully heeded. After the forces of conservatism and
liberalism, of radicalism and reaction , of emotion and of
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process
and averaged and come to rest in some compromise
measure ... a decision striking it down closes an area
of compromise in which conflicts have actually, if only
temporarily, been composed. Each such decision takes
away from our democratic federalism another of its
defenses against domestic disorder and violence. The
vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years
in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of
the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of
our social and economic conflicts."
Justice Jackson reiterated these thoughts shortly before his
death in what was to be the last of his Godkin Lectures : 75
"I have said that in these matters the Court must re74
7

~

R. H . Jack::;on, The Struggle for Judicial Suprcmi\ C) 321 (1941 ).
R. H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American Sy::;tcm of

Government (il-62 (1955).
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spect the limitations on its own powers because judicial
usurpation is to me no more justifiable and no more
promising of permanent good to the country than any
other kind. So I presuppose a Court that will not depart
from the judicial process, will not go beyond resolving
cases a11d controversies brought to it in conventional
form, and will not consciously encroach upon the functions of its coordinate branches."
Because we are satisfied that the MBE porvision of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 satisfies constitutional
criteria, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.' 0
Affirmed.

Although the complaint aliPgrd ihat the MRE program violated several fedrral ,.;latutCI', supra, n. 5, the only statutory argument urged upon
ns is that tho :MBE provi:;ion is inconsist<'nt with title VI of the Civil
Righs Act of 1964. We perceiv<' no inconsistency between the requirements
of title VI and those of the MBE provision. To the extent any statutory inconsistencirs might be asserted, the MBE provision-the later,
more specific enactment-mwst be deemed to control. See, e. g., Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Preise1· v. Rod1iguez, 411
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S.
76

753, 758 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188-189 (1939).
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APPENDIX
,-r 1. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks, 123 Cong.
Rec. Hl388-H1389 (Feb. 23, 1977), were as follows :
"The history of public works projects, as a countercyclical device, reveals that local government expenditures
for projects create direct jobs and stimulate complementary expenditures in the material and supply market . ...
"If public works projects are to have optimum effect
on both the economy and the labor force, we must both
trigger and target the public works bill. Estimates reveal
that there is currently 35 percent unemployment in the
minority construction sector and an estimated 20 percent
of the complementary construction industries that are
minority owned have dissolved in the midst of a depression in the minority business sector. ...
"The Federal Government has not played its role in
the quest for economic parity. . . .
" ... In the process to parity the minority business sector
should receive from 15-18 percent of the contract receipts,
however, in fiscal year 1976 the minority business sector
received less than 1 percent of the contract receipts of the
Federal Government. . . .
"I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and
promote growth in the minority business community. I
appeal to the consciousness of parity and not the vote of
disparity in requesting that Members of this legislative
body support my amendment to insure minority business
participa.tion in the construction industry."
~ 2. Representative Mitchell's introductory remarks, 123
Cong. Rec. H1436-H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977), included the
following:
"Let me tell the Members how ridiculous it is not to·
target for minority enterprises. We spend a great deal
of Federal money under the SBA program creating,
strengthening and supporting minority businesses and

"
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yet when it comes down to giving those minority busi·
nesses a piece of the action, the Federal Government is
absolutely remiss. All it does is say that, 'We will create
you on the one hand and, on the other hand, we will deny
you.' That denial is made absolutely clear when one
looks at the amount of contracts let in any given fiscal
year and then one looks at the percentage of minority
contracts. The average percentage of minority contracts,
of all Government contracts, in any given fiscal year is
1 percent--1 percent....
"In the present legislation before us it seems to me
that we have an excellent opportunity to begin to remedy
this situation."
' 3. The following colloquy occurred between Representative
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas, 123 Cong. Rec.
H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977):
"Rep. KAZEN: All right. What happens in the rural
areas where there are no minority enterprises? Will the
10 percent be held up in order to bring minority enterprises from somewhere else where there is no unemployment into a place where there is unemployment and there
is no minority enterprise?
"Rep. MITCHELL: In response to the gentleman's
question, the answer is 'No.'
"Rep. KAZEN: ... [W]here there are no minority
enterprise contractors then this provision would not be
in effect; am I correct?
"Rep. MITCHELL: That is absolutely correct, and
that is done by administrative action already on the books
with all of the agencies.
"Rep. KAZEN: Does the gentleman's amendment
leave room for that type of discretion in the Secretary?
"Rep. MITCHELL: I assume that it does. It would
be my intent that it would because that is existing admin·
istrative law."
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tautly to promote a sense of economic equality in thi&
Nation."
~

6. Senator Brooke's principal remarks, 123 Cong. Rec. S3910
(Mar. 10, 1977), were as follows:
"It is proper that we target this $4 billion on areas of
greatest need: the inner city, our depressed rural communities, and other areas where unemployment has been
particula.rly severe and prolonged. And it is important
that we focus on the unemployment experiences of different ethnic and racial groups in designing a sensitive
and responsive jobs program. For example, among
minority citizens, the average rate of unemployment runs
double that among white citizens... .
"Of course, EDA will refine its funding procedures
based on its experiences with the last public works jobs
program. But another way to insure that the moneys
are properly targeted is to set aside a reasonable percentage of the public works jobs funds to go to qualified
minority contractors.
"This is entirely proper, appropriate and necessary.
It is necessary because minority businesses have received
only 1 percent of the Federal contract dollar, despite
repeated legislation, Executive orders and regulations·
mandating affirmative efforts to include minority contractors in the Federal contracts pool.
"It is a proper concept. . . . [T]he Federal Government, for the last 10 years in programs like SBA's 8 (a)
set-asides, and the Railroad Revitalization Act's minority
resources centers, to name a few, has accepted the setaside concept as a legitimate tool to insure participation
by hitherto excluded or unrepresented groups.
"It is an appropriate concept, because minority businesses' work forces are principally drawn from residents
of communities with severe and chronic unemployment.

78-1007-0PINION APPENDIX

44

FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

With more business, these firms can hire even more
minority citizens...•
"Many have expressed concern about the impact of this
amendment as a limitation on contracting in areas where
there are few minorities. But this amendment is not a
limitation. Rather, it is designed to facilitate greater
equality in contracting. This amendment provides a
rule-of-thumb which requires much more than the vague
"good-faith efforts" language which currently hampers
our efforts to insure minority participation.
"One final objection to this set-aside may be that it
will cause undue delays in beginning these vital public
works projects. In fact, EDA already maintains a roster
for each State of capable and qualified minority enterprises who are ready and willing to work. These firms.
are capable of competitive bidding, and need the financiaL
support which this potential level of Federal contracting.
will guarantee."
~ 7.. The Subcommittee stated in part, H. R. Rep. No. 94-468~
p. 28 (1975):
"According to the testimony received from Federal procuring agencies, the subcommittee is of the opinion that
there has been inadequate effort to identify minority
businesses and match their capabilities with Federal procurement requirements. There has been a lack of 'outreach' to the minority business community to locate
potential minority contractors and yet some agencies have
informed the subcommittee that there are very few
minority businesses which can perform the specialized
work required by those agencies in the performance of
their contracts. The subcommittee wonders how such
statements can be honestly made when there has not
.been a sufficient effort to identify minority businesses in
the first instance."
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8. The EDA guidelines, at 2-7, provide in relevant part :
"The primary obligation for carrying out the 10% MBE
participation requirement rests with EDA Grantees...•
The Grantee and those of its contractors which will make
subcontracts or purchase substantial supplies from other
firms (hereinafter referred to as 'prime contractors') must
seek out all available bona fide MBE's [sic] and make
every effort to use as many of them as possible on the
project.
"An MBE is bona fide if the minority group ownership
interests are real and continuing and not created solely
to meet 10%· MBE requirements. For example, the
minority group owners or stockholders should possess
control over management, interest in capital and interest
in earnings commensurate with the percentage of ownership on which the claim of minority ownership status is
based. . . .
"An MBE is available if the project is located in the
market area of the MBE and the MBE can perform
project services or supply project materials at the time
they are needed. The relevant market area depends on
the kind of services or supplies which are needed. . . .
EDA will require that Grantees and prime contractors
engage MBE's [sic] from as wide a market area as is economically feasible.
"An MBE is qualified if it can perform the services or
supply the materials that are needed. Grantees and prime
contractors will be expected to use MBE's [sic] with
less experience than available nonminority enterprises
and should expect to provide technical assistance to
MBE's [sic] as needed. Inability to obtain bonding will
ordinarily 11ot disqualify an MBE. Grantees and prime
contractors are expected to help MBE's [sic] obtain bonding, to include MBE's [sic] in any overall bond or to
waive bonding where feasible. The Small Business Ad-
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ministration (SBA) is prepared to provide a 90% guarantee for the bond of any MBE participating in an LPW
[local public works] project. Lack of working capital
will not ordinarily disqualify an MBE. SBA is prepared
to provide working capital assistance to any MBE participating in an LPW project. Grantees and prime contractors are expected to assist MBE's [sic] in obtaining
working capital through SBA or otherwise.
" ... [E]very Grantee should make sure that it knows
the names, addresses and qualifications of all relevant
MBE's [sic] which would include the project location
in their market areas. . . . Grantees should also hold
prebid conferences to which they invite interested
contractors and representatives of ... MBE support
organizations.
"Arrangements have been made through the Office of
Minority Business Enterprise . . . to provide assistance
to Grantees and prime contractors in fulfilling the 10%
MBE requirement....
"Grantees and prime contractors should also be aware
of other support which is available from the Small Business Administration ....
" ... [T]he Grantee must monitor the performance of
its prime contractors to make sure that their commitments
to expend funds for MBE's [sic] are being fulfilled . .. .
Grantees should administer every project tightly. . . ."
1T 9. The EDA guidelines, at 13-15, provide in relevant part:
"Although a provision for waiver is included under
this section of the Act, EDA will only approve a waiver
under exceptional circumstances. The Grantee must
demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business enterprises whose market areas
include the project location to justify a waiver. The
Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the
Grantee and potential co~ tractors have exerted to locate
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'and enlist MBE's [sic]. The request must indicate the
specific MBE's [8ic] which were contacted and the reason
·each MBE was not used. . . •
"Only the Grantee can request a waiver. . . . Such a
waiver request would ordinarily be made after the initial
'bidding or negotiation procedures proved unsuccessful. ...
"[A] Grantee situated in an area where the minority
·population is very small may apply for a waiver before
·requesting bids on its project or projects.... "
1f 10..The EDA ·technical bulletin, at 1, provides the following
aefinitions:
"a) Negro-An individual of the black race of African
origin.
'"b) ·spanish•speaking-An individual of a Spanishspeaking culture and origin or parentage.
'"c) Oriental-An individual of a culture, origin or parentage traceable to the areas south of the Soviet Union,
East of Iran, inclusive of islands adjacent thereto, and
out to the Pacific including but not limited to Indonesia,
Indochina, Malaysia, Hawaii and the Philippines.
"d) Indian-An individual having origins in any of the
original people of North America and who is recognized as
an Indian by either a tribe, tribal organization or a suitable authority in the community. (A suitable authority in
the community may be: educational institutions, religious
organizations, or state agencies.)
"e) Eskimo-An indivdiual having orgins in any of the
original peoples of Alaska.
"f) Aleut-An individual having orgins in any of the
original peoples of the Aleutian Islands."
1f 11. The EDA technical bulletin, at 19, provides in relevant

part:
"Any person or organization with information indicating unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals

•
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in the MBE program or who believes that the MBE participation requirement is being improperly applied should
contact the appropriate EDA grantee and provide a
detailed statement of the basis for the complaint.
"Upon receipt of a complaint, the grantee should
attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. In the event
the grantee requires assistance in reaching a determination, the grantee should contact the Civil Rights Specialist
in the appropriate Regional Office.
"If the complainant believes that the grantee has not
satisfactorily resolved the issues raised in his complaint,
he may personally contact the EDA Regional Office."
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of Commerce of the United
States, et al.

v.

[May -, 1980]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opm1on of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to consider a facial constitutional
challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending program that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used
by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies
from busin esses O\med and controlled by members of statutorily identified minority groups. 441 U.S. 960.

I
In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended
the Local Public 'Vorks Capital Development and Investment
Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94- 369, 90 Stat. 999. The 1977 amendments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for
federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce,
acting through the Economic Development Administration
(EDA), to state and local governmental entities for use in
local public works projects. Among the changes made was
· the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this
litigation. Section 103 (f) (2) of the 1977 Act, referred to

·.f. .

'::(_~~c....(
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as the "min6rity business enterprise" or "MBE" provision.
requires that: 1
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any
local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10
per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended
for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means
a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by
minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned
business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which
- is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskomos, and
Aleuts."
In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations
governing administration of the grant program which were
amended two months later. 2 In August 1977, the EDA
issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations
with respect to minority business participation in local public
works grants, 8 and in October 1977, the EDA issued a technical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and information to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the
10% MBE requirement. 4
91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) ~ 6705 (f) (2) .
42 Fed. R eg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 Fed . R eg. 35822 (1977) ;
13 CFR part 317 (1978).
8 U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic D evelopm ent Administration, Local Public Works Program , Round II, Guid elin es For 10% Minority
Businrss Participation In LPW Gmnt s (1977) ; App . 156a-167a..
4 U. S. Department of Commerce, E conomic D evelopment Adminil:> tration, EDA l'vlinority Enterprise (MBE) T echnical Bulletin (Additional
Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Contractors
In Meetjng The 10% MBE Requirement) (1977); App. 129a-155a.
1

2

',

.

~
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On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin
enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants
were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administrator, and the State and City of New York, as actual and pot-ential project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of
construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm engaged in heating, ventilation and air conditioning work.
Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic
injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and
that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thr equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and various statutory antidiscrimination
pro,·isions.~

Aft-er a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the
District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order
and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the
merits. On December 19. 1977, the District Court issued a
memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE program and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove v.
Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (SDNY 1977) .
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 584 F. 2d GOO (CA2 1978). holding that "even
under the most exacting standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional muster." Id., at 603. Considered in the context of many years of govemmental efforts
to remedy past racial and ethnic discrimination. the court
found it "difficult to imagine" any purpose for the program
other than to remedy such discrimination. Id., at 605. In
5 16 Stat. 144, 42 U. S. C. § 1981; 17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983;
12 S1at. 284, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U . S. C.§ 1985; title VI , § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stnt. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d; title VII , § 701 et
seq. of the Civil R.ights Act of 1964, 78 Stnt. 253, ns nmended, 42 U.S . C.
§ 2000e et seq.

··(.·,

''

''
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its view, a number of factors contributed to the legitimacy
of the MBE provision, most sig11ificant of which was the
narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and
administrative program, in size, ill1pact and duration, id.,
at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other
courts of appeals and district courts that the MBE program
was constitutional, id., at 608-609. 6 It expressly rejected
petitioners' contention that the 10 % MBE requirement violated the equal protection guaralltees of the Constitution. 7
584 F. 2d, at 609.
II

A
The MBE provJSIOil was enacted as part of the Public
Works Employment Act 9f 1977, which made variol!S amendments to title I of the Local Public '~Torks Capita] Development and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was intended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem
of national unemployment and to stimulate the national
economy by assisting state and local governments to build
6 Ohio C011tractors Asliociatio-n v. Economic Development Administration, 580 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1978); Constructors Association v. Kreps, 573
F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978); Rhode I sland Chapter, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (DRI 1978); Associated General Con·tractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-4218 (Kan. Dec. 19, 1977) ;
Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors Y. Kreps, 442 F. Supp.
392 (SC 1977); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. Economic Developrnent Administration, 452 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ohio 1977) ; Montaua Co11tractors Association v. Secretary of Contmerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (Mont. 1977);
Florida East Coast Chapter v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-8351 (SD
Fla. Nov. 3, 1977); but see Associated General Contractors v. Secrr•tary
of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (CD Cal. 1977), Yacated nnd remanrlrd
for consideration of mootne~:o, 438 U. S. 909 (1978), on rPmand 459 Y .
Supp. 766 (CD Cal.), appeal docketed su.b nom. Armilitead "· A~sociated
General Contractors of California, No. 78-1107.

• 7 Both the Court of Appeals and the Di~trict Comt n·jcdcrl petitioners•
nrious statutory argument~ without extended dbcu:;:;ion. 584 F. 2d, at
608, n. 15; 443 F. Supp., at 262.
·
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need ed public facilities. 8 To accomplish these objectives,
the Congress authorizPd th<-> Secretary of Commerce, acting
through the E conomic Development Administration. to make
grants to state and local govPrnments for construction, renovation, repair or other improvement of local puulic works
proj ects. 9 The 1076 Act placed a number of restrictions
on project eligibilty designed to assure ~ federal mom es
were targeted to accomplish the legi slative purposes.' 0 1t
establi shed criteria to determine grant prioriti es and to apportion federal funds among political jurisclictions. 11 Those
criteria directed grant. funds toward areas of high un employment.12 The statute authorized the appropriation of up to
$2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; 1 3 this appropriation was soon consumed by grants made under the
program.
Early in 1977, Congress began consid eration of expanded
a.ppropriations and am endm ents to the grant program.
Under administration of the 1976 appropriation , referred to
as "Round I" of the local public works program, applicants
seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2 ___rbillion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications,.(kSijoN/y
~2, 000 were granted. 11 The results provoked widespread
concern for the fairness of the allocation process. 15 Because
s H. R. R ep. No. 94-1077, p. 2 (1976) . The bill di;:;cu ssed in this report
was accepted by the Conft•rence Committee in pr€'fl:'rence to th e Senate
version . S. Conf. Hep. No. 94-939, p. 1 (1!:176); H. R. Conf. Hep .
No. 94-1260, p. 1 (1976).
9 90 Stat. 999 , 42 U . S. C. § 6702.
10 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S.C. § 6705.
11 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U.S. C. § 6707.
12 90 Stat. 1001, 421i . S.C.§ 6707 (c).
u 90 Stat. 1002, 42 U. S. C. § G710. The actual appropriation of the
full amount. aut.l10rizcd wa,; made seYeral week:; later. Pub. L. No . 94-447,
90 Stat. 1497.
14 123 Co11g. Rec. 81355 (Jan. 25, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Rand olph) .
1 5 See, e. g., H earing::: on H. R. 11 and related bilb before th e Subcommittee on Economic Development of the House Committee on Public

,-;..

)
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the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an additional $4 billion to fund "Round II" of the grant program, 16
the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amendments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems
of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the
supplemental appropriation. 17 The result of this attention
was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the allocation criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, however, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into
areas of high unemployment. 18 The 1977 Act also added new
restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal
grants; 19 among these was the MBE provision .
The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House
version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the
House on Feb. 23, 1977 by Representative Mitchell of Maryland.20 As offered, the amendment provided: 21
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant
shall be made under this Act for any local public works
project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles,
materials, and supplies which will be used in such project
are procured from minority business enterprises. For
purposes of this paragraph, the term 'minority business
enterprise' means a business at least 50 percent of which
is owned by minority group members or, in case or
publicly owned businesses, at Ieast 51 percent of the stock
Works aud Tran:;portation, 95th Cong., bt Ses::;. (1977) ; H . n:. Rep.
No. 95-20 (Hl77); S. Rep. No. 95-38 (1977) .
1o 91 Stat. 119, 42 U . S. C. (1976 ed., Supp. I) § 6710. The actual
appropriation of the full authorized amount was made the l;'ame day. 91
Stat. 123.
17 E. g., Hea rings, cited, at n. 14, supra; 123 Cong. Rec. Bl401- Hl462'
(Feb. 24, 1977); 123 Cong. Rec . 83851- 83927 (l\1ar. 10, 1977).
1 ~ 91 Stat . 117, 42 U . S. C. (1976 ed. Supp.l) § 6707.
1 9 91 Stat.. 116, 42 U. S. C. (Hl76 ed. Supp. I) § 6705.
20 123 Con g. Rec. H1388 (Feb. 23~ 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell) ..
:u Fd., at H1389'..
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of which is owned by minority group members. For the
purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts."
The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment
was to direct funds into the minority business community, a
sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but
which, on the basis of past experience with government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works program as then formulated.~~
He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year
1976 less than I % of all federal procurement was concluded
with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18 % of the population. 28 When the amendment
was put forward during debate on H. R. 11, 21 Rep. Mitchell
reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would
obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of this
government program. 25
The amendment was put forward not as a new concept,
but rather one building upon prior administrative practice.
In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal
squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small
!d., at Hl388-Hl389. Represent:ltive J\'litchell's principal remarks
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, , 1.
23 !d., at H1389.
24 123 Cong. Rec. H1435 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. J\fitchell).
As reintroduced, the first ::;entence of the nmendment. was modified to
provide:
"Not"·ith:::tanding any other provision of Jaw, no grant <;hall be made under
this Act. for any local public works project unless at least 10 per centum
of the dollar volume of each contract :shall be :set aside for minority business enterprise and, or, unless at least 10 per centum of the articles,
materials, and supplies which wilJ be used in such project are procured
from minority business enterprises."
25 !d., a.t. H1435-H1437.
Repreo;entMive l\Jitchell's remarks are set out,
in part, in 1he Appendix to thjs opinion, , 2 .
22

•• <
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Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2 (8), 72 Stat. 389,
which, as will become evident, served as a model for the
administrative program developed to enforce the MBE
provision: 26
"The first point in opposition will be that you canuot
have a set-aside. ·wen, Madam Chairman, we have been
doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A
set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more
than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and
bona fide. We are doing it in this bilL"
Although the proposed MBE provision on its face appeared maudatory, requiring compliance with the 10 o/c· minority participation requirement "[n]otwithstamling auy
other provision of law," its sponsor gave assurances that
existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in
admi11istration if, with respect to a particular proj ect, compliance with the 10%- requirement proved illfeasible. 27
Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change
of language expressing the twin intentions (1) that the federal
administrator would have discretion to waive the 10 % requirement where its application was not feasible. and (2) that the·
grantee would be mandated to achieve at least 10 % participa-.
tion by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demonstrated.28 He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence
of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted: ~
"Except to the extent that the Secretary determines
otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any
local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per2

123 Cong . R ee. H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of RPp . 1\fit ehell) .
!d., nt, Hl437- HI438. A reYea ling colloquy b etween R epresent a tive
Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas is set. out in th e Appendix
to this opinion, ~ 3.
28123 Cong. Rec. Hl438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of R ep. Roe).
2G

27
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cent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for
minority business enterprises."
The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification because it retained the directive that the initial burden of compliance v,;ould fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden
was necessary because, as he put it, "every agency of the
Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this
very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up
with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it." so
Other supporters of the MBE amendment echoed the sponsor's concern that a number of factors, difficult to isolate or
quantify, seemed to impair access by minority businesses
to public contracting opportunities. Representative Conspoke of the frustration of the existing situayers of T
tion, in which, due to the intricacies of the bidding process
and through no fault of their own, minority contractors and
businessmen were unable to gain access to government contracting opportunities. 31
Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need
for the amendment to "promote a sense of economic equality
in the Nation." He expressed the view that without the
amendment, "this legislation may be potentially inequitable
to minority businesses and workers" in that it would perpetuate the historic practices that have precluded minority
businesses from effective participation in public contracting
opportunities. 8 2 The amendment was accepted by the House.8 8
Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427. its package
of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Develop!d. (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
!d., at H14-10 (remnrks of Rep . Conyers) . Represenative Conyers
remarks are set out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 4.
az 123 Cong. R ec. H1440-H1441 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Biaggi). Reprf'se ntative Biaggi's remarks are set out, in part, in the
Appendix to this opinion, , 5.
88 !d., at H1441.
llO
lll

,;.

.

78-1007-0PINION
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

10

ment and Investment Act of 1976. At that time Senator
Brooke of Massachusetts introuuced an MBE amendment,
worded somewhat differently than the House version, but
aimed at achieving the same objectives. 34 His statement
in support of the 10ro requirement reiterated and summarized
the various expressions on the House side that the amendment was necessary to ensure that minority bush1esses were
not deprived of access to the government contracting opportunities generated by the public works program.M 5
The Senate adopted the amendment without uebate. 80 The
Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between
the House and Senate versions of the Public \Vorks Employment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the
House for the MBE provision. 37 The Conference Reports
added only the comment, 11 This provision shall be dependent
on the availability of minority business enterprises located
in the project area." ss
34 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-S3910
(Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). The first par;Jgraph of Senator Brooke'~ formulntion wns identical to the Yer~ion originally offered by Repre::;entath·e Mitchell, quoted
in the te:\i. at pp. 6--7, supra. A second paragraph of Senator Brooke's
amendment. prO\·ided:
"This section shall not be interpreted to defund projects with less than 10
percent minority participation in areas with minority population of less
than 5 percent. In that event, the correct level of minority participation
will be predetermined by the Secretary in ronsultation with EDA and
based upon its lists of qualified minority contractors and its solicitation
of competitive bid::; from all minority firms on tho::;e lists." 123 Coug.
Hec. S3910 (~Ja.r. 10, 1977).
85 I d., at S3910.
Senator Brooke's principal remarks are set out in the
Appendix to this opinion, ~ 6.
aG !d., at. S3910.
87
S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-110, p. 11 (1977); H. R Conf. Rep . No . 95230, p. 11 (1977)
88 Ibid.
The Conferenee Committee bill was agre<:'d to by the Senate,
123 Cm1g. Rec. S6755-S6757 (Apr. 29, 1977), and by the House, 123
Con g. Rec. H3920--H3935 (l\iay 3, 1977), and wa:s :;igned into hlw on
0

May 3, 1977.
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The uevice of a 10% MBE participation requirement, subject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required
that to assure minority business participation; otherwise it
was thought repetition of the prior experience could be expected, with participation by minority business accounting
for an inordinately small percentage of government contracting. The causes of this disparity were perceived as involving
the longstanding existence and maintenauce of barriers impairing access by minority enterprises to public coutracting
opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct discrimination, but not as relating to lack- as Senator Brooke
put it-"of capable and qualified minority enterprises who
are ready and willing to work." sP In the words of its sponsor, the MBE provision was "designed to begin to redress
this grievance that has been extant for so long." 40

B
The legislative objectives of the MBE prov1s10n must be
considered against the background of ongoillg efforts directed
toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of
economic opportunity.
The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the
Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing administrative programs promoting minority opportunity in government procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the
Small Business Act. of 1958. 41 Section 8 (a) delegates to the
SBA an authority and an obligation "whenever it determines
such action is necessary" to enter into contracts with any
procurement agency of the Feueral Government to furnish
required goods or services, and, in turn, to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for the performance of such
~ 9 123

Cong. Rec. 83910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remark of Sen. Brooke) .
123 Cong. Rec. H1440 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remark~ of Rep. Mit.chell) .
41 123 Cong. Rec. Hl437 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell);
123 Cong. Rec. 83910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen . Brooke) .
~0

.
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contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Commencing in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the President ~ 2 to develop a program pursuant to its ~ 8 (a) authority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled
by "socially or economically disadvantaged" persons to achieve
a competitive position in the economy.
At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regulations governing the § 8 (a) program defined "social or economic disadvantage" as follows: 48
"An applicant concern must be owned and controlled
by one or more persons who have been deprived of the
opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural,
social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or
other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not
limited to, black Americans, American Indians, SpanishAmericans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts .... '~
The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that
a minority business could not be maintained in the program,
even when owned and controlled by members of the identified
minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been
deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic
disadvantage.u
4 2 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order
No. 11518, 3 CFR 907 (1966-1970 Comp.).
4813 CFR § 124.8-1 {c)(1) (1977).
H U. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Business Development,
Section 8 (a) Program, Small Business Administration Standard Operatin Procedure 15- 16 (1976); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) ("[T]he
relevant rules and regulations require such applicant to identify with the
disadvantages of his or her racial group generally, and that such disadvantages must have personally affected the applicant's ability to enter
into the mainstream of the business community."); U. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Minority Small Business and Capital Own-

.. ,...·
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As the Congress began consideration of the Public 1Vorks
Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small
Business issued a lengthy report summarizing its activities)
including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program. 45
One chapter of the report, entitled "Minority Enterprise and
Allied .Problems of Small Business," summarized a 1975 committee report of the same title dealing with this subject
matter.46 The original report, prepared by the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise,
observed: H
16

The subcommittee is acutely aware that the economic
policies of this Nation must function within and be
guided by our constitutional system which guarantees
'equal protection of the laws.' The effects of past inequities stem,ming from racial prejudice have not remained
in the past. The Congress has recognized the reality that
past discriminatory practices have, to some degree,
adversely affected our present ecmwmic system.
"\Vhile minority persons comprise about 16 percent of
the Nation's population, of the 13 million businesses in
the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0
percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most
recent data from the Department of Commerce also indicates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this country totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only
$16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minority business concerns.
ership Development, MSB & COD Programs, Small Business Administration Standard Operating Procedure 20 (1979) ("[T]he social disadvantage
of individuals, including those within the above-named [racial and ethnic]
groups, shall be determined by SBA on a. case-by-c1-1se basis. 1\Jembership alone in any group is not conclusive that an individual is socially
disadvantaged.").
45 H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977).
46 !d., at 124-149.
47 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 (1975) •

•r.
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"These statistics are not the result of random chance.
The presumption must be made that past discriminatory
systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In
order to dght this situation, the Congress has formulated
certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially
or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where
they may effectively participate in the business mainstream of our economy.*
"*For the purposes of this report. the term 'minority' shall include
only such minority indi,·iduals as are con,.;idered to be economically
or socially di::;n dnmtnged." ~s (Emphasis rt ddrcl .)

The 1975 report gave particular attention to the§ 8 (a) program, expressing disappointment with its limited effective~
ness. 40 \Vith specific reference to government construction
contracting, the report concluded, "there are substantial § 8 (a)
opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but ... the
practices of some agencies preclude the realization of that
potential." "0 The subcommittee took "full notice .. , as
evidence for its consideration" of reports submitted to the
Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the U. S,
Another chapter of the 1977 R eport of the Honse Committee on
Small Businr:ss Slllllmarized a review of the SEA's Seeurity Boud Guarantee Progrmn, making specific reference to minority lm ~i ne~ participation in the construction industry:
"The wry basic problem disclosed by the testimony is that., over the
years, there ha s den·loped a business system which has traditionally excluded measu rable minority pa.rticipation. In the past. more than the
present, this tlYSfem of conducting business transaction~ overtly precluded
minority input. (;urrently, we more often encounter a business system
which is racially neutral on its face, but becau:;e of past overt. social and
economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, 10 perpetuate
these past inequities. Minorities, until recent!~·, have not. participated
t.o any measurable ext1'nt, in our total bu::;ine,;::: 8~·;. tem generally, or in the
con st.ruction industry, in particular." H. R. RE'p. No. 94-1791, p . 182
(1977), quoting from H. R. Hep. No. 94-840, p . 17 (1976).
49 H. R. Hep . No. 94-468, pp. 28-30 (1975).
The subcommittee's comment s are set. out, in part, in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 7.
50 !d., at 29.
48
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Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program. 61 The
Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the
barriers encountered by mjnority businesses in gaining access
to government eontracting opportunities at the federal, state
and local levels. 52 Among the major difficulties confronting
minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an
inadequate "track record," lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection
before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor
minority businesses. 53
The subcommittee report also gave consideration to the
operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise
(OMBE), aJ1 agency of the Department of Commerce organized pursuant to Executive Orders fi4 to formulate and coordinate federal efforts to assist the development of mi11ority
businesses. The report concluded that OMBE efforts were
"totally inadequate" to achieve its policy of increasing opportunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on
public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a "glaring
lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should
be required to achieve," by a "lack of enforcement provisions,'Y
and by a "lack of any meaningful monitoring system." 55
Ll !d., at 11: U. S. General Acc01mt.ing Office, "Questionnble Effectiveness of the § 8 (a) Pror11rement Program" (1975); U. S. Commission on
Civil Rights, "Minorities and Women as Government Contractors" (1975).
52 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, "l\Iinorities and Women aE Government Contra.ctors" 16-28, 8G-88 (1975).
53 Ibid.
54 Exec. Orclrr No. 11458, 3 CFR 779 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order
No. 11625, 3 CFR. 616 (1971- 1975 Comp.).
55 H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 32 (1975).
For other congrc;;sionnl observntions with respect to the effe(·t of past di.~crimin~ltion on current. business opportunities for minorities, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, p. 3
(1972); H. R. Rep. No. 95-949, p. 8 (1978); S. Rep. No . 95-1070, pp. 14-

"~
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Against this backdrop of legislative ru1d administrative pro~
grams, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were
not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and
of the reasons prompting its enactment.

c
Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only
the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a 11umber of
critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited racial
and ethnic preference; the specifieation of a minimum level
for minority business participation; the identification of the
minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program;
and the provisim: for an administrative waiver where application of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the
administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant
to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an administrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and
objectives.
As required by the Public ·works Employment Act of 1977,
the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into
motion "Round II" of the federal grant program."0 The
regulations require that construction projects funded under
the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by
competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has
made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a
particular project some other method is in the public interest.
·where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo
the statute's requirement that contracts are to be awarded
on the basis of the "lowest responsive bid submitted by a
bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility," and they
also restate the MBE requirement. 57
15, (1978); S. Rep. No. 96-31, pp. 107, 123-124 (1979) ; see al:>o, e. g.,
H. R. Doc. J\'o. 92-169, p. 4 (HJ71); H. R. Doc. J\'o. 92-194, p . 1 (1972) .
5 u 91 Stat. 117, 42 U.S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6706; 13 CFR part 317
(1978).
57
91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. (1976 ed. Supp. I) § 6705 (e) (1); 13 CFR
§ 317.19 (1978).

..
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EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the
administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines outline the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available,
qualified, bona fide MBEs, to provide technical assistance
as needed, to lower or waive bonding requirements where
feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise, the Small Business Administration or other sources
for assisting MBEs in obtaining required working capital,
and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding
process.:;s
EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Congress, most local public ·works projects will entail the award
of a predGminant prime contract, with the prime contractor
assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 107o
MBE requirement.n 9 The EDA guidelines specify that when
prime contractors are selected through competitve bidding,
bids for the prime contract "shall be considered by the Grantee
to be responsive only if at lf'ast 10 percent of the contract
funds are to be expended for MBE's [sic]." 00 The administrative program euvisions that competitive incentive will
motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obligations under the MBE provision so as to qualify as "rf'sponsive"
bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the
lowest responsive bidder, the same incentive is expected to
motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive
of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This
too is consistent with the legislative intcntion.r. 1
The EDA guidelines also outline the projected administration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE require58 Guidelines, n. 3, supra, at 2-7; App. 157n-160a. The relevant portjons
of the guidrlines are ~et . out in t.he Appendix t.o thi,.; opinion, ,j 8.
suJd., at 2; App. 157a; :-:ee 123 Cong. Rrc. HH3i-Hl438 (Feb. 24,
1977) (remarks of Hep. :\Iitchell and Rep. Hoe).
u<J Guidelines, n. 3, supra. at 8; App. 161:1.
61
See 123 Coug. Rec. H1437-H1438 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Mitchell and Rep. Roe) .

..
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ment, which may be sought by the grantee either before or
during the bidding process. 02 The technical bulletin issued
by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing of waiver
requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines.
It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on
the circumstances,68 and it illustrates the projected operation
of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with
projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical
is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the
scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the
federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is
confronted with an available, qualified , bona fide minority
business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder.
The hypothetical provides: 64
"Question: Should a request for waiver of the 10% requirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an
MBE ever be granted?
"Answer: It is possible to imagine situations where an
MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is
unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified.
However, before a waiver request will be honored, the
following determinations will be made:
"a) The MBE's quote is unreasonably priced. This
determination should be based on the nature of the product or service of the subcontractor, the geographic location of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar
products or services in the relevant market area, and general business conditions in the market area. Furthermore, a subcontractor's price should not be considered
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs
because the price results from disadvantage which affects
62 Guidelines, n. 3, supra. at 13-16; App. 165n-167a.
The reJe,·nnt. portions of the guid elines are set out in the Apprndix to this opinion, ~ 9.
63 Technical Bulletin, n. 4, supra, at 5; App. 136a.
6 4 /d., at 9-10; App. 143a.
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the MBE's cost of doing business or results from
discrimination.
"b) The contractor ha.s contacted other MBEs and ha.s
no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high
price."
This announced policy makes clear the administrative understanding that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will
be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business
enterprise at an "unreasonable" price, i. e., a price above competitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority
firm's attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of
disadvantage or discrimination.
This administrative approach is consistent with the legislative intention. It will be reca.Iled that in the report of the
House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise the subcommittee took special care to note that when
using the term "minority" it intended to include "only such
minority individuals as are considered to be economically or
socially disadvantaged." 65 The subcommittee also was cognizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure
that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority
business enterprises be those whose competitive position is
impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination.
In its report, the subcommittee expressed its intention that
these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA's
§ 8 (a) program.66 The sponsors of the MBE provision, in
their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that
the term "minority business enterprise" would be given that
same limited application; this even found expression in the
legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the
point: 67
when we are talking about companies held by
es Text accomp:mying n . 48, supm.
H. R. Rep. 1\o. 94-408; p. 30 (1975).
e1 123 Gong. Rec. H1439 (Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Roe) .
;;G

..
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minority groups . . . [ c] ertainly people of a variety of
backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a
measurement. They are talking about people in the
minority and deprived."
The EDA technical bulletin provides other elaboration of
the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of "minority
group members." 68 It also indicates EDA's intention "to
allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts
in whic'h involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening
the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the
construction and related industries." 69 Finally, the bulletin
outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of
"unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the
MBE program," or of improper administration of the MBE
requirement. 70

III
When we are required to pass on the constitutiona1ity
of an Act of Congress, we assume ''the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform."
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of
Holmes, J.). A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination;
yet we are bound to approach our t~k ·with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by
the Constitution with the power to "provide for the . . .
general 'V { elfare of the United States" and "to enforce by
appropriate legislation" the equal protection guarantees of
the Fourte~nth Amendment. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Amdt. 14,
§ 5. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
Technical Bulletin , n. 4, supra, at 1; App. 131a-132a. Tl1e8e definition;; are ;;et out in the Appeudix to thi:; opinion, ,I 10.
tiu !d., at 3; App. 135a.
70 !d., at 19; App. 155a.
The relevant portions of the t€clmical bulletin
are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, 11.
68

,r
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l{at'i,onal Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded
"great weight to the decisions of Congress" even though
the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not different when a congressional program raises equal protection
concerns. See, e. g., Cleland v. National College of Business,
435 U. S. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181
(1976).
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a
school board but on a considered decision of the Congress
and the President. However, in no sense does that render it
immune from judicial sc..:rutiny and it "is not to say we 'defer'
to the judgment of the Congress . . . on a constitutional question," or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution
should v,;e determine that Congress has overstepped the
bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broa.dcasting,
supra, 412 U. S., at 103.
The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by
our 11ecessarily extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was designed to ensure
that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect
to participate would not employ procurement practices tha.t
Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the
effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting
opportunities. The MBE program does not manda.te the
allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages
solely based on ra.ce or ethnicity.
Our a.na.lysis proceeds in two steps. At the outset, we
must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are
within the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide
whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the
context presented, is a con·stitutionally permissible means
for achieving the congressional objectives.
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A
(1)

In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress
employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers.
The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very nature, is primarily an exercise of the Spending Power. U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This Court has recognized that the
power to "provide for the . . . general Welfare" is an indet?..vf)ori-f)',
pendent grant of legislative }"11€1 ogative, plenaFy within its.,__
sphere an4 distinct from other broad congressional powers.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-~H (1976); United States v.
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress ha.s frequently
employed the Spending Power to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies upon
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.. This Court has repeatedly upheld
against constitutional chal1enge the use of this technique to
induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. 1-lichols, 414 U. S. 563
(1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comrn'n,
330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619
(1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
The MBE program is structured within this familiar legislative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public
works grants upon agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10%) of the federal funds wi11 be
devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent
this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access
and by awarding contracts to bona fide l\1BEs. It is further
conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are
competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced
but for the preseut effects of prior discrimi11ation. Admittedly, the problems of administering this program with respect to these conditions may be formidable. Although the
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primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation
falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of
the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a general or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority
participation devolve upon the priva tc contracting party;
this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the
prime contract.
0
The pevrer to eondition federal expenditures to induce
voluntary action is pet ha:ps o11e of the lea-st encumbered of all _Q_
legisl&ii ve powers.. Here we need not explore the outermost
limitations on the objectives attainable through such an application of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending
Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory
powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers,
Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE
program, then it may do so under the Spending Power. And
we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the
objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce
Power insofar as achievement efthe program objectives
pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and
through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of state and local grantees.

(2)
We turn first to the Commerce Power. U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn
on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime
contractors on federally funded public works projects.. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The
legislative history of the MBE provision shows that ..the!"e ~
·
·
Congress -te ~concTird e
a t 1e su contrac't:i;g J)ractices of prime contractors could perpetuate
the prevailing impa.ired access by minority businesses t-o

..
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public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has
an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take
necessary and proper action to remedy the situation. Ibid.
It is not necessary that these prime contractors be shown
responsible for any violation of a.ntidiscrimination Jaws. Our
cases dealing with application of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of
the congressional authority to prohibit practices "cha11enged
as prrpetuati11g the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination
occurring prior to the effective date of the Act." Franks v.
Bowman Transporation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976); see
California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, U. S. - , No. 781548 (Feb. 20. 1980); l11ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albe-marle Paper Co.
v. :Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains
to the actions of private prime contractors. the Congress could
have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause.
Thus, "·e conclude that the objectives of the MBE provision
are withiu the scope of the Speucliug Po\\·er.
(3)

In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of
the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and
local governments. National Lea.gue of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to
~ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate
the procurement practices of state and local grantees of federal funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitze-r, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). A
review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the
MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5
"to enforce by appropriate legislation" the equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Katzenbach v. }.forgan, 384 U.S. 641 (196G), we equated
the scope of this authority with the broad powers expressed
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8,
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d. 18. "Correctly viewed~ § 5 is a positive ·gra1it o(Jegislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U. S.,
at 651. In Katzen bach, the Court upheld ~ ~ (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, " ;hich prohibited application of state English-language literacy requi1~ements to
otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth grade
in an accredited American school in which a language other
than English was the predominant meclium of instruction.
To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court
found no prerequisite that application of a literacy requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S., at 648649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis
upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment
that application of literacy qualifications within the compass
of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of access to the ballot
and consequently in terms of access to the provision or
administration of governmental programs. !d., at 652-656.
Four years later, in Oregon v . .Mitchell, 400 U .. S. 112
(1970)~ we upheld § 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a five-year nationwide prohibition on the use of various voter-qualification
tests and devices in federal, state and local elections. The
Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in concluding that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the
use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably
determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of
attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination, even though the use of these tests or devices might have
discriminatory effects only. See ~e v. United
States, U . S. - , No. 78-1840, slip op., at 18- 19 (Apr.
22, 1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment,
U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 2, confirm that congressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful dis..:··

•
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crimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory
impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. City
of Rome, supra; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301
(1966).
'Vith respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant
evidence from which it could conclude that minority businesses have been denied effective participation in public
contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination. ,(Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked
disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to
minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered
to result not from any lack of capable alld qualified minority
businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers
to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic
discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any
intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. Although much of this history related to the experience of
minority businesses in the area of federal procurement. there
was direct evidence before the Congress that this pattern of
disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to state
and local construction contracting as well. In relation to the
MBE provision, Congress acted within its competence to
determine that the problem was national in scope.
Although the Act recites no preambulary "findings" on the
subject. we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical
basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could
perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Accordingly,
Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to )Ublic contracting opportunities generated by the Act was appropriate
to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in federal grants to state and local
governments. \vhich is one aspect of the equal protection of
the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actions

' ..
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of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its
objectives by use of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives
of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending
Power.
(4)
There are revelant similarities between the MBE program and the federaCspendi~program reviewed in .!:!!:J: v.
Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language barrier
"effectively foreclosed" non-English-speaking Chinese pupils
from access to the educational opportunities offered by the
San Francisco public school system. !d., at 564-566. It had
not been shown that this had resulted from any discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts.
Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a federal
regulation applicable to public school systems receiving federal
funds that prohibited the utilization of "criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect . . . of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the [educational] program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." !d., at 568 (emphasis
added). Moreover, we upheld application to the San Francisco school system, as a recipient of federal funds, of a requirement that "[w]here inability to speak and understand
the English language excludes national origin-minority group
children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open
its instructional program to these students." Ibid.
It is true that the MBE 0:_ovision ..sllifers from the l)f.9.4ram
approved in Lau in that the MBE program directly employs
rac~c criteria as a means to accomplish congressional objectives; however, these objectives are ess<:>ntially the
same as those approved in Lau. Our holding in Lau is
instructive on the exercise of congressional authority by way

7
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of the MBE provision. The MBE program. like the federal
regulations revieweu in Lau, primarily regulates state action
in the use of federal funds voluntarily sought and aecepted
by the grant.ees subject to statutory and administr·ative conclitions. The MBE participation requirement is din~ ct.ed at
the utilization of criteria, metl1ods or practices thought by
Congress to have tl1e effect of defeating. or substantially
impairing. access by the minority business community to
public funds made ayailable by congressional appropriations.

B
\Ve now turn to the question whether. as a means to
accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives, ~ress
may use racial and ethnic criteria, in this limited way, as a
condition attached to a federal grant. \Ve are mindful that
"[i]n no matter should we Jay more clef renee to the opinion
of Congress than m 1ts choice of instrumentalities to perform a
function that is ·w ithin its power," .ll..otional Afutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 603 (1949)
(opinion of Jackson, J.). ~t,. -the same time, wg recogniee
tbe need for careful judicial inql-liry as to governmental prGgr&ms that en:~play racial or ethnic crit eria to accomplish
even conc:::tit.ntional objective~
Agsin, we stress the limited
scope of our inq"Yiry Petitiongre-ehalleng€ the constitutionality of the MBE provision on its face; they have not
sought damages or other specific relief for injury allegedly
flowing from specific applications of the program; nor have
tl1ey attempted to show that as applied in identified situations the MBE provision violated the constitutional or statutory rights of any party to this case. 71 In these circumIn 1ht>ir eompbint, in ordl'r to <'~1<1bli!:'h !:'1:mding to challenge the
validity of the program, pet-ition er>< <IIIeged as "[t:]pecifir examples" of
economic injury three in~t:mtes where one of t.heir number a:;;;ertedly
would h<Ive been awarded a public work:; contract but for enforcement oi
71

{
'\
\.

\

----------------------------------------------------~~
However, Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications
in exercising its Spending or other legislative Powers only if
those classifications do not violate the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We
recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure
that any congressional program tfiat employs racial or ethnic
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present
effects of past discrimination is narrowlL t2ilored to the
achievement of that goal.
Again, we stress the limited scope of our inquiry. Here we
are not dealing with a remedial decree of a court but with the
legislative authority of Congress. Furthermore, petitioners
have challenged

\
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stances, given a reasonable construction and in light of its
projected administration, if we find the MBE program on its
face to be free of constitutional defects, it must be upheld as
within congressional power. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760
(1974); Fortson v. Secretary of State of Georgia, 379 U. S.
433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States"· Ra·ines, 362 U.S.
17, 20-24 (1960).
Our review of the regulations and guidelines governing administration of the MBE provision reveals that Congress
enacted the program as a strictly remedial measure; moreover, it is a remedy that functions prospectively, in the
manner of an injunctive decree. Pursuant to the administrative program, grantees and their prime contractors are required to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBEs;
they are required to provide technical assistance as needed, to
lov,:er or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise,
the Small Business Administration or other sources for assisting MBEs to obtain required working capital, and to give
guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. Supra,
at 16- 17. The program assumes that grantees who undertake
these efforts in good faith will obtain at least 10% participation by minority business enterprises. It is recognized that,
to achieve this target, contracts will be awarded to available,
qualified, bona fide MBEs even though they are not the lowest competitive bidders, so long as their higher bids, when
challenged, are found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs
inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination. Supra, at 18- 19. There is available to the
grantee a provision authorized by Congress for administrative
the MBE provi,.ion. Petitioners requested on!~· deC'laratory and injunctive
relief against- continued enforcement of tlw l\IBE provi~ion; they did not
seek a ny remedy for t he."e spC:>cific insta.nce:; of a.::;::;ertedly unalwful discrimination. App. 12a.-13a, l'ia-19a.
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waiver on a case-by-case basis should there be a demonstratiorithat, despite affirmative efforts, this level of participation cannot be achieved without departing from the objectives of the
jJrogram. Supra, at 17-18. There is also an admillistrative
mechanism, including a complaint procedure, to ensure that
only bona fide MBEs are encompassed by the remedial prog'ram, and to prevent unjust participation in the program by
those minority firms whose access to public contracting opportunities is not impaired by the effects of prior discrimination. Supra, at 19-20.
(1)

As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in
the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly
"color-blind" fashion. In Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklenberg
Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 18-21 1971), we rejected
this argument in considering a court-formulated school desegration remedy on the basis that examination of the racial
composition of student bodies was an unavoidable starting
point and that racially based attendauce assignments were
permissible so long as no absolute racial balance of eac~
school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41
( 1971), citing S~ann, we observed that "[i] n this remedia.i
process, stBps will almost invariably require that students be
assigned 'differently because of their race.' . . . Any other
a,pixoach would freeze the status quo that is the very target
of all desegregation processes." (Citations omitted.) And
in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971), we invalidated a state law that or ade assignment
of any student on account of race because it foreclosed implementation of desegregation plans that w·ere designed to remedy constitutional violations. We held that "[j]ust as the'
tace of students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be~
considered in formulating a remedy." 402 u. s., at 46.

I'
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In these school desegregation cases we dealt with the
authority of a federal court to formulate a remedy for unconstitutional racial discrimination. However, the authority of
a court to incorpora.te racial criteria into a remedial decree
also extends to statutory violations. Where federal antidiscrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy
may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976);
see Int ernational Brotherhood of Teamsters Y. United States,
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U. S. 405 (1975). In another setting, we have held that a
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably necessary
to assure compliance with federal voting rights legislation,
even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a
constitutional violation.
United Jewish Organizations of
Williarnsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-165 (1977)
(opinion of .WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and
STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 180-187 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting on
other grounds).
When we have discussed the remedial powers of a federal
court, we have been alert to the limitation that (([t]he power
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and
stat-e governmental entities is not plenary. . . . [A] federal
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the
nature and extent of the ... violation." Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkuwn, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717.738 (1974), and Swann
v. Charlotte-Jv[ecklenburg Board of Education, supra, 402
U.S., a.t 16).
Here we deal not with the limited remedial powers of a
federal court, but 'vith the broad remedial powers of Congress.
is fundamental that in no organ of government does
ere repose a more comprehensive remedial power than
the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
mpetence and authority to advance the g_ene~al ~e as

•
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well as to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with
existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination
provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to declare
certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, a11thorize and
induce state action to avoid such conduct. Supra, at 23-27.

A

(2)
A more specific cl1a1Jenge to the MBE program is the
charge that it impermissibly deprives nbnminority businesses
of access to at least some portion of the government contracting opportunities generated by the Act. It must be conceded that by its objective of remedying the historical impairment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of'
awarding some contracts to MBEs which otherwise might be
awarded to other businesses, who may themselves be innoc~t -~A._
of any prior discriminatory actions. "An+filO one has a con/_ 1 .,
stitut~onal right to be awarded a public~:~-~s~ contract,_./ ,1ui- - .ttd ~~
ure oTl.loJDTiinority firms to receive certain contracts is, of ~
~
course, an incidental consequence of the program, not part
~
' ,
of its ~)jective; similarly, past impairment of minority-firm
~:::;;:~-~~, ··/ - 11
access to public contracting opportuniti es may have been an
~
11
incidental consequence of business-as-usual" by public con·. . tl ~ · ·· ---,
traeting agencies and among prime contmctors.
~1
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that
C'-,
it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms.
When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy
to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing·
of the burden" by innocent pa.rties is not impermissible.
Franks, supra, at 77; see Albemarle Paper Co. , suwa; U'nited
Jewish Organizat?:on, supra. The actual 11burdcn" shouldered·
by nonminority firms is relatively light in this connection
·when we consider the scope of this public works progTaJn as·
compared with overall construction contracting opportuni-
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ties. 72 1\Ioreovcr, although we may assume thnt the complaining partie's are innocent of any discriminatory conduct,
it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some nonminority businesses may
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the
virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contra.cting
opportunities.
{3)
J\'nother ehallcnge to the validity of the MBE program
is the assertion that it is underinclusive-that it limits its
benefit. to specified minority ~her than extRnding its
remedial objectives to all businesses whose access to government contracting is impaired by the effects of disadvantage
or discrimination. Such an extcntion would, of course, be
appropriate for Congress to provide; it is not a function for
the courts.
Even in this context, the well-established eoncept that a
legislature may take onr step at a time to remedy only part
of a broader problem is not without relevance. See Dandridge v. Williams, 3~)7 P. 8. 471 (1970); Will?:am.son v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1055). \Ye are not reviewing a
federal program that seeks to confer a preferred status upon a
nondisa(h·antagcd minority or to give special assistance to
only one of seve>ral groups cstaulished to be similarly disadvantagrcl minorities. Even in such a setting. the Congress is
not "·ithout a certain authority. Sre, e. g., P ersonnel Adm.i?~
ish·ator of Massadwsetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 25G (197P);
72 The Court. of Appe::~.ls relied upon Dep[lrtmcnt. of Commerce statistics to rillcul:ttc thnt the S4.2 billion in frd(·r:ll grnnts conditioned upon
compli[lm·c with the l\IBE prO\· i ~ion [)mounted to :1bout 2.&% of the totnl
of ncarl~· Sl/0 billion flpc·nt on const.nl(·tion m the Unit{'d Stntcs clming
1977. Thus, the 10% minimum minority hu;,:ine::;s p:ut ieipation c.:ontemplated by this program would ilccount. for only 0.25% of th e annual
expcmliture for cou::;truction work in the United States. Fullilove v.

Kreps, 584 F. 2d 600, 607 (CAZ 1978).
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Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Morton v. Man.cari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
The Congress has not sought to give select minority groups
a preferred standing in the construction industry, but has
embarked on a remedial program to place them on a more
equitable footing with respect to public contracting opportunities. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has
inadvertently effected an invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that
has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups
encompassed by the MBE program. It is not inconceivable
that on very special facts a case might be made to challenge
the congressional decision to limit MBE eligibility to the
particular minority groups identified in the Act. See T1ance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U. S. 112, 240 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and
MARSHALL, JJ.). But on this record we find no basis to hold
that Congress is without authority to undertake the kind of
limited ~~erimentaYremedial effort represented by the MBE
program. Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social
problems.
(4)

It is also contended that the MBE program is overinclusive-that it bestows a benefit on businesses identified t:iy
-r-adiil or ethnic criteria which cannot be justified on the basis
of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the present effects of
identified prior discrimination. It is conceivable that a particular application of the program may have this effect; however, the pEC_uliarities of specific applications are not before
us in this case. We are
presenteanerew}th 'iCi1al1enge
i1i'Vo vmg a specific award of a construction contract or the
denial of a \Yaiver request; such questions of specific application must a"·ait future cases.

not

J
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This docs not mran that thr rlnim of owrittc~lusivcness
is e:>ntitk<.l to no con~irlf•rat.ion in thf' JH'CS<'IIt ease. The
history of gowrnmen tal tolerntwe of prar.tiers using racial or
Aethnie crikria. for the puq>OSl' or with the c>ffpct of imposing
an invirlious di seriminatioJJ must alert 11s to the deleterious
rtl'ccb of CH.'tL.J.wnigtJ racial or ethnie ela ~sifieat.ions when
tlwy ~tray from tU\.JTO\\' n•mc>rlial justificat.ions. E'Yf:'ll in the
con tc·xt -of a facial ehalh•ng<:' such a~ i~ prPs<:'ntt•tl in this case,
the ).!BE proYi sioll ennttot pass must<•r unless, with due acCO\ltlt for its arlmini~trativc program. it proYidc·s n reasonable
nsst trnn<·.(> that application of raf·ia.l or Pthnic· eritcJria will be
limit~ ·d to acc·omplishing tlw n•mc•dial objectives of Congress
and that misapplications of the program will be prolllptly
and nrl equatcly rclltcdicd administratiye]y.
It i:-- ,;;ignifieant that thP admiuistrative sehemP J)I'OYides for
\\'flin·r :md exemption. Two fundanl<'ntal c·oJtgressional as~~ tl l JII ions u ~krli<' tlw .\1BE progra111: (1) that the' prest>nt
l'il<·d~ 11f past cli sc'rilllination haw impairc'd thl con1pditiYe
po~it io11 of husitH'RE'<'S O\\·' IJf'd ancl C'ontrollt'cl h~· JlWJIIbers of
min(lrit~· groups; and (2) that affirmatin rffurts to eliminate
l>nrric·r~ 10 minority-firm accPss. and to t'Yaluat.e ],ids with
:HI,iw-tttH·IJt. for thf' prc>sc•nt. effc>et!; of >ast discritnin ation
IU>uld !t""llrf' that. 0 /{ of the fC'c!Pral fund~ gratll<'d llllder
tlte Pul,Jie 'YorkR EmploymPnt Act of l!J/7 would IJp aeClllltdt·d for by eontrnds "·ith nvailahlt- . CJW-llifil'd . bona ficle
mi 11mi ty hu si ness Pll tc~ rprises. Each of these asstu11ptions
Jltny ],(. rt 'hlttt.Pcl in thr adntinistrative pn>tess.
Tl11: adtllillistratiYe program contains mPasurt:'S to effe<:tuute
t!Je c·oJJgr•·:-:-.ional objPctive of assuring legitimate participatiun b~· di ~nrlYantagPd MBEs. :\rlministrativf' tl1Jfinition
has tight<·lwd sonw lPss drfinite aspeets of thP statutory identification of the ·mi11ority groups Pncompasserl by the progratll. Tll<'n' is adtltinistrati\·e scrutiny to ickntify and
elilllittatc· front partif'ipation in the program YIBEs wlto are
110t '·boll H-fide '' within the rpgulations ami guidelines; for

-

-

,.
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example, spurious minority-front entities can be exposed. A
significant aspect of this survcillauce is the complaint procedure available for reporting "unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program." Supra, at 20.
And even as to specific contract awards, waiver is available to
avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to exploit the
remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable
price, i. e., a price not attributable to the present effects of
past discrimination. Supra, at 17-19. \Ye must assume that
CoJJgress intended close scrutiny of false claims and prompt
action on them.
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that
their best efforts \\·ill not succeed or have not succeeded in
achieving the statutory 10% target for minority firm participation within the limitations of the program's remedial objectives. In these circu.mstances a waiver or partial waiver is
available once compiiance ·l1aSbeen oemons rated. A waiver
m~y be sought and granted at any time during the contracting process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts
warrant.
Nor is the program defective because a waiver may be
sought only by the grantee and not by prime contractors
who may experience difficulty in fulfilling contract obligations
to assure niinority participation. It may be administratively
cumbersome, but the wisdom of concentrating responsibility
at the grantee level is not for us to evaluate; the purpose is
to allow the Economic Development Administration to maintain close supervision of the operation of the MBE provision.
The administrative complaint mechanism allows for grievances of prime contractors who assert that a grantee has failed
to seek a waiver in an appropriate case. Finally, we note
that ·where private parties, as opposed to governmental entities, transgress the limitations inherent in the MBE program, the possibility of constitutional violation is more removed. See United SteelwoTkers of America v. Tfl eber, 443
u.s. 193, 200 (1979).

··'
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That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised
on assumptions rebuttable in the admillistrative process gives
reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program
will be limiteo t.o accomplishing the remedial objectives contem 1lated b · Congress and that misapplications of tJ1e ra.cial
and ethnic criteria can be remedie . ffi relation to thi~ faeia]..JL.
cl!allet1ge to the statute, doubts mast be 1 Psol ced in favor of _A._
the congr~~>~ional judgment that this Jimit.td- experilJJcJJt is a -t..
~1ecessary step to effPctuat@ the mttndate for equality of
...._
economic opporitH+ity. l~s is appropriate for a pilot or e~
perimental project, the MBE-pFBgr-am is limited in extent. and
c:.
cl-tlration. This is significant in the sense that the -j-tls---->2trneation for any remedi-al program lapses when it has ae .Q__
eomplished its object],zeso, bas proved nm,;uccessful, or has ..Q_
m<hausted its appropriation; there is also the comside1 ation

SL

that this relatively short-te!ln 1 ellledial measm e will be .-'L
subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress
prior to any extension or reenactment.~ ]\fiscarriages of administration could have only a transitory economic impact on
businesses not encompasssed by the program, and would not be
irrem ed iable.
(5)
3

Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need
to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort
to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. In
this effort, C',ongress has necessary latitude to tr.x: new tech- ~
ni~es such as the limited use of racial amlethnic crite"ria
to accomplish remedil,ll objectives; this especially so in prog;ams where voluntary) cooperation with remedial measures
is induced by- j:)l'fl-cinf conoitions on federal expenditures.

-----

Cf. GAO Report. io ihe Congre.s:::, J\1inority Firms on Llral Public
'''orks Projrrt ~-:\Jixe·d Re.~ul1::;, CED-79-9 (J:m . 16, Hl79); U. S. Dept.
of Conunerre, E<·onomie Den·lopment. Aclmini ~ tration, Lo<"al Publir. Works
Program In1erim Report on 10 Percent J\Jinority Bu :; ines.~ Enterprise
Requirement (Sept. 1978).
73

In dealing with this facial challenge to th: s at~te, ~oubts
must be resolved in · support of the congress1o al JUdgment ttret
this limited program is a necessary step to ffectuate t~e
constitutional mandate for equality
o portun1ty.
The MBE provision may be viewed as
~~t~--~
appropriately limited in extent and

(

/1)
'· I
'
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That the program may press the out0r limits of congressional
authority affords no basis for striking it down.
Petitiouers have mounted a facial challenge to a program
developed by the politically responsive branches of Government. For its part, the Congr0ss must proceNl only with
programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objectiv0s, subject
to continuing evaluation · and rrasscssmcnt; administration
of the programs p1ust he vi&:iliant ami fl0xible; and, when
such a program comps under judicial review, courts must be
satisfied that the legislative objectives and projected adminis'
J
•
tration give reason hle assuran ce}that
the J1rogTam will func~o,.J/S~
,,.J~
.~
J,f'fd~.Jf t:.r>,J/~x ~___,....·o~n within co~oilaJ lumtations. But as Justice Jackson ebser,~in 1941: a
"The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in
its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged most
earnestly by members of the Court itSf'lf are humbly and
faithfully heeded. After the forces of conservatism and
libPralism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process
and averaged and come to rest in some compromise
nwasure ~a. decision striking it down closes an area
of compr01mse in which conflicts have actually, if only
temporarily, been composed. Each such decision takes
away from our democratic federalism another of its
defenses against omestic disorder and violence. The
vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years
in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of
the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of
our social ru1d economic conflicts."
Justice Jackson reiterated these thoughts shortly before his
death in what was to be the last of his Godkin Lectures: 75
"I have said that in these matters the Court must reR. H. Jnck,:;on, The Struggle for Jurlicinl Supremacy 321 (1941).
R. H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the Americ~1n Sy:otem of
Government 61-62 (1955).
74

76
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spect the limitations on its own powers because judicial
usurpation is to me no more justifiable and no more
promising of permanent good to the country than any
other kind. So I presuppose a Court that will not depart
from the judicial process, will not go beyond resolving
cases and controversies brought to it in conventional
form, and ,.,·ill not consciously encroach upon the functions of its coordinate branches."
Because we are satisfied that the MBE porvision of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 satisfies constitutional
criteria, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affinned. 7{;
Affirmed.

76 Although the complaint nl lt>ged th::1t. the ~· IRE program violatt>d sev.
eral fr>deral sintute;.:, supra., n. 5, the only statutory argument urged upon
us is that the :MBE provi~ion is incon:;i;;tent with title VI of the Civil
Righf:' Act of 1964. We perceivE' no incon~:;i:<tency betwePn the requirements
of title VI and t.ho ~e of the 1\lBE provision. To the extent. any statutory irwonsi:;tencies might be asserted, the ::UBE proYi~ion-the later,
more ;;pecific enactment-must be depmed to control. See, e. g., Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974). Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 489-490 (1973); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S.
753, 758 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188-189 (1939),
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APPENDIX
~ 1. Representative Mitchell's principal remarks, 123 Cong.
Rec. HI388-HI389 (Feb. 23, 1977), were as follows:

"The history of public works projects, as a countercyclical device, reveals that local government expenditures
for projects create direct jobs and stimulate complementary expenditures in the material and supply market ....
Hlf public works projects are to have optimum effect
on both the economy and the labor force, we must both
trigger and target the public works bill. Estimates reveal
that there is currently 35 percent unemployment in the
minority construction sector and an estimated 20 percent
of the complementary construction industries that are
minority owned have dissolved in the midst of a depression in the minority business sector ....
tiThe Federal Government has not played its role in
the quest for economic parity. . . .
H • • • In the process to parity the minority business sector
should receive from 15-18 percent of the contract receipts,
however, in fiscal year 1976 the minority business sector
received less than I percent of the contract receipts of the
Federal Government. . . .
"I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and
promote growth in the minority business community. I
appeal to the consciousness of parity and not the vote of
disparity in requesting that Members of this legislative
body support my amendment to insure minority business
participation in the construction indus try."
~

2. Representative Mitchell's introductory remarks, 123
Cong. Rec. HI436-HI437 (Feb. 24, 1977), included the
following:
"Let me tell the Members how ridiculous it is not to
target for minority enterprises. ·we spend a great deal
of Federal money under the SBA program creating,
strengthening and supporting minority businesses and
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yet when it comes down to giving those minority busi~
nesses a piece of the action, the Federal Government is
absolutely remiss. All it does is say that, 'We will create
you on the one hand and, on the other hand, we will deny
you.' That denial is made absolutely clear when one
looks at the amount of contracts let in any given fiscal
year and then one looks at the percentage of minority
contracts. The average percentage of minority contracts,
of all Government contracts, in any given fiscal year is
1 percent---1 percent ....
"In the present legislation before us it seems to me
that we have an excellent opportunity to begin to remedy
this situation."

1f 3. The following colloquy occurred between Representative

'.

Mitchell and Representative Kazen of Texas, 123 Cong. Rec.
H1437 (Feb. 24, 1977):
"Rep. KAZEN: AlJ right. What happens in the rural
areas where there are no minority enterprises? \VilJ the
10 percent be held up in order to bring minority enterprises from somewhere else where there is no unemployment into a place where there is unemployment and there
is no minority enterprise?
"Rep. MITCHELL: In response to the gentleman's
question, the answer is 'No.'
"Rep. KAZE~: . . . [W]herP there a.rp no minority
enterprise contractors then this provision would not be
in effect; am I correct?
"Rep. l\HTCHELL: That is absolutely correct, and
that is done by administrative action already on the books
with all of the agencies.
"Rep. KAZEN: Does the gentleman's amendment
leave room for that type of discretion in the Secretary?
"Rep. MITCHELL: I assume that it does. It would
be my intei1t that it would because that is existing administrative law."
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U4. Representative Conyers' remarks, 123 Cong. Rec. H1440
(Feb. 24, 1977), included the following:
"First of all, minority contractors and businessmen
who are trying to enter in on the bidding processand my office is replete with examples of this-get the
'works' almost everytime. The bidding process is one
whose intricacies defy the imaginations of most of us
here. The sad fact of the matter is that minority enterprises usually lose out, and subsequently end up in a congressional office or some other unlikely place complaining
bitterly. . . . [M]any other Members have had the same
dismaying experience of trying to give solace to small
businessmen who through no fault of their own simply
have not been able to get their foot in the door."

U5. Representative Biaggi's remarks. 123 Cong. Rec. H1440
(Feb. 24, 1977), included the following:
"This Nation's record with respect to providing opportunities for minority businesses is a sorry one ....
"What the amendment seeks to do is guarantee that
a.t least 10 percent of all funds in this legislation will go
to contracts which will be awarded to minority business
enterprises. This is not an unreasonable demand-in
fact it is quite modest. If implemented however it could
have great benefits to the entire minority community.
Fiscal year 1976 figures indicate that less than 1 percent
of all Federal procurement contracts went to minority
business enterprises. This is a situation which must be
[r] emedied.
"The objectives of this legislation are both necessary
and admirable. Yet without adoption of this amendment, this legislation may be potentially inequitable to
minority businesses and workers. It is time that the
thousands of minority businessmen enjoyed a sense of
economic parity. This amendment will go a long way
toward helping to achieve this parity and more impor·

; ,.;. ·lllt17- tll'l'\1< t.\ .\I'J'J-:\'Itf.\
.Fl Ll.l L(t\ E

11 .
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t.1.mtly to promote a sen~e of econo111ic rqunlity in thif!
::\'ation.''
~ li. Senntor Brooke'::' prill{'ip:tl n·m1nks, 123 Cong. Hcc. S3~HO

(J\far. 10, 1977), werP n:;: follo,\'S:

" It i:-: proper thof we targPt thiE $4 billion on :nea :3 of
gre11te::;t ueed: thP illlwr eity. our dcprc·:-:-ccd rmal c·oJnmunitit'~. nnrl otltcr area~ 'd1en· uncmpluynwnt ltn~ lweu
p:u·tittthtrlr ::;P\'c' n• nnd prolongc' rl. .\nd it i:! imporfaut
that " ·c fcwu~ on 1hP tJtwmploymPttt exp e riPtH't ·~ of rliffcrpnl ethnic: nnd rtwial g:ruttps itt 1k:-:i;;nin;.r :1 :-:c' tl,.:itin•
und rl'spun:-:in• .iub!' pro~ram. For t•>-.:;lt ttpk , :lllH!llg
mittctrity <·iti%t•ll!-;, thP !1\'Nage ratt' of UIH 'InJlloyllwnl run:::
double tlw t among white c·i t izPn::; .. . .
"Of (:Oilr:-:'1'. FD:\ "·ill rcfitte it!-; ftturling ~w0c·c·dmc:::;
hasrd 011 it::; c•xpnic•tt<·c·::; " ·ith tltP bst J'ltiitlil' ,·,orb jolt.~
program . Bnt :llltd h<'l' wny tn in,.:urc> tlu.l! tit<' lltOIH')'~
nre properly targ<'ft·d i~ to H,t n~id<' n rc:t,..on ~ti,Je JH'n·<·ntnge of t.lw public· \Yorks job~ fund~ to go to qnulified
mitlorit~· <·otl!rndorl'.
"Thi~ i~ c>tdird.v propf'r. appropriate• }tnd llt' r·P~:::Ill'~'
It is nccc::;~ary 1>('1':111:-:f' lllinorif~' hu:::inP:::-:l'" lt:'tn• n~c·cin·d
0111~· 1 pPH'(•Jlt of thf' FNTeral eunlrad dnlLr. dC':-:pite
reprntPd kgi~btion. Exf'eutiYe orrkr~ :1nd rr·~.!;ubticlllS
mandnfing ;t{finn:ltin~ pffort:-:: to indude llliJtnrity eontractors in thr FN!t·r :!1 eontr:wts pool.
''It is a proper f'Oilt<'pt. . . . lT]he Fl·dt·rul Gowrnnwnt. for thr la~t 10 yt':ll's in prn~rant::; Jik(· 813..\'::: S (a)
set-asides, and thf' Hailroad HPvitalization :\c·t'::,: minority
resource~ <~Prtkrl'. to nunw :.1 few, ha::; H(·<:t"Jd<'d tlw setaside cOll<'Cpt as a lq!,itimate tool to in:'tJrP part il'ip:1tiou
by hitlwrto C'Xdu ckd or umepre."'t' ntcd g;roup::::.
"It is n n n ppropria te tonc<'pt. be<· a UH~ mi nori t~· husine:::"es' work forces nrc prin\:ipaliy drawn from rc ~ idcnts
t1f c:omnnmities " ·ith ~evcre and chronic tlllc'lnploylnPnt.
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With more business, these firms can hire even more
minority citizens...•
"Many have expressed concern about the impact of this
amendment as a limitation on contracting in areas where
there are few minorities. But this amendment is not a
!,imitation. Rather, it is designed to facilitate greater
equality in contracting. This amendment provides a
rule-of-thumb which requires much more than the vague
"good-faith efforts" language which currently hampers
our efforts to insure minority participation.
"One final objection to this set-aside may be that it
will cause undue delays in beginning these vital public
works projects. In fact, EDA already maintains a roster
for each State of capable and qualified minority enterprises who are ready and willing to work. These firms
are capable of competitive bidding, and need the financial
support which this potential level of Federal contracting
will guarantee."

-n-7.. The Subcommittee stated in part, H. R. Rep. No. 94-468;.
p. 28 (1975):
"According to the testimony received from Federal procuring agencies, the subcommittee is of the opinion that
there has been inadequate effort to identify minority
businesses and match their capabilities with Federal procurement requirements. There has been a lack of 'outreach' to the minority business community to locate
potential minority contractors and yet some agencies have
informed the subcommittee that there are very few
minority businesses which can perform the specialized
work required by those agencies in the performance of
their contracts. The subcommittee wonders how such
statements can be honestly made when there has not
.been a sufficient effort to identify minority businesses in
the first instance."
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1f 8. The EDA guidelines, at 2-7, provide in relevant part:
"The primary obligation for carrying out the 10% MBE
participation requirement rests with EDA Grantees ...•
The Grantee and those of its contractors which will make
subcontracts or purchase substantial supplies from other
firms (hereinafter referred to as 'prime contractors') must
seek out all available bona fide MBE's [sic] and make
every effort to use as many of them as possible on the
project.
"An MBE is bona fide if the minority group ownership
interests are real and continuing and not created solely
to meet 10%· MBE requirements. For example, the
minority group owners or stockholders should possess
control over management, interest in capital and interest
in earnings commensurate with the percentage of ownership on which the claim of minority ownership status is
based. . . .
"An MBE is available if the project is located in the
market area of the MBE and the MBE can perform
project services or supply project materials at the time
they are needed. The relevant market area depends on
the kind of services or supplies which are needed . . . .
EDA will require that Grantees and prime contractors
engage MBE's [sic] from as wide a market area as is economically feasible.
"An MBE is qualified if it can perform the services or
supply the materials that are needed. Grantees and prime
contractors will be expected to use MBE's [sic] with
less experience than available nonminority enterprises
and should expect to provide technical assistance to
MBE's [s1:c] as needed. Inability to obtain bonding will
ordinarily not disqualify an MBE. Grantees and prime
contractors are expected to help MBE's [sic] obtain bonding, to include MBE's [sic] in any overall bond or to
waive bonding where feasible. The Small Business Ad-
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ministration (SBA) is prepared to provide a 90% guarantee for the bond of any MBE participating in an LPW
[local public works] project. Lack of working capital
will not ordinarily disqualify an MBE. SBA is prepared
to provide working capital assistance to any MBE partieipating in an LP'V project. Grantees and prime contraetors are expected to assist MBE's [s-ic] in obtaining
working capital through SBA or otherwise.
" . . . [E) very Grantee should make sure that it knows
the names, arldresses and qualifications of all relevant
MBE's [sic] which would include the project location
in their market areas. . . . Grantees should also hold
prebid conferences to which they invite interested
contractors and representatives of . . . MBE support
organizations.
"Arrangements have been made through the Office of
Minority Business Enterprise ... to provide assistance
to Grantees and prime contractors in fulfilling the 10%
MBE requirement ....
"Grantees and prime contractors should also be aware
of other support which is available from the Small Business Administration ....
" ... [T]he Grantee must monitor the performance of
its prime contractors to make sure that their commitments
to expend funds for MBE's [sic] are being fulfilled ... .
Grantees should administer every project tightly. . . ."
~

•"£

•

"'

•

9. The EDA guidelines, at 13-15, provide in relevant part:
"Although a provision for waiver is included under
this section of the Act, EDA will only approve a waiver
under exceptional circumstances. The Grantee must
demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business enterprises whose market areas
include the project location to justify a waiver. The
Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the
Grantee and potential co:~ tractors have exerted to locate

,

.
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'and enlist MBE's [sic]. The request must indicate the
specific MBE's [sic] which were contacted and the reason
·each MBE was not used . . . .
"Only the Grantee can request a waiver. . . . Such a
waiver request would ordinarily be made after the initial
'bidding or negotiation procedures proved unsuccessful. ...
"[A] Grantee situated in an area where the minority
population is very small may apply for a waiver before
·requesting bids on its project or projects.... "
1T 10. The EDA 'technicaJ bulletin, at 1, provides the following
definitions:
"a) Negro-An individual of the black race of African
origin.
'"b) ·spanish-spea.king-An individual of a Spanishspeaking culture and origin or parentage.
·tic) Oriental-An individual of a culture, origin or parentage traceab1e to the areas south of the Soviet Union,
East of Iran, inclusive of islands adjacent thereto, and
out to the Pacific including but not limited to Indonesia,
Indochina, Malaysia, Hawaii and the Philippines.
"d) Indian-An individual having origins in any of the
original people of North America and who is recognized as
an Indian by either a tribe, tribal organization or a suitable authority in the community. (A suitable authority in
the community may be: educational institutions, religious
organizations, or state agencies.)
"e) Eskimo-An indivdiual having orgins in any of the
original peoples of Alaska.
"f) Aleut-An individual having orgins in any of the
original peoples of the Aleutian Islands."
1T 11. The EDA technical bulletin, at 19, provides in relevant

part:
"Any person or organization with information indicating unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals

,. \

,

.
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in the MBE program or'who believes that the MBE participation requirement is being improperly applied should
contact the appropriate EDA grantee and provide a
detailed statement of the basis for the complaint.
"Upon receipt of a complaint, the grantee should
attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. In the event
the grsmtee requires assistance in reaching a determination, the grantee should contact the Civil Rights Specialist
in the appropriate Regional Office.
"If the complainant believes that the grantee has not
satisfactorily resolved the issues raised in his complaint,
he may personally contact the EDA Regional Office."

..
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens ...•

The .law regards man as

man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his
color .••• "

Those words were written by a Member of this Court

eighty-four years ago.

Rl0ssy v. Ferguson,. 16 3 U.S. 5 37, 5 59

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

His coll eagues disagreed with him,

and held thr.l t a sta t:u te that required the separ. a tion of people
on the basis of their race was constitutionally valid because
it was a "reason able" exercise of the police pm'ler that had
been "enacted in good faith for the promotion [of] the public
.....

........

good •..• "

rq_~ ,

at

550 •

.Today,

the Court upholos a statute

that accords a preference to citizens who are "Negroes ,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts",
because the statute is reasonable and was enacted in good faith
for the promotion of the public gdod.

I think today's decis5on

is wrong for the same reason that _!>lessy v.
and I respectfully dissent.

¥..<~rgus~E!:

was wrong,

---

- 2 A

The equal protection standard of the Constitution has one
clear and central meaning

-~

discrimination by government.

it absolutely prohibits racial
It is a standard that must be

met by every State under the .Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
v. Texas, 316

u.s.

Loving v. Virginia, 388

1, 10; Hill

U.S~

400; Strauder v. west Virginia, 100

u.s.

303, 307-308; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72.

And

it is a standard that must be met by the United States itself
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 497.1/

u.s.

229, 239; Bolling v.

Sharp~,

347

Under our Constitution, any official action that

treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic

---

origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192; Bolling v. Sharpe,
supra, at 499; Korematsu v. United States, 323

u.s.

214,

~~
~

216.~/

The hostility of the Constitution to racial
classifications by government has been manifested in many cases
decided by this Court.

See,

~'

Loving v. Virginia, supra;

Mclaughlin v. Florida, supra; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 '

u.s.

483; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.

Cana~~,

305 U.S. 337. · And

our cases have made clear that the Constitution is wholly
neutral in forbidding such racial discrimination, whatever the
race may be of those who are its victims.
Martin, 375
state

l~w

u.s.

399, for instance, the

In Anderson v.

Cour~

dealt with a

that required that the race of each candidate for

~
~ 7 _

- 3 election to public office be designated on the nomination
papers and ballots.

Although the law applied equally to

candidates of whatever race, the Court held that it nonetheless
violated the constitutional standard of equal protection.

"We

see no relevance", the Court said, "in . the State's pointing up
the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications
for office."

Id., at 403 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in

~IJoving v. Virginia, supra, and McLaughlin v. Florida, supra,

the Court held that statutes outlawing miscegenation and
interracial cohabitation were constitutionally invalid, even
though the laws penalized all violators equally.

The laws were

unconstitutional for the simple reason that they penalized
individuals solely because of their race, whatever their race
might be •

See also Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683;

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60.1/
This history contains one clear lesson.

Under our

Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of
a person solely because of that person's race.!/

The color of

a person's skin or the country of his origin is an immutable
fact that bears no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral
~

culpability, or any other

char~cteristics

permissible interest to government.

of

~onstitutionally

"Distinctions between

citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very

upon the doctrine of equality."
320

u.s.

Hirabayashi .v. United States,

81, 100, quoted in Loving v. Virginia,

supr~,

388

7

- 4 U.S. , . at 11. .?/
The rule cannot be any different when the persons
disadvantaged by a racially biased law are not members of a
racial minority.

The guarantee of equal protecti6n is

"universal in [its] application, to all persons .•• without
regard to any difference of race, of color, or of
nationality."
~re

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369. See In
/
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717; Hernandez v. !exas, 347 U.S. 475;

Truax v. Raic.Q., 239
SUE£~,

100

u.s.,

u.s.

at 308.

33, 39-43; Strauder v. West Virginia,

The command of the equal protection

guarantee is simple but unequivocal:

In the words of the

Fourteenth Amendment, "No state shall ... deny to .?!.!2Y person
•.. the equal protection of the laws."

Nothing in this

language singles out some "persons" for more "equal" treatment
than others.

Rather, as the Court made clear in Shelley v.

Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22, the guarantees afforded by the Equal
Protection Clause "are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual.

[They] are personal rights."

From the perspective

of a person detrimentally affected by a racially discriminatory
law, the " arbitrariness and unfairness is entirely the same,
whatever his skin color and whatever the law's purpose, be it
purportedly "for the promotion of the public good" or
otherwise.
No one disputes the self-evident proposition that Congress
has broad discretion under its Spending Power to disburse the
revenues of the United States as it deems best and to set

,,

- 5 conditions on the receipt of the funds disbursed.

No one

disputes that Congress has the authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate contracting practices on federally funded
public works projects, or that it enjoys broad powers under §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce by appropriate
legislation" the provisions of that Amendment.

But these

self-evident truisms do not begin to answer the question before
us in this case.

For in the exercise of its powers, Congress

must obey the Constitution just as the legislatures of all the
States must obey the Constitution in the exercise of their
authorized powers.

If a law is unconstitutional, it is nd less

unconstitutional just because it is a product of the Congress
of the United States.

B

On its face, the MBE provision at issue in this case
denies the equal protection of the law.

The Public Works

Employment Act of 1977 directs that all project construction
shall be performed by those private contractors who submit the
lowest competitive bids and who meet established criteria of
responsibility.

42

u.s.c. §6705 (e) (1) (1976 ed. Supp. I).

13 CFR part 317 (1978).

See

One class of contracting firms --

defined solely according to the racial and ethnic attributes of
their owners -- is, however, excepted from the full rigor of
these requirements with respect to a percentage of each federal
grant.

The statute, on its face and in effect, thus bars a

- 6 -

class to which the petitioners belong from having the
opportunity to receive a government benefit, and bars the
members of that class solely on the basis of their race or
ethnic background.

This is precisely the kind of law that the

guarantee of equal protection forbids.

~~

The Court's attempt to characterize the law as a proper
remedial measure to counteract the effects of

~t ~r ~ent ~
'l'he legislative ~

branch of government is not a court of equity.

It has

neither~~
~rf

the dispassionate objectivity nor the flexibility that are

~

needed to mold a race-conscious r.emedy around the single
objective of eliminating the effects of past or present
discrimination.~/

But even assuming that Congress has power, under §5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or some other

c_ons_~itutional

provision, to

}/5

remedy previous illegal racial discrimination, there was no
evidence that Congress has in the past engaged in racial
discrimination in its disbursement of federal

funds.

~

contractin~

The MBE provision thus pushes the limits of any such

justification far beyond lhe equal protection standard of the
Constitution.

Certainly, nothing in the Constitution gives

Congress any greater authority to impose detriments on the
basis of race than is afforded th e judicial branch.l/

And a

judicial decree that imposes burdens on the basis of race can
be upheld only Where its sole purpose is to eradicate the
actual effedts of illegal race discrimination.

~

See Pasadena

- 7 City Board of Education v.

~Eangler,

427 U.S. 424.

The provision at issue here does not satisfy this
condition.

Its legislative history suggests that it had at

least two other objectives in addition to that of counteracting
the effects of past or present racial discrimination in the
public works construction

industry.~/

One such purpose appears

to have been to assure to minority contractors a certain
·percentage of federally-funded public ·works contracts.2_/

But,

since the guarantee of equal protection immunizes from
capricious governmental treatment "persons"-- not "races", it
can never countenance laws that seek racial balance as a goal
in and of itself.

"Preferring members of any one group for no

reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
its own sake.

This the Constitution forbids."

University of California v.
of Powell, J.).

~akke,

for

Regents of the

438 U.S. 265, 307 (Opinion

Second, there are indications that the MBE

provision may have been enacted to compensate for the effects
of social, educational, and economic "disadvantage".lO/

No

race, however, has a monopoly on social, educational, or
economic disadvantage,ll/ and any law that indulges in such a
presumption clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection.

-

Since the MDE provision was in whole or in

part designed to effectuate . objectives other than the
~

elimination of the effects of racial discrimination, it cannot
stand as a remedy that comports with the strictures of equal
protection, even if it otherwise could.l2/

- 8 -

c
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to ensure that every
person must be treated equally by each State regardless of the
color of his skin.

The Amendment promised to carry to its

necessary conclusion a fundamental principle upon which this
nation had been founded -- that the law would honor no
preference based on lineage.l}/

Tragically, the promise of

·1868 was not immediately fulfilled , and decades passed before
the States and the Federal Government were finally directed to
eliminate detrimental classifications based on race.

Today,

the Court derails this achievement and places its imprimatur on
the creation once again by government of privileges based on
birth.
The Court,

mor~over,

takes this drastic step without, in

my opinion, seriously cons ic1er :i. ng th_e
decision.

r~mi

f ications of its

Laws that operate on the basis of race require

definitions of race.

Because of the Court's decision today,

our statute books will once again have to contain laws that
reflect the odious practice of delineating the qualities that
make one person a Negro and make another white.l4/

Moreover,

racial discrimination, even "good faith" racial discrimination,
is inevitably a two-edged sword.

"[P]referential programs may

only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups
are unable to achieve success without special protection based
on a factor having no relationship to individual· worth."
University of California

..

R~ents

v.

~akke,

su~,

438 U.S., at

- 9 -

298 (Opinion of Powell, J.).

Most importantly, by making race

a relevant criterion once again in its own affairs, the
Government implicitly teaches the public that the apportionment
of rewards and penalties can legitimately be made according to
race -- rather than according to merit or ability -- and that
people can, and perhaps should, view themselves and others in
terms of their racial characteristics.

Notions of "racial

·entitlement" will be fostered, and private discrimination will
necessarily be encouraged.l5/
339

u.s.

See Hughes v. Superior Court,

460, 463-464; T. Eastland & W. Bennett, Counting by

Race 139-170 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:

Race, the

Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 775 (1979).
There are those who think that v1e need a nev1 Constitution,
and their views may someday prevail.

But under the

Constitution we have, one practice i_n wJ]ich government may
never indulge -- not even "temporarily" or as an "experiment"
is the practice of racism.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

- 10 FOOTNOTES

!/

" Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is

the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Valeo, 424

u.s.

1, 93.

Buckley v.

- 11 -

ll

By contrast, nothing in the Constitution prohibits a

private person from discriminating on the basis of race in his
personal or business affairs.

See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443

U.S. 193.

The Fourteenth Amendment limits only the actions of

the

the Fifth Amendment limits only the actions of the

States~

national government.

- 12 -

11 University of California Regents v.

~akke,

438 U.S. 265,

and United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, do not
suggest a different rule.

The Court in Bakke invalidated the

racially preferential admissions program that had deprived
Bakke of equal access to a place in the medical school of a
state university.

In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, a

state legislature had apportioned certain voting districts with
an awareness of their racial composition.

Since the plaintiffs

there had "failed to show that the legislative reapportionment
plan had either the purpose or the effect of discriminating
against them on the basis of their race", no constitutional
violation had occured.

430 U.S. 179-180 {concurring opinion).

No person in that case was deprived of his electoral franchise.
More than thirty-five years ago, during the Second World
'var, this Court did find constitutional a governmental program
imposing injury on the basis of race.
State~,

81.

323 U.S.

214~

See Korematsu v. United

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.

Significantly, those cases were decided not only in time

of war, but in an era before the Court had held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes the same equal
protection standard upon the federal governmerit that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the States.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497.

See Bolling_ v.

- 13 -

!/

A court of equity may, of course, take race into account in

devising a remedial decree to undo a viol ation of a law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race.

See Teamsters

v. United States, 431 U.S. 324; Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424

u.s.

747; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of

Education, 402 U.S. 1, 18-25; North Carolina Board of Education
v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43.

But such a judicial decree, following

litigation in which a violation of law has been determined, is
wholly different from generalized legislation that awards
benefits and imposes detriments dependent upon the race of the
recipients.

See text in Part B, infra.

- 14 -

2.1

As Mr. Justice Murphy t.Hote in dissenting from the Court's

opinion and judgment in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 242:
Racial discrimination in any form and in any
degree has no justifiable part whatever in our
democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any
setting but it is utterly revolting among a free
people who have embraced the principles set forth in
the Constitution of the United States.
See also Defunis v. Odegaard, 416

u.s.

312, 331-344 (Douglas,

J. , dissenting)i A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 132-133
(1975 ) .

- 15 ~/

See n. 4,

~upra.

In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, the

Court approved a county's voluntary race-conscious redrafting
of its public school pupil assignment system in order to
eliminate the effects of past unconstitutional racial
segregation of the pupils.

But no pupil was deprived of a

public school education as a result.

'

'

- 16 -

11

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the

authority to "enforce'' the provisions of Section 1 of the same
Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."

Neither section

grants to Congress the authority to require the States to flout
their obligation under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
afford "the equal protection of the laws" or the power to enact
legislation that itself violates the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment.

- 17 ~/

The legislative history of the MBE provision itself

contains not one mention of racial discrimination or the need
to provide a mechanism to correct the effects of such
discrimination.

From the context of the Act, however, it is

reasonable to infer that the program wa$ enacted, at least in
part, to remedy perceived past and present racial
discrimination.

In 1977, Congress knew that many minority

business enterprises had historically suffered racial
discrimination in the economy as a whole and in the
construction industry in particular.

See H.R. Rep. No.

94-1791, pp. 182-183 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2
(1975); To Amend and Extend the Local Public Works CaEital
Development and Investment Act:
on Economic

Dev~_loprnent

Hearing_~-

before the Subcomm.

of the House Comm. on Public Works and

Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 939 (1977)
Rep. Conyers).

(statement of

Some of this discrimination may well, in fact,

have violated one or more of the state and federal
anti-discrimination laws.

'•

- 18 -

2.1

See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl436

(Feb. 24, 1977)

(Rep. Mitchell)

("all [the MBE provision] attempts to do is to provide that
those who are in minority businesses get a fair share of the
.action from this public works legislation") (emph a sis supplied);
123 Cong. Rec. Hl440

(Feb. 24, 1977)

(Rep. Biaggi)

("It is time

that the thousands of minority businessme n enjoyed a sense of
economic

~ri

ty") (empha sis supplied).

Moreo v er, sponsors of

the legislation repeatedly referred to the low participation
rate of minority businesses in federal procu r ement programs.
~

See 123 Cong. Rec. Hl440

(Feb. 24, 1977)

(Rep. Biaggi)

Cong. Rec. Hl436 - Hl437

(Feb. 24, 1977)

(Rep. Mitchell); 123

Cong. Rec. Hl388- Hl389

(Feb. 23, 1977)

(Rep. Mitchell); 123

Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977}

(Sen. Brooke).

123

- 19 10/

See 123 Cong. Rec .. Hl440 (Feb. 24, 1977)

(Rep. Conyers)

("minority contractors and businessmen who are trying to enter
in on the bidding process ... get the 'works' almost every
time.

The bidding process is one whose intricacies defy the

imaginations of most of us here.")
"disadvantage

11

That the elimination of

is one of the program's objectives is an

inference that finds support in the agency's own interpretation
of the statute.

See

u.s.

Department of Commerce, Economic

Development Administration, EDA Minority Business Enterprise
Technical Bulletin (Additional Assistance and Information
Available to Grantees and Their Contractors In Meeting The 10%
MBE Requirement) 9-10 (Oct . 11, 19'77)

(Technical Bulletin)

("a

[minority] subcontractor's price should not be considered
unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs because
the price results from disadvantage which affects the MBE's
costs of doing business or results from discrimination"
(emphasis added)).

- 20 11/

For instance, in 1978, 83.4%. of persons over the age of 25

who had not completed high school were "white", see U.S. Dept.
of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 145 (1979), and, in 1977, 79.9% of households
with annual incomes less than $5,000 were "white", see id., at
458.

- 21 12/

Moreover, even a properly based judicial decree will be

struck down if the scope of the remedy it provides is not
carefully tailored to fit the nature and extent of the
violation.

See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.

4 0 6 , 419- 4 2 0 ; Mi 1 1 i ken v . Br ad 1 e_y, 418 U. S • 7 1 7 .

Her e ,

assuming that the MBE provision was intended solely to remedy
for past and present racial discrimination, it sweeps far too
broadly.

It directs every state and local government covered

by the program to set aside 10% : of its grant for minority
business enterprises.

Waivers from that requirement are

permitted, but only where insufficient numbers of minority
businesses capable of doing the work at non-exorbitant prices
are located in the releva nt contracting area.

No waiver is

provided for any governmental entity that can prove a history
free of racial discrimination.

Nor .is

~ny

exemption permitted

for nonminority contractors that are able to demonstrate that
they have not engaged in racially discriminatory behavior.
Finally, the statute makes no attempt to direct the aid it
provides solely toward those minority contracting firms that
arguably still suffer from the effects of past or present
discrmination.
These are not the characteristics of a racially-conscious
remedial decree that is cl6sely tailored to the evil to be
corrected.

In today's society, it constitutes far too gross an

oversimplification to assume that every single Negro,
Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo and Aleut

-

22 -

potentially interested .in construction contracting currently
suffers from the effects of past or present racial
discrimination.

Since the MBE set-aside must be viewed as

resting upon such an assumption, it necessarily paints with too
broad a brush.

Except to make whole the identified victims of

racial discrimination, the guarantee of equal protection
prohibits the government from taking detrimental action against
innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their own
race.

- 23 -

13/

The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time \>'hen the

Old World still operated in the shadow of ancient feudal
traditions.

As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set

out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions
among white men on account of their birth.

See U.S.

Constitution, Article I, §9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall
be granted by the United States").

The words Thomas Jefferson

· wrote in 1776 in the Declaration of Independence, however,
contained the seeds of a far broader principle:
truths to be self-evident:

"We hold these

all men are created equal ...• "

I'

-

14/

24 -

See Technical Bulletin,

SUP£~,

at 1.

Cf., Ala. Code tit.

1, §2 (19 40); Tex. Penal Code Art. 493 (1947).

- 25 -
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"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.

For· good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example."

Olmstead v. United States, 277

(Brandeis, J., dissenting).

.

'.

u.s.

438, 485
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concurring in the judgment.

My resolution of the constitutional issue in this ca s e is
governed by the separate opinion I coauthored in University of
Californi a Regen t s v . Bakke, 438 U. S . 265, 324-379 (1978).

In

my v iew, the 10% minority set-aside provision of the Public
Work s Employment Act of 1977 passes constitution a l muste r under

J

the standard announced in that opinion. _II
I

I n Bakke , I j oined my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, and BLACKMON
in articu l ating the view th a t "racial classifications are not
12er

~

invalid under [the Equal Protection Clause o f ] the

Fo u rteenth Amendment."

Id., at 356 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE,

MARSHALL, and BLACKMON, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)
op i nion ) . -.l:_l

(hereinafter cited as joint s e p a rat e

We acknowledged that "a government practice or

statute which . . . contains 'suspect classifications' is to be
subjected to ' st r ict scrutiny' and c nn be jus tified only if it
furthers a compe lling gove r nmental purpose and, even then, only

-lif no less restrictive alternative is available."
357.

.!.9_.:.., at

Thus, we reiterated the traditional view that racial

classifications are prohibited if they are irrelevant.
357.

Id.:.., at

In addition, we firmly adhered to "the cardinal

principle that racial classifications that

stigmatize~-because

they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to
another or because they put the weight of government behind
racial hatred and separatism--are invalid without more."

Id.,

at 357-358.
We recognized, however, that these principles outlawing the
irrelevant or pernicious use of race were inapposite to racial
classifications that provide benefits to minorities for the
purpose of remedying the present effects of past racial
discrimination. _l/

Such classifications may disadvantage some

whites, but whites as a class lack the "'traditional indicia of
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political procesS.

1 11

Id., at 357 (quoting San Antonio

Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
(1973) ).

u.s.

u.s.

1, 28

See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304

144, 152, n. 4 (1938 ) .

Because the consideration of race

is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past racial
discrimination, and because governmental programs employing
racial classifications for remedial purposes can be crafted to
avoid stigmatizaUon, we concluded that such programs should
not be subjected to conventional

..

11

strict scrutiny"--scrutiny

/ c:~~~'1'.·

·- 5--

that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact .

Id.,.at 362.

~ ~
~,.,...._

Nor did we determine that such programs should be analyzed
under the minimally rigorous rational-basis standard of
review.

Id., at 358.

We recognized that race has often been

used to stigmatize politically powerless segments of society,
and that efforts to ameliorate the effects of past
· discrimination could be based on paternalistic stereotyping,
not on a careful consideration of modern social conditions.

In

addition, lt!e acknowledged that governmental classification on
the immutable characteristic of race runs counter to the deep
nationa l belief that State-sanctioned

ben~fits

and burdens

should bear some relationship to individual merit and
responsibility.

Id., a t 360-361.

We concluded , therefore, that because a racial
classifi c ation ostensibly designed for remedial purposes is
susceptib l e t o misuse , it

c~d ~

by showing "an

i mportant and articulated purpose for its use . "

Id., at 361.

I !;~
~

-

" In add i tion, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any

1 1

group o r tha t si ngles o ut those least well represented i n the
pol itical process to bear the brunt of a benign program."
I b id .

~
~

In our v iew, then , t he pr oper inquiry is whether racia l

classifications designed to furt her remed i al purposes serve
impor t ant governmental o bjectives and are substantially
to achievement of those objectives.

rela~

Id. , a t 359.

II
J udged under this standard, t he 10% minority set-aside
provision at i ssue in this case i s plainly

cons~itutional.

I ndeed, the question is not even a close one.

~·-

As the Court demonstrutes, see ante, at 6-16, it is
~

indisputable that Congress' articulated purpose for enacting
the set-aside provision was to remedy the present effects of
past racial discrimination.

See also the separate opinion of

My Brother POWELL, post, at 9-12.

Congress had a sound basis

for concluding that minority-owned construction enterprises,
though capable, qualified, and ready and willing to work, have
received a disproportionately small amount of public
contracting business because of the continuing effects of past
discrimination.

Here, as in Bakke, supra, at 362 (joint

separate opinion), "minority underrepresentation is substantial
and chronic, and . . . the handicap of past discrimination is
impeding access of minorities to" the benefits of the
governmental program.

In these circumstances, remedying these

present effects of past racial discrimination is a sufficiently
important governmental interest to justify the use of raci al
classifications.

Ibid.

Because t

See generally id., at 362-373. __!/
osen by Congr ess to implement the

~

substantially related to the

----- -

~u~1-'l

--

achievement of its remedial purpose, the provision also meets--the second prong of our Bakke test.

Congress reasonably

determined that race-conscious means were necessary_ to break
down the barriers confronting participation by minority
enterprises in federally funded public works projects.
the set-aside creates

a-~in
C7"

favor of qualified and

That~

/.A

'*

available minority business enterprises does not necessurily
indicate that it stigmatizes.

. •

~~

~;~.,

As our opinion stated in Bakke,

"[f]or purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no

..

JA

,pt;;..,~

0

·- j difference between" setting aside "a predetermined number of
places for qualified minority applicants rather than using
minority status as a positive factor to be considered in
evaluating the applications of disadvantaged minority
applicants."

Id., at 378.

The set-aside, as enacted by

Congress and implemented by the Secretary of Commerce, is
ca refully tailored to remedy racial discrimination while at the
~-

"'7

same tm1e avoiding stigmatization and penalizing those least
able to protect themselves in the political process.
at 28-36.
at 14-21.

See ante,

Cf. the separate opinion of My Brother POWELL, post,

,.-.J

V"'-

Since under the set-aside provision a contract may

be awarded to a minority enterprise only if it is qualified to
do the work, the provision stigmatizes as inferior neither a
minorjty firm that benefits from it nor a nonminority firm that
is burdened by it.

Nor does the set-aside "establish a quota

in the invidious sense of a ceiling," Bakke, supra, at 375
(joint separate opinion), on the number of minority firms that
can be awarded public works contracts.

In addition, the

set-aside affects only a miniscule amount of the funds annually
expended in the United States for construction work.

j

See ante,

at 33, n. 72.
In sum, it is clear to me that the racial classlfications
employed in the set-aside provision are substantially related
to the achievement of the important and congressionally
articulated goal of remedying the present effects of past
racial discrimination.

I

The provision, therefore, passes muster

under the equal protection standard I adopted in Bakke.

??

--6 ......
III
In my separate opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-396, I
recounted the "ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination
against the Negro" long condoned under the Constitution and
c oncluded that "[t)he position of the Negro today in America is
the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal
treatment."

Id., at 387, 395.

I there stated:

"It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we ·
now must permit the institutions of this society to give
consideration to race in making decisions about who will
hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in
America.

For far too long, the doors to those positions

h ave been shut to Negroes.

If we are ever to become a

fully integrated society, one in which the color of a
person's skin will not determine the opportunities
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps
to open those doors . "

I d., at 401.

Those doors cannot be fully opened without the acceptance of

---

race-conscious remedies.

As my Brother BLACKMUN observed in

Bakke, "[i] n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race.

There is no other way."

Id., at 407

(separate opinion ) .
Co ngress recognized these realities when it enacted the
minority set-aside provision at issue in this c ase.

Today, by

upholding this race-conscious remedy , the Court accords
Congress the authority necessary to undertake the task of
moving our society toward a state of meaningful equality of
opportunity, not an abstract version of equality in which the
effects of past discrimination would be forever frozen into our

;,

-7social fabric.
{

I applaud this result.

Accordingly, I concur

in the judgment of the Court.

•

'

FOOTNOTES

I

1.

On the authority of Bakke, it is also clear to me

that the set-aside provision does not violate Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000d.

§

In Bakke five

members of the Court were of the view that the prohibitions of
Title VI--which outlaws racial discrimination in any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance--are
coextensive with the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

See 438

u.s.,

at 328 (Opinion of

BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.)

~·

id., at 287

(Opinion of POWELL, J.).

2.

In Bakke, the issue was whether a special minority

admissions program of a state medical school violated the Equal
Protection Clau se of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the present

case, the issue is whether the minority set-aside provision
violate s the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

As noted in Bakke, " 1 [e]qual

protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as
that under the Fourteenth Amendment.
(joint separate opinion)
93 (1976)

1

"

438

u.s.,

at 367, n. 43

(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

1,

(per curiam)).

3.

In Bakke, the Medical School of the University of

California at Davis had adopted a special admissions program in

which 16 out of the 100 places in each entering class were
reserved for disadvantaged minorities.

A major purpose of this

progrrun was to ameliorate the present effects of past racial
discrimination.

See 438 U.S., at 362 (joint separate opinion);

id., at 306 {Opinion of POWELL, J).

4.

Petitioners argue that the set-aside is invalid

because Congress did not create a sufficient legislative record
to support its conclusion that racial classifications were
required to ameliorate the present effects of· past racial
discrimination.

In petitioners' view, Congress must make

particularized findings that past violations of the Equal
Protection Clause and antidiscrimination statutes have a
current effect on the construction industry.
This approach is

fund~entally

misguided.

Unlike the

courts, Congress is engaged in the broad mission of framing
general social rules, not adjudicating individual disputes.
Our prior decisions recognize Congress' authority to
"require or authorize preferential

trea~ent

for those

likely disadvantaged by societal racial
discrimination.

Such legislation has been sustained

even without a requirement of findings of intentional
racial discrimination by those required or authorized
to accord preferential trearnent, or a case-by-case
determination that those to be benefited suffered from
racial discrimination.''
(joint separate opinion).

Bakke, 438

u.s.,

at 366

'

.

See also ante, at 26; the separate opinion of My Brother
POWELL, post, at 8-9.
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The 10% set-aside contained in

t~e

Public Works Employment

Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 11.6 ("the Act") creates monopoly
privileges in a $400,000,000 market for a class of investors ~J
defined solely by racial characteristics.

The oirect

beneficiaries of these monopoly privileges are the relatively
small number of persons

wit~jn

the racial classification who

borrow, working capital.

History teaches us that the costs associated

wit~

a

sovereign's grant of exclusive privileges often encompass

mor~

than the high prices and shoddy workmanship that are Familiar
hand maidens of monopoly: they engender animositv and
discontent as well.

The economic consequences of using noble

birth as a basis for classification in eighteenth century
France, though disastrous, were nothing as compared with the
terror that was engendered in the name of "egalite" and
"fraternite."

Grants of privilege on the bas-is of

-4..

characteristics acquired at birth are far from an unm1xeo
bJessing.

··· ~
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Our historic aversion to titles of nobility~/ is only one
aspect df our commitment to the proposition that thP sovereign
has a fundamental duty to govern impartially.~/

When

government accords different treatment to different persons,
there must be a reason for the difference.l/

1/

Because racial

"Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a
'legitimate purpose' for our Fe0eral Government, which
should be especially sensitive to ~iscrimination on grounds
of birth.
'Distinctions between citizens solely because oF
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality .' Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 u.s. 81,
100. From its inception, the Feneral Government has been
directed to treat all its citizens as having been 'cr eated
equal' in the eyes of the law. ~he Declaration oF
Independence states:
"'We hold these truths to be self-evident , that all
men are created equal , that they are en~owe0 by the ir
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.'
"And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant
of any title of nobility by the United States, see u.s.
Canst., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the
United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a
citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, S?0-521
n. 3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

~/

"The federal sovereig n, like the States, must govern
impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is
served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process,
as well as by the Equal Protection ~lause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100.

See a!.so Harris v. McRae,
u.s.
,
(S~EVENS, ,J.,
dissenting); rraig v. Boren,-429 u.~lq~2ll fSTEVENS, J.,
concurring) .

ll

"As a matter of principle and in view of mY attitude
toward the equal protection clause, I do not think
differences of treatment under law should be approved on
classification because of di fferences _.u orelated i;..Q"_the
legislative purpose. The equal protection clause ceases to
assure either equaltty or protection if it is avoi~e~ by
any conceivable difference that can be pointed out between
those bound and those left free.
This rourt has often
announced the principle that the differentiation must have
an appropriate relation to the obiect of the legislation or
ordinance." Railway Express v. New York, 336 u.s. 106, 11s
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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characteristics so seldom provide a

~elevant

basis for

disparate treatment,i/ and because classifications based on
race are potentially so harmful to the entire body po1itic,2 1
it is especially important that the reasons for any such
classification be clearly identified and unqufU=itionab1y
legitimate.

-

il

"Habit, rather than analysis, makeR it seem acceptable
and natural to distinguish between male and fema 1 e,
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate: for
too much of our history there was the same inertia in
distinguishing between black and white. But that sort
of stereotyped reaction may have no rational
relationship--other than pure preludicial
discrimination--to the stated purpose for which the
classification is being made." Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 520-521 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote
omit ted) •

5/ Indeed, the very attempt to define with precision a
bineficiary's qualifying racial characteristics is repugnant to
our constitutional ideals. The so-calJed guidelines developed
by the Economic Development Administration, see the Court's
appendix, ante, at 47, are so general as to be fairly
innocuous;-as-a consequence they are too vague to be useful.
For example, it is unclear whether the firm described in n. 16,
infra, would be eligible for the JO% set-aside.
If the
Nat1onal Government is to make a serious effort to 0efine
racial classes by criteria that can be administered
objectively, it must study precedents such as the Reichs
Citizenship Law of November J4, 1935, trans1ate0 in 4 Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression 1417-PS, p.8-9 (1946):
"On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 15 Sept.
1935 (RGBl. I, page 146) the following is ordered:

*

*

*

*

*

"Article 5
"l. A Jew is anyone who descended from at 1east three
grandparents who were racially full ~ews. Article 2, par. ?,
second sentence will apply.
"2. A Jew is also one who descended from two fu11 ~ewish
parents, if: (a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community
at the time this Jaw was issued, or who loined the community
later; (b) he was married to a Jewish peq;oo, at the-t.i_me the
law was issued, or married one subsequently: fc) he is the
offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in the sense of Section
1, which was contracted after the Law for the protection of
German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl. I, page
1146 of 15 Sept 1935); (d) he is the offspring of an
extramarital relationship, with a Jew, acco~ding to Section 1,
and will be born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936.".
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Th

s defined by the Act to inc,uoe

"citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."
All aliens and all non-members of the racial class are
excluded.

No economic, social_, geographic or historical

criteria are relevant for exclusion or inclusion.

~here

is not

one word in the remainder of the Act or in the legislative
history that explains why any Congressman or Senator favored
this particular definition over any other or that

i~enti~ies

the common characteristics that every member of the preferred
class was believed to share.~/

Nor does the Act or its

history explain why JO% of the total appropriation was the
proper amount to set aside for
racial

investors in each or the six

subclasses.2 1

6/--~~~~~----~--~~~-----In 1968, almost 10 years before the Act was passed, the
Small Business Administration had oevelopeo a program to assist
small business concerns owned or controlled by "socially or
economically disadvantaged pe~sons."
The Agency's description
of persons eligible for such assistance stated that such
"persons include, but are not limited to, black Americans,
American Indians, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans,
Eskimos and Aleuts.
" Ante, at 12.
Evidently, this is
the origin of the class at issue in this case.
But the SBA's
class of socially or economically disadvantaged persons neither
included all persons in the racial class nor excluded all
nonmembers of the racial class.
Race was used as no more than
a factor in identifying the class of disadvantaged.
The
difference between the statutory quota involved in this case
and the SBA's 1968 description of those whose businesses were
to be assisted under § 8(a) of the Small Business Act is thus
at~t as the difference between the University of
California's raci~l quota and the Harvaro admissions system
that MR. JUSTICEVPOWELL regarded as critical in University of
California v. Bakke, ·438 u.s. 265, 315-31~.
......,."'_

7/ It was noted that the va1ue of the federal contracrs
awarded to minority business firms in prior years had amounted
to less than 1% of the total~ since the statutory set asi~e of
10% may be satisfied by subcontracts to minority business
enterprises, it is possible that compliance with the statute
would not change the 1% figure.

78-1007
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+~~

Four different, though somewhat interrelated,

-

justifications for the racial classifications in

...

been advanced:

t~is

~

Act have

first, that the 10% set aside is a form of

reparation for past injuries to

t~e

entire membership of each

of the six classes; second, that it is an appropriate remenv
for past discrimination against minority business enterprisPs
that have been denied access to public contracts; thiro,

t~at

the members of the favored classes have a specia l entit lement
to "a piece of the action" when government is
benefits; and , fourth,

t~at

distri~uting

the program is an appropriate

method of fostering greater minority participation in a
competitive economy.

Each of these

a~serted

iustifications

merits separate scrutiny.

7/ (continued)
The legislative history also revealed that minority
business enterprises represented about 3 or 4% of a11 eligible
firms; the history does not jndicate, however, w~ether the 10%
figure was intended to provide the existing firms with three
times as much business as they could expect to receive on a
random basis or to enco ur age members of the class to acquire or
form new firms. An EDA guideline arguably }mplies that new
investments made in order to take anvantage or t~e 10% set
aside would not be considered "bona fide." See ante, at 45.
The 10% figure bears no special relationship to t~e
relative size of the entire racial class, to any of the six
subclasses, or to the population of any of them in the areas
where they primar51y reside . The Aleuts and the Eskimos, for
example , respectively represent less than 1% and 7% of the
population of AJ ask a,· see The New rol umb i a f:ncyc l opediQ_
(Columbia University Press 1975), pp. 47, ~Q, 9q1, while
Spanish-speaking or Negro citizens represent a maiority or
almost a majority in a large number of urban areas . In the
State of Hawaii, citizens of Japanese ancestry far outnumber
the descendants of the native Hawaiians, yet the larger group
is included in the preference and the smaller is exc1uoed .

78-1007
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I

Racial characteristics may serve to define a group of
persons who have suffered a special wrong and who, thPrefore,
are entitled to special reparations.

Congress has rpcognizeA,

for example, that the United States has treated some

Tnd~an

tribes unjustly and has created procenures for allowing members
of the injured classes to obtain cJasswide relief .
See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business
U.S. 73.

Comm~ttee

v. Weeks, 430

But as I have tormerly suggested, if Congress is to

authorize a recovery for a class of similarly situated

vict~ms

of a past wrong, it has an obligation to distribute that
recovery among the members of the injured class in an
evenhanded way.

See~

at 97-98

(S~EVENS,

J., dissenting).

Moreover, in such a case the amount of the aware should bear
some rational reJationship to the extent of the harm it is
intended to cure.

In his eloquent separate opinion in University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438

u.s.

265 , 387, MR.

JUS~Tr.E

MARSHALL recounted the tragic class-based discrimination
against Negroes that is an indelible part of America's
history.

-

"

II
I assume that the wrong committed against the Negro

------

-----

class is both so serious and so pervasive that it would
constitutionally just·ify an appropriate

c~a~swide

rec..o'i_ery

measured by a sum certain for every member of the iniured
class.

Whether our resources are adequate to support a fair

remedy of that character is a po1 icy question I have neither

?
"

I
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the authority nor the wisdom to aonress.

But that serious

classwioe wrong cannot in itself iustify the particular
classification Congress has made in this Act.

Racial

-----------------------~~--------------------classifactions
are simply too pernicious to permit any but

t~e

most exact connection between justification and
classification.
~

Quite obviously, the history of discrimination

against black citizens jn America cannot iustiry a grant of
privileges to Eskimos or Indians .

Even

jf

we assume that each of the six racial subclasses

has suffered its own special iniury at some time in our
history , surely it does not necessarily follow that each of
those subclasses suffered harm of identical magnitude .
Although "the Negro was dragged to this country in chains to be
solo in sJavery , "

Bakk~

Opinion of MARSHALL , J. , supra, 43 8

U.S. , at 387 , the "Spanish speaking" subclass came voluntarily ,
frequently without invitation , and the Indians, the Eskimos ann
the Aleuts had an opportunity to exploit America ' s resources
before most American citizens arrived .

There is no reason to

assume, and nothing in the Jegislative history suggests much
less demonstrates, that each of these subclasses is equally
entitled to reparations from the United States Government . ~/

Further, I believe it is unrealistic to regarn the
statutory preference ·as a form of
the injured classes.

-a;

reparat~OD

ror

the...m~_mbers

of

For those who are the most aisanvantagen

Ironically , the Aleuts appear to have been ruthlessly
exploited at some point in their history by Russian fur
traders . See The New Columbia Encyclopedia, p . SQ .
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within each class are the least likely to receive anv benefit
from the special prjvjJege even though they are the persons
most likely to be still suffering the consequences of the past
wrong.~/

A random d}stribution to a favored few is a poor

form of compensation for an injurv

share~

bv manv.

My principal objection to the reparation iustification for
this legislation, however, cuts more deeply than mv concern
about its inequitable character .
ignore

-

We can never either erase or

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL has recounted .

But if that history can justify such a random d}stribution of
benefjts on racial lines as that embodied in this statutory
scheme , it will serve not merely as a basis for remedial
legislation, but rather as a permanent source of iustification
~

for grants of special privileges .

-------~

For i f there is no

~u~v

to

attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to
distribute that recovery within the iniured class in an

~or

a similar reason, t'f-Je discdmination against males
in Califano v . Goldfarb, 430 U.S . 199 , caul~ not be
justified as a remedy for past o1scrimination against females .
That case involved a statutory provision which relieved wi0ows
from the obligation of proving dependency on their 0eceased
spouse in order to obtain benefits , but did not simil iar
relieve widowers .

c~ndemned

"The widows who benefit from the disparate treatment are
those who were sufficiently successful in the ~ob market to
become nondependent on their husbands . Such a wi0ow is the
least likely to need special benefits. ~he wi~ow most in
need is the one who js 'suddenly forced into a ~ob mar~et
with which she is· unfamiliar, and in '.'Jhich, beca\.l.S~_ of her
former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to
of fer . '
rKahn v . she v i n , 4 16 u . S . 3 5 1_ , 1 3 5 4 . To accept
the Kahn justTficatlon we must presume that rongress
deliberately gave a special benefit to those females least
likely to have been victims of the historic discrimination
discussed in Kahn . " 430 u.s., at 221 (S~EVENS , ,f. ,
concurring in~ne iudgment) .

~i)
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evenhanded way, our history will adequatelv support a
legislative preference for almost any

~thnic,

religious, or

racial group with the political strength to negotiate "a piece
of the action" for its members.

Although I do not dispute the validity of the assumption
that each of the subclasses identified in the Act has suffere0
a severe wrong at some time in the past, I cannot accept this
slapdash statute as a legitimate method of

provi~ing

c1ass-wi0e

relief.

II

The Act may also be viewed as a much narrower. remedial
measure--one designed to grant relief to the specific minoritv
business enterprises that have been oenied access to public
contracts by discriminatory practices.

The legislative history of the Act does not te11 us when,
or how often, any minority business enterprise was denieA such
access.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that the

number of such incidents has been re1atjvely small
years.

in recent

For, as noted by the Solicitor General, in the last

twenty years Congress has enacted numerous statutes 0esigned to
eUminate discrimination and its effects
programs. 101
10/

..

~r9m

feoeraJ.l'¥_ func1e0

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1qh4

"The statute with the most comprehensive coverage is
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1Q64, 42 u.s.r. 20000
et seq., wh5ch broadly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or

78-1007
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unequivocalJy ana comprehensively p r ohibits

on

disc~imination

the basis of race in any program or activity receivjng fe0era1
financial assistance.

In vjew of the scarcitv of litigated

claims on behalf of mjnority busine s s enterprjses during

t~is

period, ana the lack of any contrary evinence in the
legislative record, it is appropriate to presume

t~at

t~e

law

has generally been obeyed .

Assuming, however, that some firms have been denied public
business for racial reasons , the instant statutory remedy is

-

nevertheless demonstrably much broader than is necessary to
'--

right any such past wrong .

----

-...._---....,_

-.../

For the statute grants the special

preference to a class that includes (l) those minority owned
firms that have successfully obtained business in the past on a
free competitive basis ana undoubtedly are capable of doing so
in the future as we l.l;

( 2 ) firms that have nevet' at tempted to

obtain any public business in the past;

(3 ) firms

t~at

initjally formed after the Act was passed , including

were

t~ose

that

may have been organized simply to take advantage of its

provisions;~/ (4) firms that have tried to obtain public

lQ./ (continued)

activity receiving federal financial assistance . Since the
passage of Title VI, many other specific federal grant
statutes have contained similar prohibitions against
discrimination in particular funded activities. See , e.g.,
State ana Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 1976, 31
U.S . C. 1242; Energy Conservation ana Pro0uction Act, 42
U.S.C. 6870 ; Housing ana Community Deye}opment A~ .. _o f 1q74,
42 U.S.C. 5309; Comprehensive Employment ana Training Act
of 1973, 29 u.s.c. 991." Brief for Respondent 21 , n.7 .

11/ Although the plain language of the statute appears to
include such firms, as I have already noted supra, at
, n.7,
the EDA guidelines may consider such newly formed firms
ineligible for the statutory set-aside .
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business but were unsuccessful for reasons that are unrelater
to the racial characteristics of their stockholders; and (5)
those firms that were victimized by racial discrimination.

Since there is no reason to believe that any of the firms
in the first four categories had been wrongfully exclu0ed from
the market for public contracts, the statutory preference for
those firms cannot be justified as a remedial measure.

And

since a judicial remedy was already available for the firms in
the fifth category,~/ it seems inappropriate to regard the
preference as a remedy designed to redress any specif ic
wrongs.!ll

In any event, since it is highly unlikely that

the composition of the fifth category is at a11 representative
of the entire class of firms to which the statute grants a
valuable preference, it is ill-fitting to characterize this as
a "narrowly tailored" remedial measure.2.! 1
12/ See University of California Reg e nts v. Bakke, supra, 438
at 418-421 (Opinion of STEVENS, J.). See also~ ?07fo)

~S.,

of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment
Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 999, 1007-1008.
13/ I recognize that the EDA has issued a technical bulletin,
relied on heavily by the Court, ante, at 18-20, which
distinguishes between higher bids quoted by minority
subcontractors which are attributable to the effects of
disadvantage or discrimination and those which are not. That
is, according to the bulletin, if it is determined that a
subcontractor's uncompetitive high price is not attributable to
the effects of discrimination, a contractor may be entit1e0 to
relief from the 10% set-aside requirement. But even assuming
that the technical bulletin accurately reflects rongress'
jntent in enacting the . set-aside, it is not, ~asy to e~~?ion
_how one could realistically demonstrate with any 0egree of
precision, if at all, th~ extent to which a bid has been
inflated by the effects of disadvantage or past
discrimination. Consequently, while the Court's opinion
describes the set-aside as a remedia 1 measure, it plainly
operates as a flat quota.
14/ See the Court's opinion, ante, at 28 .

..
~
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TII

The legislative history of the Act discloses that there is
a group of legislators in Congress identified as the "Black
Caucus"
...___ and that members of that group argued that if the
Federal Government was going to p r ovide $4,000,000,000 of new
public contract business, their constituents were entitlen to
"a piece of the action."

It is neither unusual nor reprehensible for rongressmen to
promote the authorization of public construction in
districts.

thei~

The flow of capital and employment into a district

inevitably has both direct and indirect consequences that are
beneficial.

As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN noted in Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, however, the award of such contracts may become a

---

form of poJitical patronage that is dispensed by the party in

power.~/

~- .....___...,___

---

--------------

AJthough the practice of awarding such contracts

t o political allies may be as much a part of our history as the
employment practices condemned in Elrod, it

wou~d

surely be

unconstitutional for the legislature to specify that all, or a
certain portion, of the contracts authorized by a specific
statute must be given to businesses controlled by members of
one political party or another.

~hat

would be true even if the

legislative majodty 'Was convinced that a _. djsproport,i.QQ_ate
share had been awarded to the opposite party in previous years .
15/ "Non-officeholders may be the beneficiaries of lucrative
government contracts for highway construction, buildings, ann
supplies." 427 u.s., at 353.
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In the short run our political processes might benef;t from
legislation that enhanced the ability of representatives of
minority groups to disseminate patronage to their political
backers.

But jn the long run any rule that authorized the

award of public busjness on a racial basis would be iust as
objectionable as one that awarded such business on a purely
partisan basis.

The legislators' interest in provjding their constituents
with favored access to benefits distributed by the Fe0eral
Government ]s, in my opinion, a plainly impermissible
justification for this racjal classification.

IV

The interest in facilitat]ng and encouraging the
participation by minority business enterprises in the economy
is unquestionably legitimate.

Any barrier to such entrv and

growth--whether grounded in the law or in irrational
prejudice--should be vigorously and thoroughly removed.
Equality of economic and investment opportunity is a goal of no
less importance than equality of employment opportunity.

~his

statute, however, is not designed to remove any barriers to
entry.

Nor does its sparse leg;slative history aeta il anv

insuperabJe or even significant obstacles _. ts> entry iR.t9. the
competjt]ve market .

...

.
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Three difficulties encountered by minority business
enterprises ·jn seeking government business on a competitive
basis are identified in the legislative history.

The~e

were

references to (1) unfamiliarity with bidding procedures
fo1lowed by procurement officers,

(2) difficulties in obtaining

financing and (3) past discrjmination in the construction
industry.

The first concern is no doubt a real problem for all
businesses seeking access to the public contract market for the
first time .

It justifies a thorough review of bjdding

practices to make sure that they are intelligible and
accessible to all .

It by no means 4ustifies an assumption that

minority business enterprises are any Jess able to

p~epare

and

submit bids in proper form than are any other businessme n.
Consequently , that concern does not 4ustify a statutory
classification on racjaJ grounds .

The second concern wouJd justify legislation prohjbiting
private d5scrimination in lending practices or authorizing
special public financing for firms that have been or are unable
to borrow money for reasons unrelated to their credit rating .
It would not be an adequate justification for a requirement
that a fixed percentage of all loans made by national banks
must be made to Eskimos or Orientals
ability to repay the loans .

regar~. l~ss

of

th~r.__

Nor , it seems to me, does it

provide a sufficient justification for granting a

p~efe~ence

to

a broad class that includes , at one extreme, firms that have no

.. '

...
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credit problem~/ and at the other extreme, firms whose
credit rating will prevent them from taking anvantage of the
statutory preference even though they are
to do the work.

othe~wise

qualifier

At best, the preference for minority business

enterprises is a crude and inadequate response to the evils
that flow from discriminatory lending practices.

The question whether the history of past discrimination has
created barriers that can only be overcome by an unusual
measure of this kind is more difficult to evaluate.

In

analyzing this question, I think it is essential to draw a
distinction between obstacles placed in the path of minority
business enterprises by others and characteristics of those
firms that may impair their ability to compete.

16/ An example of such a firm was disclosen in the record of a
recent case involving a claimed preference for a firm
controlled by Indian shareholders:

"Based on the facts that were developed in the District rourt,
. the Indian community in general does not benefit from the
rBureau of Indian Affairs'l interp~etation of rthe Buy Indian
Act] •
The facts that were developed in the District rourt show
that the beneficiaries of this interpretation were the owners
of Indian Nations Construction Company. The president of the
company is a one-fourth degree Indian who is an administrative
law judge for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
by occupation. The vice president of that company was a
one-quarter blood Choctaw who is a self-employed rancher and
who states his net worth at just under a half mi11io~~?11ars.
__ The treasurer and general manager of that . corporat5on ,sa
non-Indian and he states his net worth at $1.3 million."
Tr. of Oral Arg. in Andrus v. Glover ~onstruction Co., 0.~.
1979, No. 79-84, p.2b=2~
·
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It is unfortunately but unquestionably true that

ir~ationa

1

racial prejudice persists today and continues to obstruct
minority participation in a variety of economic pursuits,
presumably incJuding the construction industry.

But there are

two reasons why this legjslation will not eliminate, or even
tend to eliminate, such prejudice.

First, prejudice is

1

ess

likely to be a significant factor in the public sector of the
economy than in the private sector because both feoeral and
state laws have prohibited oiscrimination in the awar0 of
public contracts for many years .

Second , and of

greate~

importance , an absolute preference that is unre1ate0 to a
minority firm's abjlity to perform a contract inevitably will
engender resentment on the part of competitors excluded
the market for a purely raciaJ reason .
\

f~om

It thus seems clear to

me that this statute cannot be defended as an appropriate
J

method of reducing racial prejudice .

The argument that our history of discrimination has left
the entire membership of each of the six racial classes
identified in the Act Jess able to compete in a free market
than others is more easily stated than proved .

The reduction

in prejudice that has occurred during the 1ast generation has
accomplished much less than was anticipated; but it
nevertheless remains true that increased opportunities have
produced an ever incr.easing number of

oemsm:?trations.....t~.at

members of disadvantaged races are entirely capable , not merely

.

'
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of competing on an equal basis, but also of exce 11 ing in
most demanding professions.

But, even though it is not

actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of

t~e
t~e

t~is

kin~

inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption
that those who are granted this special preference are less
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their
race.

Because that perception--especially when fosteren by the

Congress of the United States can only exacerbate rather. than
reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when race wi1

1

become a truly irrelevant , or at least insignificant, factor.
Unless Congress clearly articu1.ates the need for racia l
classifications that are narrowly drawn, the Court should not
uphold this kind of statute.

-

This statute has a fundamentally different character

-

t~an

a

carefully tailored remedial measure like the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.

A consideration of some of

t~e

dramatic

between these two legislative responses to racia l

difference~

iniustice

reveals not merely a difference in legis1ative craftsmanship
but a difference of constitutional significance.
enactment of the

Voti~Eights

~

(/!)reas

t~e

Act was preceded by exhaustive

legislative hearings and debates concerning discriminatory
denial of access to the electoral process, and became effective
in specific States only after specific findings were made,

t~is

statute authodzes an ·automatic nationwide: p_reference......£2r a11
members of a diverse racial class regardless of their possible
interest in the area where the pub1ic contract is to be
performed.

Just why a wealthy Negro or Spanish-speaking

investor should have a preferred status in bidding on a

·'
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construction contract in Alaska--or a citiz e n of Eskimo
ancestry should have a preference in Miami or Detroit--is
difficult to understand in light of both the asserted remedial
character of the set-aside and the more basic purposes of the
public works legislation.

The Voting Rights Act addressed the problem of 0enia1 of
access to the electoral process.

By outlawing specific

practices, such as poll taxes and special tests, the statute
removed old barriers to equal access: by requiring preclearance
of changes in voting practices in covered States, it precluded
the erection of new barriers.

The Act before us to0ay does not

outlaw existing barriers to access to the economic market and
does nothing to prevent the erection of new barriers.

On the

contrary, it adopts the fundamenta11y different approach of
creating a new set of barriers of its own.

A comparable approach in the electoral context would
support a rule requiring that at least 10 percent of

t~e

candidates eJected to the legislature be members of specified
racial minorities.

Surely that would be an effective wav of

ensuring black citizens the representation
their due.

t~at

has long been

Quite obviously, however, such a measure would

'

merely create the kind of inequality that an impartial
sovereign cannot tolerate.

Yet that is p:,egisely

"remedy" that this Act authorizes.

th~~_ inn

of

In both political and

economic contexts, we have a legitimate interest in seeing that
those who were disadvantaged

78-1007
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in the past may succeed in the future.

But

neit~er

nor a market can be equally accessible to all

an election

if race provioes

a basis for placing a special value on votes or oo 1 1ars.

The ultimate goal must be to eliminate entirely from
governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human
being's race.

The removal of barriers to access to po1itica 1

and economic processes serves that goal .~1

But the creation

of new barriers can only frustrate true progress.

For as MR.

JUSTICE POWELL~/ and Mr. Justice DougJas~ 1 have
perceptively observed, such protective barriers reinforce
habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes instead of
individuals.

Preferences based on characteristics acquiren at

birth inevitably foster intolerance and antagonism against the
entire membership of the favored classes.lQ 1

For this

reason, I am firmly convinced that this "temporary measure"
will disserve the goal of equal opportunity.

177 "The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of
racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our
theory as to how society ought to be organized." DeFunis v.
Ode g a a r a , 416 u . s . 3 1 2 , 3 4 2 (Doug 1 as , J . , a ; sse n t i n g ) .
18/ See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.

265, 298 (Opinion of POWELL, J.).
19/ DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
dissenting).

u.s.

312, 343 (Douglas, J.,

£Q/ In his Bakke opinion, supra, MR. JUSTICE POWELL ~ated:
-· "It is far tooiate to argue that the guatantee of equ~-1
protection to all persons permits the recognitio n of special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that
accorded others." 438 u.s., at 295 .

. ·~ .
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v

A judge's opinion that a statute reflects a profoundly
unwise policy determination is an insufficient reason for
concluding that it is unconstitutional_.

~ongress

has hroao

power to spend money to provide for the "general Welfare of the
United States," to "regulate Commerce among the several
States," to enforce the provisions of the CiviJ War Amendments,
and to djscriminate between aliens and citizens.
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426

u.s.

88, 101-102, n. 21.2 11

See Hampton
But the

exercise of these broad powers is sublect to the constraints
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amenoment.
Clause has both substantive and procedural

components~

~hat

it

performs the off5ce of both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in requiring
that the federal sovereign act impartially.

Unlike MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, ante,
at

, however, I am not convinced that the Clause contains an

20/
(continued)
In support of that proposition he quoted Professor Bickel's
comment on the self-contradiction of that argument:
"'The Jesson of the great decisions of the Supreme rourt and
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same fo~ at
Jeast a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, ano
destructive of democratic society."Ibid, ~-~35.
-....,._
21/ This preferential set-aside specifically discriminates in
favor of citizens of the United States.
See p. 4, supra.

\

...
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absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based
~

on race.

I am persuaded, however, that it does impose a

1
J Lspec1a
·
• 1 o bl'1ga t 10n

t o scrutJn1ze
· ·
nany governmenta 1

decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions
between citizens on the basis of their race and incinenta11y
also discriminates against nonc5tizens in the preferred racial

classes.~/

For just as

~cedura1 safegua~re

necessarv

to guarantee impartial decision;aking in the -iudicial process,
so can they play a vital part in preserving the impartial
character of the legislative process. 2 3/
~/

"When the Federal Government asserts an overdoing
national interest as justifiction for a discriminatory ru 1 e
which would violate the EquaJ Protection Clause if adopted
by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to
serve that interest." Hampton v. Mow Sun \~ong, supra, 426
u.s., at 1.03.
-----

*

*

*

"It is perfectly clear that neither the rongress nor
the President has ever required the Civil Service
Commission to adopt the citizenship requirement as a
condition of eligibility for employment in the federal
civil service. On the other hand, in view of the fact that
the policy has been in effect since the Commission was
created in 1883, it is fair to infer that both the
Legislature and the Executive have been aware of the policy
and have acquiesced in it.
In order to decide whether such
acquiescence should give the Commission rule the same
support as an express statutory or Presidential commano, it
is appropriate to review the extent to which the policy has
been given consideration by Congress or the Presioent, ann
the nature of the authority specifically delegate0 to the
Commissjon." Id., at 105.
23/ See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 1q7,
(hereinafter Linde):
. _
_,..
"For the last few years have reawakened our appreciat];;n of the
primacy of process over · p~oduct in a free society, the
knowledge that no ends can be better than the means of their
achievement.
'The highest morality is almost always the
morality of process,' Professor Bickel wrote about Watergate a
few months before his untimely death.
If this republic is
remembered in the distant history of law, it is likely to be
for its enduring adherence to legitimate institutions and

255 (1976)

,'
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In both its substantive and proc e nura 1 asp e cts
markedly different from the normal p r oduct of
decisionmaking process.

~he

t~e

t~is

Act is

legislative

very fact that r.ongress for the

first time in the Nation's history has created a broad
legislative classification for entitlement to benefits ba s ed
solely on racial characteristics identifies a dramatic
difference between this Act and the thousands of statutes that
preceded it.

This dramatic point of departure is not even

mentioned in the statement of purpose of the Act or in the
reports of either the House or the Senate rommittee that
processed the legislation,~/ and was not the

m

(continued)
processes, not for its perfection of unique principles of
justice and certainly not for the rationality of its laws.
This recognition now may wel_l take our attention beyond t~e
processes of adiudication and of executive government to a new
concern with the due process of lawmaking."
(Footnote omitted.'
24/ The only reference to any minority business enterprises in
the Senate Report was a suggestion that Indians had been
receiving too great a share of the public contracts. ~~e
Report stated:
"Some concern was expressed that Indians--with exceptionally
high structural unemployment levels- - were awarded proiects at a
per capita vaJue far in excess of non-Indian communities."
S. Rep. No. 95-38, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3 (1Q77L
The Court quotes three paragraphs from a lengthy report
issued by the House Committee on small business in 1Q77, ante,
at 13, implying that the contents of that report were
considered by Congress when it enacted the 10% minority set
aside. But that report was not mentioned by anyone during the
very brief discussion of the set-aside amendment. When one
considers the vast quantity of written material turned out by
the hundreds of congressional committees and subcommittees
these days, it is unrealistic to assume that a significant
number of Jegis1ators read, or even were ?WQ.re of, t4...a~.
- report. Even if they ~id, the report does not contain an
explanation of this lO% · set-aside for six racial subclasses.
Indeed, the broad racial classification in this Act is
totally unexplained. Although the legislative history
discussed by the Court ano by MR. ,JUS'T'I~E POWELL explains whv

•.
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subject of any testimony or inquiry in any legislative hearing
on the bill that was enacted.

It is true that there was a verv

brief discussion on the floor of the House as we11 as in the
Senate on two different days, but only a handful of legislators
spoke and there was virtually no debate.

~his

kino of

perfunctory consideration of an unprecedenter policy 0ecision
of profound constitutional importance to the Nation is
comparable to the accidental malfunction of the legislative
process that led to what I regarded as a totally
discrimination in Delaware
supra, 430

u.s.,

~ribal

un~ustifier

Busjness rommittee v. Weeks,

at 97.

Although it is traditional for judges to accord the same
presumption of regularjty to the legislative process no matter
how obvious it may be that a busy Congress has acted
precipitately, I see no reason why the character of their
procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision
whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of 1aw.~/

Whenever

Congress creates a classification that would be subiect to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protectjon rlause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if it had been fashioned bv a State
24/ (continued)
Negro citizens are included within the preferred c1ass, there
is no absolutely discussi_on of why Spanish speaking, Orienta 1 s,
Indians, Eskimos, and .Aleuts were a1so included.
See_o.fi,
.
_supra.
~

~-

25/ "It is not a new thought that 'to guarantee the democratic
legitimacy of poJiticaJ decisions by establishing essential
rules for the political process' is the central function of
judicial review, as Dean Rostow and Professor Strong, among
others, have argued." Linde, supra, 55 Neb. L. Rev., at 251.

,,

..
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legislature,

jt seems to me that judicial

review should inc1uoe

a consideration of the procedural character of the
decisionmaking process.

A holding that the c 1 assification was

not adequately preceded by a consideration of less drastic
alternatives or adequately explained by a s tatement of
legislative purpose would be far less intrusive than a final
determination whether the substance of the decision is
"narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."
Court's opinion, ante, at 28.l§/

If the general

1

Cf. the

anguage of

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment authorizes this
Court to review acts of Congress under the standards of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment--a clause
that cannot be found in the Fifth Amendment--there can be no
separation of powers objection to a more tentative holding of
unconstitutionality based on a failure to follow

p~oce0ures

that guarantee the kind of de 1 iberation that a fundamental
constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits. 271

26/ "Fear of legislative resentment at iudicial interference is
not borne out by experience where procedural review exists, any
more than it was after the Supreme Court told Congress that it
had used faulty procedure in unseating Representative Anam
Clayton Powell.
It is far more cause for resentment to
invalidate the substance of a policy that the politically
accountable branches and their constitutents support than to
invalidate a lawmaking procedure that can be repeated
correctly, yet we take substantive judicial review for
granted.
Strikingly, the reverse view of propriety prevails in
a number of nations where courts have never been empowered to
set aside policies legitimately enacted i~tQ law but~Q. have
-· power to test the process of legitimate enactment." Linde,
supra, 55 Neb. L. Rev., · at 243 (footnotes omitted).

---

27/ The conclusion to the Court's opinion states:
~
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In all events, before taking the firm and final position
expressed in MR. JUS'I'ICE S'I'EWART'S dissenting opinion, T would
hold this statute unconstitutional on a narrower ground: it
cannot fairly be characterized as a "narrowly tailored" racial
clu~sification

because it simply raises too many serious

questions that Congress faiJed to answer or even to address in
a responsible way.~.!!/

The risk that habitual attitudes

toward classes of persons, rather than analysis of the relevant
characteristics of the class, will serve

a~

a basis for a

legislative classification is present when benefits are
distributed as well as when burdens are imposed.

1n the past,

traditional attjtudes too often provided the only explanation

27/ (continued)
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching examination to make
sure that it does not conflict with const1tutiona1
guarantees." Ante, at 39 (emphasis added).
I agree with this statement but it seems to me that due process
requires that the "most search~mination" be connucted in
the f~e by Congress~-~-~_:/ than by a federal court.
28/ For example, why were these six racial classifications, and
no others, included in the preferred class? Why are aliens
excluded from the preference although they are not otherwise
ineligible for public contracts? What percentage of Oriental
blood or what degree of Spanish-speaking skill is requireo for
membership in the preferred class? How does the legacy of
slavery and the history of discrimination against the
descendants of its victims support a preference for
Spanish-speaking citizens who
may be directly competing with black citizens in some
overpopulated communities? Why is a preference given on 1 v to
owners of business enterpr5ses and why is that preference
unaccompanied by any requirement concerning the emp 1 oyment of
disadvantaged persons? Is the preference . ljmited to~ subc lass
of persons who can prove that tl-Jey are sub-iect to a sp~·cial
disability caused by vast discrimination, as the rourt's
opinion indicates? Or is every member of the racial class
entitled to a preference as the statutory language seems
plainly to indicate? Are businesses formed -iust to take
advantage of the preference eligible?
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for discrimination against women, aliens, illegitimates, ann
blnck citizens.

Today there is a · danger that awareness of past

injustice will lead to automatic acceptance of new
classifications that are not in fact

~ustifieo

by attributes

characteristic of the class as a whole.

When Congress creates a special

p~eference,

or a special

disability, for a class of persons, it should identify the
characteristic that justifies the special treatment.~/

When

the classification is defined in racial ter.ms, I believe that
such particular identification is imperative.

32_1

"Even if the Court rejects this analysis, it should
not uphold a statutory discrimination against a 1 iens, as a
class, without expressly identifying the group
characteristic that justifies the discrimination.
If the
unarticulated characteristic is concern about possible
disloyalty, it must equally disqualify aliens from the
practice of law; yet the Court does not question the
continuing vitality of its decision in r1n ~el Griffithsr,
413 u.s. 717]. Or if that cha~acteristic ~s the fact that
aliens do not participate jn our democratic cecisionmaking
process, it is irrelevant to eljgibility for this category
of public service. If there is no group characteristic
that expJains the discriminat5on, one can only conclude
that it is without any justifjcation that has not alreanv
been rejected by the court." Foley v. ronnelie, 435 u.s.
291, 311-312 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
"Of course, a general rule may not define the
benefitted class by reference to a distinction which
irrationaJly differentiates between identically situated
persons. Differences in race, religion, or political
affiliation could not rationally justify a difference in
eligibility for social security benefits, for such
differences are tot a l1 y i r r e 1 evant to : tbe quest i ~,. _whether
one person is economically dependent on anothe~. But a
distinction between · married persons and unmarried persons
is of a different character." Califano v. Jobst, 434 u.s.
47, 53.

•.
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In this case, only two conceivable bases for
differentiating the preferred classes from society as a whole
have occurred to me:

that they were the victims of unfair

(l)

treatment in the past and
compete in the future.

(2)

that they are less ab1e to

Although the first of these factors

would justify an appropriate remedy for past wrongs, for
reasons that I have already stated, this statute is not such a
remedial measure.

The second factor is simply not true.

Nothing in the record of this case, the 1egis1ative history

o~

the act, or experience that we may notice iudicia11y prov;des
any support for such a proposition.

It is up to r.ongress to

demonstrate that jts unique statutory preference is ;ustifieo
by a relevant characteristic that is shared by the members of
the preferred class.

In my opinion, because it has

~ailed

to

make that demonstration, it has also failed to discharge its
}

duty to govern jmpartjaJly embodied in the Fi_fth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

I respectfuJly dissent.

•,;..

"

lfp/ss

2/29/80

In other words, two requirements must be met.
First, the governmental body that attempts to
impose a race conscious remedy must have the
authority to act in response to identified
discrimination.

u.s.

Cf. Hampton · v; · Mow - sun · wonq, 426

88, 103 (1976).

Second, there must be

findings by such a body that demonstrate the
existence of a constitutional or statutory
violation.

In Bakke, I concluded that the Reqents

failed both requirements.

They were entrusted only

with educational functions, and they conceded that
there had been no past discrimination.

Thus, no

~~
compelling governmental was present to justify the

1
use of a racial quota in medical school admissions.
Bakke, 438

u.s.,

at 309-310.

lfp/ss

2/29/80

, this court held that Congress had the power to
prohibit racial discrimination in public
restaurants on the basis of its "finding that [such
discrimination] had a direct and adverse effect on
the free flow of interstate commerce" in violation
of the Commerce Clause.

Jon:

I have reframed the above sentence

to make it fit more neatly into the two steps
analysis described in the preceding three
paragraphs.

lfp/ss

2/29/80

Rider A,_ p. ,H> ·· fn · 7 · ,(RevJ.sed

draft)
7.

Although this record suffices to

support the congressional judgment that minority
contractors suffered identifiable discrimination,
legislative and administrative bodies need not be
content with findings that must constitutiuonal
standards.

Race conscious remedies, popularly

referred to as affirmative action programs, almost
inevitably affect some innocent persons.
infra, at

See

Respect and support for law,

especially in an area as sensitive as this, depend
in large measure upon the public's perception of
its fairness.

See Bakke, 438

u.s.

at 319 n. 53; J.

Wilkinson, "From Brown to Bakke", 264-266 (1979);
M. Perry,

Modern · ~qual · protection: -

·A

Conceptulization · and - Appraisal, Colum. L. Rev.
1023, 1048-49 (1979).

It therefore is important

for the record upon which race conscious remedies
are based to be well documented with evidence that
satisfies fair minded people with the justness of
such remedies.

lfp/ss

2/29/80

Rider A; · pi - 11 - (Fullilove)

This is not a case in which Conqress has
employed a racial classification solely as a means
to confer a racial preference.

Such a purpose

plainly would be unconstitutional.

u.s.,

at 307, 310-311.

See Bakke, 438

Here the purpose souqht to

be served was the compellinq state interest of
redressinq racial discrimination.

The question,

therefore, is whether the remedy chosen is
appropriate, having in mind that any effective
remedy is likely to affect persons differently
dependinq upon their race.
Education v; · Swann, 402

u.s.

See, e.q., Board of
at 45-46.

Althouqh a

federal court may not properly approve, any more
than it may order, remedies that exceed the scope
of a constitutional violation, (add cites to the
three cases referred to on paqe 12), this Court has
not required that remedial plans be limited the to
least restrictive means of implementation.

We have

recognized, where the purpose is to redress
discrimination, that the choice of a remedy by the
court is "a balancinq process left, within an
appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to
the sound discretion of the trial court".
cite on paqe 12).

(pick up

Similarly, in reviewinq a remedy

2.

chosen by a legislative or administrative body,
courts should recognize the deference usually
accorded the exercise of discretion by such a body.

Jon:

One rereading IV-A, and

particularly the first paraqraph commencing at the
bottom of page 11, it seems to me that we have not
phrased it quite a feliticiously as we should.

You

have undertaken some editing, and I have dictated
the above revision.

I

am not satisfied with

either, and suggest that you put your hand to this
- bearing in mind the need for clarification that
both your editing and mine have pointed up.

This

is quite a critical paragraph, and not an easy one
to write - especially in view of the paucity of
authority.

Maybe we are trying to analyze in steps

that are two refined.

Do you think we should try

to generalize to a greater degree?
L. F. P. , Jr.

lfp/ss 2/29/80

Rider · A; · p; - 17 - (falliloye)

In view of the numerically limited and widely
dispersed effect of the set asides, I cannot say
that congressional choice of this remedy was
inequitable.15
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Memorandum of Mr. Justice Powell.

I

write to apply the analysis set forth in my opinion

in University of California Y..:... Bakke,
the

issue

whether

presented

the

Due

in

this

Process

case.

Clause

of

438
We

u.s.

are

the

265

{1978), to

asked

Fifth

to

decide

Amendment

is

violated by the requirement in§ 103{f)(2) of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977

(PWEA),

1

that 10% of federal grants for

local public works projects funded by the Act be set-aside for
minority business enterprises.

I

conclude that this set- as ide

enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that serves the
compel! ing governmental

interest

in eradicating the continuing

effects of past identifiable discrimination.
I

Section 103 (f)(2) employs a racial classification that
is

constitutionally

means of
California

advancing
Regents

prohibited

unless

a ·c ompelling state
v.

Bakke,
.• ,·~

438

its

use

is

a

necessary

interest. University of

u.s.

265,

291

1

l

(1978)(opinion of Powell, J .)(hereinafter Bakke)~ see In~

1 • 91 Stat • 11 6 , 4 2 U. S • C • § 6 7 0,, 5 ( f) ( 2 ) ( 1 9 7 8 S u pp) •
('"

.

'

305
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Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 ( 1973) ; Loving v. Virginia,
388 U . S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964). Racial preference does not constitute such an
interest. "'Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestory' [are] 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499
(1954) .
The Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S.
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43,
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430,
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination justifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful ... discrimination.'' Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 418 (1975) . A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such discrimination. But this Court has never approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke, 438
U. S.. at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 367-376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U. S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South
Caroli11a v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966).
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of

7

4
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the governmental body must make findings that demonstrate the
existenc<' of illPgal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with
educational functions, and they made no findings of past discrimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S .. at 309-310.
Our past cases also establish that even if the government
proffprs a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect classification , the means selected must be narrowly drawn
to fulfill the govPrmnC'ntal purpose. In re Griffiths. 413 U. S.,
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse student body. But the method selected to achieve that end,
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate
llH'ans. The Reg<>nt's quota system eliminated some nonminority applicants from all consideration for a specified number of seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S, at
275- 276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an applicant'~:~ qualifications serves the University's interest in diversity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and
competitive consideration. !d., at 317-318.
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2) , we must
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findingsof uniawful discrimination; (ii} if so, whether sufficient find-.
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ings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and
(iii) whether the lOo/o set-aside is a permissible means for
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that
we are reviewing an Act of Congress.

II
The history of this Court's review of congressional action
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations.
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress
properly may-and indeed must-address directly the problems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants
on the basis of its "findings that [such discrimination] had a
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce."
Similarly, after hea.ring 11 overwhelming" evidence of private
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88.-914, pt. 2,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order "to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored
to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co ., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976),' quoting Section-by-Section :

78-1007-\fE\IO
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec.
7166, 7168 (1972).
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 At an
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress'
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimination forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179
(1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v.
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460
(1975).
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section 4 (e) provides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write
the English language. The Court held that Congress was
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination
Set:tion 2 of the Thirteenth Ameuclmeut, whit:h aboli~hed ~lavery, provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation ." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to
(lnforce the provisions of those Amendments,
2
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against the Puerto Rican community. I d., at 652-653. Implicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination.
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases construing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966),
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding
"ster[n] and . . . elabora.te" measures. Id., at 309. Most
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express approval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[ e] remedies for voting discrimination which go into effect without the need for
prior adjudication." I d., at 328. 3
It ia beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to
Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa
et seq ., temporarily banned the use of literacy tests in all jurisdictions.
In 01·egon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exercise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. Seeid., at 117 (Black, J.) ; id., at 135 (Douglas, J.); id., at 152 (Harlan,
J.) ; id ., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281
(STEWART, J., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN, J ., concurred) .
MR. JusTICE STEWART said that :
" Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning .. . actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself'
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted'
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide QaOI
on literacy tests." I d., at 284 (citation omjtted} .
8
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradi~
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether
Congress has made findings adequate to support its
determination that minority contractors have suffered extensive discrimination.

III

A
The petitioners contend that the legislative history of
§ 103 (f) (2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Congress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination.
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to
full understanding of the legislative process.
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve
specifi0 disputes between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law.
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the
debates on § 103 (f)(2) as the complete "record" of congressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court.
But 0 ongress is not expected to act as though it were duty
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. · The creation of national rules for the governance of our ~ociety simply
does uot entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress ljas no rrsponsibility to confine its vision to the facts and
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that mny be
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation.

'T -1007-MEi\10
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_After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congres&
again considers action in that area.
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legislative action. Such a requirement would mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor
our democratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not confined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of
§ 103 (f) (2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business
enterprises.
B
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2) demon5trates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the
• I rannot accept the sugge~tion ot' the Court of Appeal:s that § lOG (f)
(2) mu ~ t be viewed w; ~erving a compelling state intere:;t if the reviewing
court can "perceive a ba:;i~'' fur legi:;lative aetion. 588 F. 2d 600, 5Q4605 (CA2 1978) , quoting Kutmtbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 656. The
"perceive a basis" ~tanclard rrfers to congre~::;ionul authority to net, not
to the di:;tinct que::;tion whether that action violate:; the Due Precess
Clnu~e of the Fifth AmendmPnt. See text, at pp. 1-2, supra.
In my view , a court should uphold a rea~onable congres::;iomtl findin.g; /
of di:;crimination. A mot•e ~t ringeut :;tandard of review would impinge
npon Congr<'~"' ahilit.\· to addrr"'' prob!Pm;,: vi' cli:<('rimination, off' pp . 5-8,
supra; a/ ~tandnrd n'4uirinl! a eourt to ·'percciw H ba:;is" is c:-;:,;entiall~·
nH·aningle~~ in this ('Ontext. That sta.ndarcl might allow a court to ju::>tify
lf•gi:;lative adion even in the ab::.ence of aftirmative eduence of cOJwressioual fiuding8.
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relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only
a few words need be added.
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced
on the floor of the House of Representatives by Representative Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal
Government was already operating a set-aside program under
§ 8 (a) of the Small BusinesR Administration Act of 1958. 15
U. 8. C'. ~ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensible way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that
we are goi11g to eventually be able to ... end certain programs which are merely support survival programs for people
which do not contribute to th(' <'conomy." 123 Cong. Rec.
H1436- H1437 (daily ecl. Feb. 24. 1977) ." Senator Brooke,
who introduced a similar measure i11 tlw Senate. reminded
the Senate of the SI>PCial provisions previously enacted iu to
§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act ami the Railroad Revitalization Act
of 1076. 49 F. S. C. § 1657a. which, he statecl, demonstrated
the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. , '3909-10
(daily rd. March 10. Hl77).
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Business Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal
Government and subcontract them out to small businesses.
The Small Business Adruinistration has been directed by
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and economically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.6 The opera5 Duriug sub~equent debate in the House, Rrpre~enta.tive Conyers empha::;izPd that minority busine::;~e::; "through no fault of their own ;;imply
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong . Rec. H1440
(dail~· rd. Feh. 2-( , Hl77); ,-pp ibid. (n•marb of Hc•p. Biaggi).
u In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the Pre::;ident is.~ued Executive Orders direeting fedrntl aid for minority hu,.:irH·,;s enterpri>ic:>. See Exee. Order 11458,
34 Fed. H('g. 4\l;~7 (1969) ; Exec . OrdPr 1151~, :35 Fed. Hc·g . ..(f);~g (Hl70);
Exee. Order llt5:!5, :w Frd. Ht·g . 19907 (1971) . Thr l're,;idPnt nott>d
that "lllC'lllUE'r" of ec•rtain minority group,.: through no fault of thPir own
have bee11 denied the full opportunity to participate in the free eutcrpri 'o

..

78-1007-MEMO

FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

11

tion of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional
committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972. the House Subcommittee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found
that minority businessnwn face economic difficulties that "are
the result of past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d
Con g .. 2d Sess .. 3 ( 1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee
on RBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that
11
[t]he effect of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by
minorities in the ecollomy was the result of "past discriminatory systems." H. R. Rep. Xo. 94-468. 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1-2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee ou Small Business
found that
"over the years, there has developed a business system
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority
participation. In the past more than the present, this
system of conducting business transactions overtly precluded minority input. Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its
face, but because of past overt social and economic discrimination is presently opera.ting, in effect. to perpetuate
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th
Coug., 2d Sess., 124 (1977).
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives. 7
s~·stem," ExPc. Order 11518, supra, at. 4940, and I ha I Ihe "opportunity
for full participation iu our frrc cntrrpri;;c ~y::;tem by ::;ocially and economically cli~advantagPd Jl<'l'~ons i::; p~:;ential if WP are to obtain ~ocial and
economie ju;;tieP." Exec. Ord('r 1 Hi25, supra, al 1!:.1967. A:;,;i:;tauce to
minority bu s inP:-;~ cnterpri:;l'>' through thP § 8 (a) program has been designed to promot<' tiJP goals of the:,;c Ex<·cutive OrdPr>'. Ray Baillie 'l'msh
Hauling. luc. v. Klepp e, .t47 F . 2d G9G, 70G (CA5 Hl7:3) , rert. denied, 415
U.S. 914 (1974) .
1 Two ·ections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress' ·

..
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, l believe
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the
small percentage of federal contracting funds that minority
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the identity of the discriminating party, violate Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. R. C. § 2000d, or 42 U.S. C. ~ 1981,
or the Fourteenth Anwnclment. Although the discriminatory
activities were not identified with the exactitude PXJwcted in
judicial or administrativP adjudication, it must be remembered
that "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than
may this Court. . . ." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284
(1970) (STBWAH'l', J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). 8
recognition of the need for remedial ~teps on brhalf of minority businesses ..
Srction 80:3, .J.5 U. S. C. § 803 prohibit~ discrimination in any aetivity
fuudl•d b~· tlw Ac·t, and § 906, .J.9 lT. S.C. § 1657:t p:.;tabli:.;hp,.: a :\finority
R<·:.;ource Center to a:;~i:.;t miuority busiri!:'>'SilH'Il obtain rontratl::-: an
businrs:.; opportunitiPii rclatPd to the maintenaneP and rehabilitation of
railroad,.;. The provi ~<ion;; wen' enacted b~ · a. Congreiis that recognized the
"e,-tahli~hrd national policy, l'<iner nt lea,.;f tlw pa.~,.:a ge of the Civil Rights
Ad of 1964, to l'nc·ouragr and a:.;,.;i:;t in the clc•velopmmt of minority bu~i
nc~,: entcrpri~c . " S. Hrp. No. Q4--Hl9, 94th Conf., 1~t Se:.;s., 44 (1975)'
(CommercE> Comrnittc•e). In January 1977, tlw Drpartmt>nf of Transportation i:;;;m•d n•gulation;; pur:.;uant to 45 U. S. C. § 40:3 that require contractor:; to forrmrlatP affirmative action program~ to en~ure that minority
bu~ines.;e~ n·eeive a. fair proportion of contraet opportunitie,.;. S(•e 42 Fed.
Rc·g. 4290-4:201 (Hli7) (codlfied aL 49 CFH. Part 265). Sec abo pp. 1719, 1111. 11 and 1:2, infra .
s Although thi~ record ;;uffice:, to wUpporL the congre~;;i onal judgment
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress·
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional standards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensitive as this, depend in large measure upon ·the public's perception of·
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IV
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classification is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classification only when necessary to accomplish a compelling
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U.S., at 305. The conclusion that Congress found a compelling governmental interest in redressing identified discrimination against minority
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10%
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually
impossible to satisfy. 011ly two of this Court's modern cases
have held tlw usc of racial classifications to he constitutional.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 F. S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 lT. S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some
to wonder whether our reYiew of racial classifications has been
strict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
A
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue.
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference.
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra,
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a nonfairne:::s. Sre Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53; J . H. Wilkiu,;on III, From
Brown to Bakke, 204-266 (1979) ; M. Perry, Modern Equal Prot ection:
A Conceptualization and Appmi~ al, 79 Colum. L . Hev. 1023, 1048--1049
(1979) . IL therE> fore is important that the l egi~lativ e record supporting
race-conscious renwdi~ contuin evidence that sa,ti.Jie::; fair minded people
that the congressional action is just.
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racial means should be ava.ilable to further the legitimate
govemmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311.
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compelling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination.
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See,
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Although federal courts may not order or approve remedies that
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 ( 1977) ; Dayton v. Brinkman,
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v.
United States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J. , concurring),
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial
discrimination is 11 a balancing process left, within appropriate
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate,
described § 5 as 11 a direct affirmative delegation of power to
Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees't
of § 1 of the Amendment. Coug. Globe , 39th Coug., 1st Sess.,
2766 ( 1866) . Furthenuor<', he stated that § 5
11
casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to
it, for the future , that all sections of the amendment are
Cfl.rried out in good faith , and that no State infringes the

..
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rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon
the Congress this power and this duty." /d., ttt 2768.
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congressional action to effectuate the goa.Is of the Fourteenth
Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress.
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruction Committrc, said that the Fourteenth Amenclnwnt "allows
Congress to corrrct the u11just legislation of the Sta.tes." id., at
2459. and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the
power of Congress to enforce priuciples lying at the very
foundation of all republican govemment. ... " Id., at 2961.
See id., at 2512 -2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511
(Rrp. Miller). Sec also E-:r parte Virg1:nia, 100 lT. S .. at 345. 0
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the
Fourteeuth Amendment. see C. Fairman. History of the
Supreme Court of the Uuited States: Reconstruction aud
Reunion. pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971). they did not believe that
cougressional action would be umeviewable by this Court.
SevPral Members of Congress mnphasized that a primary purpose of tlw Fourteenth Anwndment was to place the provisions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of
the Constitution." Cong. Globe. a9th Cong .. 1st Sess .. 2462
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id.,
at 24!18 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866. Members of
Congress fully understood that judicial review was the means
by which action of thr Legislative and Executive Branches
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737 (1803).
9 See also Jon es v. Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440--441 , quoting
Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., bt Se~s., 322 (1866 ) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull
on Congre~s' authority under the Thirteenth Ameudment) .
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I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments.
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a raceconscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of
a remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial review of racial classifications.

B
men reviewing the selection by Congress of a race...
conscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon
which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974);
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387,
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy.
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46,
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force,
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d
306, 311 (CA2 1979); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CA11974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 910

..
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(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS)
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the
availahility of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legislation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong.
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threatened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f)
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new
public construction. Since the emergency public construction funds were to be distributed quickly,t 0 any remedial provision designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover,
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for
continued success without federal assistance. 11 And Congress
10 The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that
federal monies be committed to state and liJcal grantees by September 30,
1977. 42 U.S. C. A.§ 6707 (h) (1) (Supp. 1978) . Action on applications
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application,
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of
project approval, id., § 6705 (d) .
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight committ·ee addressed the "complex
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of
tacial bias." See H. R. Rep . No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Select
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knew that the ability of minority group members to gain
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering
the construction trades. 12 The set-aside program adopted
Committee on Small Business). The committee explained how the effects
of discrimination translate into economic barriers:
"In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major problems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of
past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group.
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs.
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to
obtain 1he needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and
a track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority businessmen usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is
often turned down.
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also· the internal
functions of management." !d., at 3-4.
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set-aside in the Senate,
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate problems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment discrimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated · by the
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use
hiring goals in order to redress past ·discrimination. See Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971). The House of
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969) . · The Senate, which had approved
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. 115 Cong.
Rec . 40749 (1969).
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementatiOn of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ens.ure equal opport,unity.

-1
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-tts part of this emergency legislation served each of these
,concerns because it took effect as soon as funds were expended
under PWEA and because it provided minority contractore
with experience that could enable them to compete without
governmental assistance.
The § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of federal contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program
, concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2).
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have approved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the percentage of minority group workers in a business or governmental
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minorBoston
ity group members in the relevant population.
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are members of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members constitute about 170jo of the national population, see Contractors
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp.
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978).
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks
in the construction industry. !d., at 40742-40743. The day following the
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted
"exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades.
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of
minorities." !d., at 41072.
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The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway
between the present percentage of minority contractors and
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation.
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its
effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the
country where minority group members constitute a small percentage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2). The factors
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qualified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce,
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW
Grants, App. 165a-167a. We have been told that 1261
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37.

c
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the petitioners contend with some force that they have been asked
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are innocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved.
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors.
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would
reserve about .25 o/o of all the funds expended yearly on construction work in the United States for approximately 4%
of the Nation's contractors who are lnembers of a tniuority

7
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group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view,
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness. 13
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the setaside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination
that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently significant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the governmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise discretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the
set-aside in this case. a
13 Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contractors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrelevant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no setaside and provided S400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976)
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)
(''To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment").
Similarly, I cannot accept the ;.:uggr~tion that the set-aside should be
considerrd a "t echniqne to induce governments and private parties to
cooperate voluntarily with federal policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners,
contractors who wi,;h to compete for all federal fund::;, certainly have not
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside.
14 Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that could
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Con-

78-1007-l\IE:VIO
·i2

FULLILOVE v. KLUTZ ICK

v
In tLe history of this Court and this country, few questions
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions
played no small part in the tragic legacy of governmentsanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.)
( 1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envisions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The bne cannot
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin.
But in our quest to achieve a society free from ra.c;al classification , we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer
from the effects of identifiable discrimination.
Dist.inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that
the R egents of the University of California were not competent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of racial classifications, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a
democratic society implicit in the D1·e Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve transient social or political goals, however worthy they may be.
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power,
r;rcss docs not imply that other methods are unaYailable to Congress. Nor
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropria te remed:v
•'I that the selection of a set-aside by any other p:O\·ernmr ntnl b o d~· wou!d
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., a t 300- 310. The degree of
sp ('cificity required in the findings of discrimina tion and the breadth of
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and
authc rity of a governmental b ody .

..
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ttnd Congress has been given a unique constitutional role
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In
this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determination that minority contractors were victims of purposeful
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably necee..
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find ng constitutionfil
reason to invalidate § 103 (f) (2)/~

Petitioners a.lso contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil
Hights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the
1'-Ct-r.sidc is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not violate
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id., at
3~8-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, Wlil'l'E1 MARSliALL 1 and BLACKMUN 1 JJ.).
15
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No. 78-1007

FN. The dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall asserts
that the Court's opinion satisfies the
"intermediate" standard of review propsed by
Justices Brennan, Wihite, Marshall and Blackmun in
Bakke.

That assertion is surely correct. Any

legislative enactment that satisfies strict
scrutiny must also pass muster under a more lenient
standard of review.
Mr. Justice Marshall also asserts, I
believe incorrectly, that the Court's opinion
rejects the "strict scrutiny" standard. It is hard
for me to understand how this contention can be
made in light of the Court's explicit statement
that
[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it
does not conflict with constitutional
guarentees.
Some have characterized such
an examination as a "test:" it is not
essential that these standards of review
be characterized as one degree or another
in the hierachy of judicial analysis. What
is essential is that any enactment of
Congress which [sic] employs racial or
ethnic criteria receives probing
examination.
Ante, at 39.
It may seem that disagreement over the
appropriate standard of review for racial
classifications is sterile so long as majority of

2.

the Members of this Court agree that§ 103(f)(2) is
constitutional. But such a view overlooks this
Court's role in providing guidance to federal and
state courts who are forced to confront complex
questions of constitutional law. The Equal
Protection Clause, and the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, means that any classification among
groups must be justifiable. Different standards of
review applied to different sorts of
classifications simply recognize that some
classifications are less likely to be justifiable
than others. Racial classifications must be
assessed under the most stringent level of review
because immutable characteristics that bear no
relation to individual merit are necessarily
irrelevant to virtually every kind of governmental
decision.
While racial classifications demand strict
scrutiny, I cannot agree that the Constitution
absolutely prohibits any racial classification. Mr.
Justice Stewart recognizes the correct principle:
"Under our Constitution, any official action that

3.

treats a person differently on account of his race
or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and
presumptively invalid." Post at 2.

But, in rare

and narrowly defined circumstances, that
presumption may be rebutted.
In my view, Mr. Justice Stewart's view
would create an additional anamoly. The dissenters
state unequivocally that "[u]nder our Constitution,
the government may never act to the detriment of a
person solely because of that person's race." Post
at 2. But the dissenters recognize that
irreconciliable principle that federal courts,
surely a part of our government, "may take race
into account in devising a remedial decree to undo
a violation of a law prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race." Post at 13 n.4. So long as race
may be noted in devising a remedy, and so long as
Congress is an appropriate body to devise a remedy,
then it must be that some legislative acts that
mass strict judicial scrutiny can enact raceconscious remedies.
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In these school desrgregaiion cases we dealt with the
authority of a federal court 1o formulate a remedy for unconstit.utional ra('.ial discrimination. However, the authority of
a court to inc;orporate racial criteria into a remrdial deeree
also extends to statutory violations. ·where fed('ral anti•
discriminR1.io.n laws have Leen Yiolaied, Rn (~quitable r<:>medy
may in the appropriate case inc:ludr a rRcial or e1.Jmic factor.
Fmnks v. Bowman Transpurln.f1·on Co., 424 U. S. 74 7 (J 976);
see lnf.crno.Uonnl Brotherhood of Te.omslers Y. United St.otes,
431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. Y. ltfoody, 422
U. S. 405 (1975). In anotl1er sett.ing, we have held t.hat a
state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably nece~sary
to assure compliance with federal Yot.ing rigl1ts legi slation ,
even though the state a.ction does not entail the remedy of a
constitutional violation.
United Jewish Oryo11i:zotions of
TFillia.msburyh, Inc. v. Co.rey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-165 (1977)
(opinion of YfHJTE, J., joined by BHE:!'J'\~AN, BLAC:KMUN, and
SrEY:t::!'\'S_. JJ.); id., at 180-187 (Bl' RG:t:R, C. J., dissenting on
otl1er grounds).
·yv·hen we have discussed the remedial po"·ers of a federal
court, ·we have been alert to the limitation that "[t]he power
of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and
state governmental ent.ities is not plenary. . . . '[A] federal
court is required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit tl1e
nature and ext.ent of the . . . violat.ion." Dayton Board of
Education Y. Brink1oa.n, 433 U.S. 406. 419-420 (1977) (quotjng -~fillikcn Y. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717. 73S (1974), and Swann
v. · Clwrlott.e-ltf eckl.enbu.rq Board o Educ:.otion_. supra, 402
U. S., at l G).
.Jo.s we_ .rJo .=.
Here we deal not ·with the limited remedial po"·ers of a
federal court. but with the broad remedial powers of Congress.
It is funclamenial that in no organ of goH•rnment . .--.o-e-·s_ __, ;i./2
.)
ihere repose a more comprehensiYe rc:>meclial power than
jn the Congress, expressly d1arged by the Constitution with
competence and aut-hority 1,o adn~.I)~Q 1hQ general 'Xelfare ~

-
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to enforce Pqunl proi.edion guarantees. Congress not
only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance "·ith
existing federal statut.ory or constit.u1.ionnl antidis<'.rimination
provisions, but nlso, where (',ongrcss has nutJJOrity 1o clc·l'h.re
certain conduct. unl:ndul, jt may, ns here, anthorize :md
A. ·
induce state action to avoid SlH.:h COJJuuct. Supra, at~----:1.-~-.......
]
'(2)

A more specific clHlllenge to t.h e J\1BE program js the
charge that it. impermissibly deprives nonminoniy bDsinesses
of Bccess to at least some portion of the govemment contracting opporf.lJnit.ies generated by the Act. It. must. be eoncecJed that by its objective of remedying tl1e J1ist.orical imp3irment of acc:ess, tl1e JdBE provision can have the effect. of
aiYanJing some contracts to J\1BEs which ot.herwise might. be
awarded t.o o1l1er businesses, wl1o may themselves be inlJoeent
of any prior discriminatory artions. B ... t ne no 1' 7ic
'o1~
1
~i P*ion3l r;gl2t 1o l?o ?' ·ardc'txl a ]sul;J:e 11 c . L.. ::: - ~·· e# Failure of nonminorit.y firms to rec·.eive certain eontrtJcts is, of
course, an incidental c.onsequrncc of the program, not part
of its objective; similarly, past impairment. of minority-firm
al':c·.css 1.o public cont.ract.ing opportunities may l1ave bC>r.n an
jnciclenta] r.onsequenc.e of "bu~iness- as - us113l" by public contracting agencies and among prime (·ont.rad.ors.
It js not a constit.Dtional defect in this program tl1at
it may disappoint t.he expectations of nonminority firms.
\Vhen effectDating a limited and properly tailored remedy
t.o cure the effects of ]1rjor discrimin3iion, suc.h "a sharing·
of the burc:len" by innocent parties is not impermissible.
Franks, supra . at. 77; see A lurmwrle Paper Co., S?lpra.; Un·ited
J eu:ish Orucwiza.tion, supra. The act uaJ "burden" sJJOulclered·
by nonminority firms is relatiYely · light.. in t])is connection
wben we consider the scope of this pDblie works progTaJD as·
compared with 0\'erall construction contraci.ing opport.uni-:
r
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This clors not. mrRn that thr c·lnim of on·riru :lusi\'C'llt·ss
is <·ntitl .. tl tu no con!-:idPr.Ation )n ll1r> pn.'l'Pilf l':lse. TJ1c
hi!'lury of gon•fllllK'Ilf.'l] tolPr:llwe of prnrfi<·.r~ using ra.cia] or
c1Jn,ic: <:rilt:ria for the purpo~t· or wit.h the c•ffc-ci of imposing
inYiriious cii ~< · rin1inn tion must slt•rt tiS 1.0 the clc!lr.krious
Plfrct ~ of r.Yl'll lwnign r:H·iu] ur <'tlllliC' l'lR!"~ifit·IJt .ion~ when
tht·y ~I rny frolll Mr .JTO\\' renwrlisl jw:f ifit:I:Jf .i ons. EY«'ll in the·
<·onfc ·xf of .A f:1cial l'h :.lll<·llgC' Stlclr ns i!-= pr<'St' Jlf•·u in this <.:ns e,
the :\JBE prc!\·is ior1 1':1llllOt. p3 s~ 111U.'::kr unle s~. " ·ith due ac<·ou,.t for it .c: .Ar!mini !" trnlive prugr~m. if prO\·in .. s n l'P.Il!'O lJ<Jb]e
n ~~ ·JrflJH·.e fhHt nppli< ·fltion of nH ·inl or ethnic· <'rifc·r·ia wilJ be
Jimik<J to arc·ompli shing t.hr. n •nwcli.Al obj ec:tin' S of Cm,gress
:l))d lklt mis:1ppli<:ations of the pro~ram will he prL•Jllp1ly
:md :Hll:'Cjll:ltc:Jy I'CIIH.'rlie<) tlrlmini:-:tnJ(jye)y.
It j-:- =:: ig nifil'nnt flJ!.lt flw ~nmi11istn~tiYe ~ c ·hpnw pr ·oyitJ es for
"· njq~ r :md e;-.;c mpfion.
T"'o fullrL.lnH·ntal c·oJJgrc·:::sional as!'JJJilJ•li<JJlS \JIHI<·r)ic· L]Jr• :\JBE prugralll: (l) thAt. 11H• prPSPJJt
f'lf•·t · 1~ 11f Jl ;'\ St di ~ rTilllinatiolJ ]J:t\'t ' imp:~in·cl 1lll' <·OJlljJ1'1itivr.
Jlll~i1io11 of bu ~ ilH· Sf:: c •.c:. mnwd .AlHl c·uJJtro]J,,d by llll'llllH,rs of
m i11orir.Y group ~ ; alld (2) 11131 ~ffirnl:Jtin• rtfurts to Pliminate
)Jflrric·r!-' 1n minority -finn ac·.(:, •.ss . and to c·YaluB1.e l1ids \\'ith
: ~t!,ill.'.: 11Jli ' IJ1 . for 1hf' pn•!-:c'llf. P ff<'<:t~ of
J:J..st di.sr.riJJlilJ3tiun
"ou)d :J ...:..:urc> 1h B1 WJ of tJw ft •d<•ra) funcJ~ gT31J1t•d lllllh:r
the Plllili< ~ \\' orks EmploymP.n1 .AC't of 1!1/7 " ·ould UP 3et•llllt!c-cl for by contr<'ld!; \\·it.h nvailRhlP. qufllifit·<l. ho113 fide
mi11ority lm s i1Jes~ ~ll1.(~ rpri~t ~s. Eac:h uf tlH' .Se l:l~ S IIIllptinlls
Jt1:Jy },. ,.,.J>IJlt.Pd in thr 3dmini:::.1rstin' pr~HTSS.
Tl1t: ;Hllnini s triltin:· prngrHm C'untaills mc•.::~.surt'~ to dfe<:tuate
tl1e (CiJJgr• ·::-.iolla) objl'eti\'e of :t ssuring lcgitim:-ite partit:ipati•_tll by di ~ :Hh ·a n1:Jgf"d ]\JBEs. Arlministrntive definition
l1a.-; 1igh !t·Jwd !:'ome )p :-;~ clefinit'~ n~pc•ct.s of tfJP sf 81tltur_v iden~11. ,uf 1ht~ mi11t>r}t~' gro.llps enc:m.np:l s:o;c·rl .lJ~· t_he prof-!-:!-J
gr;lllJ.~ J J,c·J ·c· ~ ~ .AJrnJJJJS1rat.Jn• · :::<TU1Jrly iu Jd<'lJtJf~· f!IHI
f'linJiJJ:ik fn.llll p.Arti<:ip:ltiull in the ]m>gnml :\JBE!:= " ·hu nre
!JUt ':l.>u11:>-fide'' withiu the rt>gllbfiolls a11d guidt·lillt:'S; fur
!lll
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73/ The MBE provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (f) (2)
(1976 ed. Supp. I), classifies as a minority business
enterprise any "business at least 50 per centum of
which is owned by minority group members or, in the
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per
centum of the stock of which is owned by minority
group members." Minority group members aie defined
as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and
Aleuts." The administrative definitions are set out
in the Appendix to this opinion, ~ 3. These
categories also are classified as minorities in the
regulations implementing the nondiscrimination
requirements of the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 u.s.c. § 803, see
42 Fed. Reg. 4285, 4288 (1977), on which Congress
relied as precedent for the MBE provision. See 123
Cong. Rec. S3910 (Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke).
The House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and
Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a
significant part in the legislative history of the
MBE provision, also recognized that these categories
were included within the Federal Government's
definition of "minority business enterprise." H.R.
Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 20-21 (1975).
The specific
inclusion of these groups in the MBE provision
demonstrates that Congress concluded they were
victims of discrimination. Petitioners did not press
any challenge to Congress' classification categories
in the Court of Appeals; there is no reason for this
Court to pass upon the issue at this time.
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Mr.

Justice Powell,

concurring

in part

and

concurring

in

the

judgment.
The

question

in

this

case

is

whether

Congress

constitutionally may enact the requirement in§ 103(f)(2) of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 1 that 10% of federal
grants for local public work projects funded by the Act be set
aside for minority business enterprises.

For the reasons stated

in Part III-A of the Court's opinion, I agree that Congress has
the

legislative

authority

to

enact

the

set-aside.

Because

I

agree that enactment of the set-aside does not violate the Due
Process

Clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment,

I

also

join

all

but

subsections (1) & (4) of Part III-B of the Court's opinion.
I

Section 103(f) (2) employs a racial classification that
is constitutionally prohibited unless it is a necessary means of
advancing a compelling state interest. University of California
Regents

v.

Bakke,

Powell,

J.)(hereinafter Bakke):

717, 721-722 (1973):
McLaughlin
adherence
scrutiny

v.
to

of

438

racial

265,

Loving~

Florida,
this

U.S.

3 79

see

In

305
re

(1978)(opinion
Griffths,

u.s.

Virginia, 388

U.S.

standard,

299,

184,

which

classifications,

196

( 1964) •

demands
as

1, 11

413

of

U.S.

(1967):

I

consider

strict

judicial

important

as

well

as

required by precedent. At times, debate over the proper standard

2.

of judicial review of equal protection claims may seem sterile
and

less

important

than

the

outcome

of

any

particular

controversy. But I have though that the enunciation of standards
is

a

crucial

part

of

this

guidance to state and

Court's

federal

responsibility

to

provide

courts that must decide complex

questions of constitutional law.
The Equal Protect ion Clause, and the equal protect ion
component of
demands

the

that

Due

any

Process

Clause

of

classification

the

among

Fifth

Amendment,

groups

must

be

justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different
sorts
some

of classifications simply
classifications

others.

less

likely

to

be

legitimate

than

Racial classifications must be assessed under the most

stringent
which

are

illustrate the principle that

level

bear

no

of

review

relation

because
to

immutable

individual

characteristics,

merit

or

need,

are

irrelevant to virtually every legitimate governmental decision.
See e.g.,

Anderson~

Martin, 375

u.s.

399, 402-404 (1964).

This is the first case since University of California
v.

Bakke,

438 U.S.

government
members

may

of

justifiable
interest

in

265

establish

minority
as

(1978),

a

groups.

remedy

eradicating

discrimination

a

identified

to present the issue whether a
racial
I

that
the
by

classification

believe
serves

that
the

§

favoring

103(f) (2)

compelling

continuing

effects

Congress.

Although

of
the

is

state

the

past

Court's

opinion does not explicitly adopt a standard for judicial review

,;.

.

.

.

3.

of racial classifications,

I am satisfied that its analysis is

essentially consistent with the traditional standard discussed
in my Bakke opinion.

u.s.,

See 438

at 287-299.

It

is on this

understanding that I join the Court's opinion.
Nevertheless,

I

recognize

that

the

several

opinions

that join in the opinion of the Court are not of a single mind
on the proper standard for review of racial classifications. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall joins the Court opinion only on
the understanding that it is consistent with the "intermediate"
level of scrutiny adopted
Brennan, White,
324-379.

Of

scrutiny

test

in the separate opinion of Justices

Marshall and Blackmun in Bakke,

course,

any

legislation

that

by

definition,

pass

will,

438 U.S.

survives
any

the

less

265,

strict

stringent

standard of review.
But Mr.
not

evaluate

Justice Marshall

the

'strict

scrutiny'

opinion

quite

language of the

set-aside

insists that the Court "does

provision

standard."

differently.

Ante,
In

my

under

at 6.
view,

I

the

conventional

read

the

the

Court's

reasoning

Court's opinion demonstrates that

§

and

103 (f) ( 2)

has been subjected to the exacting examination that is required
of a racial classification.
The

Court

recognizes

"the

need

for

careful

judicial

evaluation to assure" that a racial classification is "narrowly
tailored"

to

discrimination."

remedy
Ante,

"the
at

28.

present
The

Court

effects
emphasizes

of

past

that

"any

...

4.

preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination." "What is essential," the
Court

concludes,

"is

that

any

enactment

of

Congress

which

employs racial or ethnic criteria receives probing examination."
Ante, at 39.
In

the

"conventional"
Justice

absence

standard

Marshall's

of
of

an

explicit

review,

conclusion

that

I

see

the

rejection

of

the

no

basis

for

Mr.

Court

today,

for

the

first time, has subjected a racial classification to less than
strict

scrutiny.

explaining

my

Accordingly,
conclusion

constitutional muster.2

~.

<

'

I

that

merely
this

echo

the

set-aside

Court

in

passes

5.

FOOTNOTES
1. 91 Stat. 116, 42

2.
judicial

Although

scrutiny,

prohibits

any

recognizes

the

u.s.c.

racial
do

I

rae ial

~

6705(f)(2)

( 19 7 8

require

classifications

not

agree

that

classification.

correct principle:

s u pp)

the

Mr.

0

strict

Constitution

Justice

Stewart

"Under our Constitution,

any

official action that treats a person differently on account of
his

race

or

presumptively

ethnic

origin

invalid."

Post at

is
2.

inherently
But,

suspect

in rare

and

and

narrowly

defined circumstances, that presumption may be rebutted. Cf. Lee
v.

Washington,

390

u.s.

333,

334

(1968)(Black, . Harlan,

and

Stewart, JJ., concurring).
Nevertheless,
view.
may

Justice

Stewart

takes

a

contrary

His dissent states unequivocally that governmental action

never

opinion

Mr.

be

based

also

upon race.

recognize

the

Post at

2.

But the dissenting

irreconciliable

principle

that

federal courts, surely a part of our government, "may take race
into account in devising a remedial decree to undo a violation
of a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race."

~

at 13 n.4. So long as race may be noted in devising a remedy for
identified racial discrimination, and so long as Congress is an
appropriate

body

congressional

to

devise

a

remedy,

legislation that passes strict

can include race-conscious remedies.

,'

then

it

must

be

that

judicial scrutiny
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Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.
Although I would place greater emphasis than the Chief
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review
in conventional terms,
accord

with

my

own

I view his opinion as substantially in
views.

Accordingly,

I

join

the

Chief

Justice's opinion and write separately to apply the analysis set
forth

in my opinion in University of California v. Bakke, 438

U.S. 265 (1978)(hereinafter Bakke).
The question in this case is whether Congress may enact
the requirement

in

103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment

§

Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public
work

projects

business

funded

enterprises.

by

the

Act

Section

be

set

aside

103(f)(2)

for

employs

minority
a

racial

classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is
a

necessary

Bakke

at

means

299,

of

305;

advancing

see In

~

a

compelling

Griffths,

(1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388

u.s.

413

state

u.s.

interest.

717,

721-722

1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v.

Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). For the reasons stated in my
Bakke

opinion,

I

consider

adherence

to

this

standard

as

important and consistent with precedent.
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection
component

of

the

Due

Process

Clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment,

demand that any classification among groups must be justifiable.

2.

Different

standards

classifications

of

review

simply

classifications are

applied

illustrate

less

to

the

different

principle

sorts
that

of

some

likely to be legitimate than others.

Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent
level of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no
relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost
every

legitimate governmental decision.

Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-404 (1964).

See e.g.,

Anderson

~

In this case, however, I

believe that§ 103(f)(2) is justifiable as a remedy that serves
the

compelling

state

interest

in

eradicating

the

continuing

effects of the past discrimination identified by Congress.1

FOOTNOTE

3.

1.
judicial

Although

scrutiny,

racial
I

do

not

prohibits

all

recognizes

the principle that

our

racial

Constitution,

differently

on

classifications
agree

that

classification.

any

I

official

account

of

his

Mr.

believe

is

action

that

race

or

require
the

strict

Constitution

Justice

Stewart

applicable:

"Under

treats

person

ethnic

a

origin

inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2.
in

narrowly

rebutted. Cf.

defined
Lee~

circumstances,
Washington, 390

that

u.s.

Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring).

presumption

may

is
But,
be

333, 334 (1968)(Black,
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Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.
Although I would place greater emphasis than The Chief
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review
in

conventional

judgment

as

Accordingly,

terms,

I

view

substantially
I

in

his

opinion

accord

announcing

with

my

own

the

views.

join that opinion and write separately to apply

the analysis set forth by my opinion in University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)

(hereinafter Bakke).

The question in this case is whether Congress may enact
the requirement

in §

103(f)(2)

of the Public Works Employment

Act of 1977 (PWEA), that 10% of federal grants for local public
work

projects

business

funded

by

enterprises.

the

Act

Section

be

set

aside

103(f)(2)

for

employs

minority
a

racial

classification that is constitutionally prohibited unless it is
a

necessary

means

of

advancing

interest. Bakke, at 299, 305; see
721-722

( 1973);

McLaughlin~

stated

in

my

Loving

v.

Florida, 379
Bakke

a
In~

Virginia,

u.s.

opinion,

compelling

governmental

u.s.

Griffths, 413

388

U.S.

1,

11

717,

( 1967);

184, 196 (1964). For the reasons
I

consider

adherence

to

this

standard as important and consistent with precedent.
The Equal Protection Clause, and the equal protection
component

of

the

Due

Process

Clause

··'

li

.

of

the

Fifth

Amendment,

2.

demand

that

any governmental distinction among groups must be

justifiable. Different standards of review applied to different
sorts
some

of

classifications

classifications

simply illustrate the principle that

are

less

likely

to

be

legitimate

than

others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most
stringent
which

level

bear

irrelevant

no
to

of

review

relation
almost

because
to

every

immutable

individual
governmental

characteristics,

merit

decision.

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-404 (1964).
however,

I

believe

that

§

103(f)(2)

is

or

need,
See,

are
~'

In this case,

justified as

a

remedy

that serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating
the

continuing

Congress. 1

·.·
1.1··

effects

of

past

discrimination

identified

by

3.
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1.
judicial

Although

scrutiny,

prohibits

all

racial
I

do

racial

classifications

not

agree

that

classification.

Mr.

recognizes the principle that I

believe

is

our

action

that

Constitution,

differently

on

any

official

account

of

his

race

or

require
the

strict

Constitution

Justice

Stewart

applicable:
treats
ethnic

"Under

a

person

origin

inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Post at 2.
in

narrowly

rebutted. Cf.

defined
Lee~

circumstances,
Washington, 390

that

u.s.

Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring).

presumption

may

is
But,
be

333, 334 (1968)(Black,
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to apply the analysis set forth by my opinion
in University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) 1
to the issue presented in this case. We are asked to decide
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
is violated by the requirement in § 103 (f)(2) of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 42 U. S. C. A.
§ 6705 (f) (2) (Supp. ~978), that 10% of federal grants for
local public works projects funded by that Act be set aside
for minority business enterprises. I conclude that this setaside enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that
serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating
the continuing effects of past identifiable discrimination.

I
Review of the constitutionality of this set-aside involves
two distinct inquiries: (i) Did Congress have the authority
to enact § 103 (f) (2), and (ii) Do the terms of § 103 (f) (2)
violate the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I regard the answer to the
first question as relatively easy. As the opinion of the Court
demonstrates, this leg· slative act can be justified by several
explicit grants of power to Congress. I cannot, however, join

~

~

78-1007-~
2
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the analysis of the Court. It does not address explicitly the
s.econd, and in my view the most important, question raised
this case.
The Court's opinion fails to apply traditional equal protecn and due process analysis to decide whether this racial
c assification comports with constitutional requirements. To
be sure, isolated passages in the opinion rely on language from
our cases that have reviewed the use of racial classifications.
See, e. g., ante, at 28, 37, 38. But the recitation of general
language untied to any constitutional provision is not illuminating in this case. 1
Section 103 (f) (2) employs a racial classification that is
constitutionally prohibited unless its use is a necessary means
of advancing a compelling governmental interest. University
of Caltfornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 305 (1978~
~
(opinion of PowELL, J.) (hereinafter Bakke); see In r~
1 One cnnnrt identify the st::mdard of review applied in the Court's
opinion. It is possible that-for the first time in the jurisprudence of
this Court~a racial claEsification has been reviewed under the "rational
basis" test. Ne'lr the end of its opinion the Court quotes Mr. Ju tice
Jackson's discussion of judicial review. Ante, at 38. But the Court does
not recrgnize that the situations described by him were very different
from this case. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "After the forces of conservatism and liberali~m. of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and averaged and
come to rest in some compromise measure such as the Missouri Compm- yO (V\
'{()'{'~\ mise, theN. R. A., the A. A. A., a min;mum-wage law, or some other legislative policu, a decision striking it down closes an area of comprnmise in
which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been comprsed." R. H.
Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 321 (1941) (emphasis
added). The analvsis of tho~e ca~es reviewing the enactment of economic
legislation, see United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), is simply
not applicable to review of thi~ racial clao-sification.
Nor do I ngrcc that Lau v. Nirhols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), is instrurtive.
In that case "the 'preference' approved did not result in the denial of
the relevant benefi~'meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program'-to anyone else." University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265,304 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, i.).
~
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Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964). Racial preference does not constitute such an
interest. "'Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestory; [are] 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499
(1954).
The Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District
No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, i., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S.
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43,
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430,
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination justifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful ... discrimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 418 (1975). A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether
§ 103 (f)(2) was enacted as a means of redressing such discrimination. But this Court has never approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or leg:slative
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke , 438
U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 367-376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U. S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966).
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action

and impermissible racial preference rests on the existenc/
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the governmental body must make findings that demonstrate the
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the R egents
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with
educational functions, and they made no findings of past discrimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309- 310.
Our past cases also establish that even if the government
proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect clai'sification, the means selected must be narrowly dra.wn
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.,
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse student body. But the method selected to achieve that end,
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate
means. The Regent's quota system eliminated some nonminority applicants from all consideration for a specified number of seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S, at
275- 276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes
race as a factor , but not the sole factor, in assessing an applicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in diversity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and
competitive consideration. I d., a.t 317-318.
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2), we must
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings
of unlawful discrimination; (ii) if so, whether sufficient find-'

.0

·,to-X

78-1007-CONCUR
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

5

ings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and
(iii) whether the lOo/o set-aside is a permissible means for
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that
we are reviewing an Act of Congress.

II
'T he history of this Court's review of congressional action
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations.
Unlike the Regents of the University of Californ!a, Congress
properly may-and indeed must-address directly the problems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants
on the basis of its "findings that [such discrimination] had a
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce."
Similarly, after hearing "overwhelming" evidence of private
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 8&--914, pt. 2,
88th Cong., 1st Sess, 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order "to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored
to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976), quoting Section-by-Section

'
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec.
7166, 7168 (1972).
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 At an
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress'
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimination forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179
(1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v.
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460
(1975).
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b) (e). Section 4 (e) provides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write
the English language. The Court held that Congress was
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination
2

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of those Amendments.
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against the Puerto Rican community. !d., at 652-653. Implicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination.
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases con.:
struing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966),
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding
"ster[n] and . . . elaborate" measures. !d., at 309. Most
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express approval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[ e] remedies for .voting discrimination which go into effect without the need for
prior adjudication." !d., at 328. 8
It i3 beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa
et seq., temporarily banned the use of lit,eracy tests in all jurisdictions.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exercise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. See
id., at 117 (Black, J.); id., at 135 (Douglas, J.); id., at 152 (Harlan,
J.); id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); id., at 281
(STEWART, J., with whom BuRGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, J., concurred).
MR. JusTICE STEWART said that:
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning ... actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban
on literacy tests." I d., at 284 (citation omitted).
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradicate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether
Congress has made findings adequate to support its
determination that minority contractors have suffered extensive discrimination.

III
A
The petitioners contend that the legislative history of
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or

constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the
assertion that a reviewin~ court may not look beyond the
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Congress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination.
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to
full understanding of the legislative process.
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve
specifi0 dispt1tes between competing adversaries. Its constitutionul role is to be representative rather than impartial, to
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law.
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the
deb3tes on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of congressional decisionmaking underlving that statute is essentially
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court.
But Congress is not expected to act as thou~h it were duty
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congrel"s has no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation.

'

.'

78-1007-CONCUR
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress
again considers action in that area.
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legislative action. Such a requirement would mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor
our democratic tradition warrants such a ·c onstraint on the
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not confined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of
§ 103 (f) (2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business
enterprises.
B
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f)(2) demonstrates that Cong~ess reasonably concluded that private and
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the
4

I cannot accept
suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f)
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing
court....can 1 perceive a basi3" for legislative action. 588 F. 2d 600, 604605 (CA2 1978), quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S., at 656. The
"perceive a basis" standard refers to congre~:sional authority to act, not
to the distinct question whether that action violates the Due Precess
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See text, at
supm.
:!JeattJ ti8 tcpcat the Ooatt of Appeals' ePFer. Oce ante, at 26-.
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonab!e congressional finding
of discrimination. A more stringent standard cf review would impinge
'WOn Congress' ability to address problems of discrimination, see
,
~ supra; a standard requirirg a court to "perceive a bas's" is eso:en\ tially meaningless in this context. That standard might allow a court to
justify legislative action even in the absence of affirmative evidence of
congressional findings.
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relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only
a few words need be added.
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced
on the floor of the House of Represcnta.tives by Representative Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal
Government was already operating a set-aside pro ram under
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Ac 15 U. S. C.
§ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensible
~ for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result bein · that
""We are going to eventually be able to end certain programs for
people which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong.
Rec. H1436-H1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). 5 Senator
Brooke, who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, reminded the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted
--f---.4-~ § 8 (a.) of the SBA Act and the Railroad Revitalization
Ac , 4 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated the
v;t idity o IS amen men .
ectwn 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Business Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal
Government and subcontract them out to small businesses.-4l

oP /'IS~

q

-

(Jd,/1 eA.. ~till!
lo~ l9~9)

During subsequent debate in the House, Representative Conyers emphasized that minority businessrs "throu~h no fault . of their own sim11ly
have not been able to 14et their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H1440
..,...(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977)j ;tee ~ ~ )(}~~8
(remarks of Rep.
Biaggi).
~
6 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders directing federal aid for minority business cntcrprisjls. See Exec~ Order
11458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (~ 1969); Exec~ Order 11518, 35 Fed.
Reg. 4939 (~1. ~ 1970); Exec ~ Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967
~ 1971). The President noted that "members of certain minority
groups through no fault of their own have been denied the full opportunity to participate in the free enterprise rsystcm," Exe~ Order 11518,
supra, at 4940, and that the "opportunity for full participation in our
free enterprise system by socially and economically disadvantaged persons
is essential if we are to obtain social and economic justice." Exec~
5

Hlf

(
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The oper ion of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the
'---'""+_..,_o_u_se'"""
~ommittee on Small Business found that mmority businessmen face economic difficulties that "are the resu t
of past social standards which linger as characteristics of
minorities as a group." . H. R. Rep. No. 92- 1615 3 (1972).
In 1975, the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversig t an
Minority
· · concluded that "[t]he effect of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained in
the past," and that low participation by minorities in the
economy was the result of "past discriminatory systems(
H. R. Rep. No. 941- 2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee on Small Business found that
"over the years, there has developed a business system
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority
participation. In the past more than the present, this
stem of conducting business transactions overtly preuded minority input. Currently, more often encounter
business system which is racially neutral on its face,
ut because of past overt social and economic discriminar
on is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate these
· past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791L124 (1977).

)qz~ ~J) 2J1
Sc..ss. )

46il 'fl/-& ~j
1st rt4() ..>

.

~ ~·J li. ~·j

The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives. 7
------Order 11625, supra, at 1996'r! Assistance to minority business enterprises
through the § 8 (a ) program has been designed to promote the goals of
these Executive Orders. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 447
F. 2d 696, 706 (CAS 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 914 (1974).
~
. . _ 7 Two sections of the R ailroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congres~
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses.
45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity funded by the
Act, and
U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minority Resource Center to
assist mmority businessmen obtain contracts and other business opportunities related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of railroads. The
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, I believe
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the
small percentage of federal contracting funds that minority
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the identity of the discriminating party, violate Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, or the Fourteenth
mendment.
t ough the discriminatory activities were not
i,!dentificd with the exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication, it must be remembered that "Congress
gress may paint with a much broader brush than may this
Court .... " Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 (1970)
(STEWART, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 8

(
I

provisions were enacted by a Congress that recrgnizod the "established
national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
to encourage and assist in the development of minority business enter(Commerce Committee). In January
prise." S. R ep. No. 94-499
1977, the Department of Transportation issued regulations pursuant to
45 U . S. C. § 403 that require contractors to formulate affirmative action
programs to en8tue that minority businesses receive a fair proportion of
contract opportunities. See 42 Fed. Reg. 4290-4291 (1977 . See also
nn. 11 and 12, infra.
8 Although this record suffices to support the congres ional judgment
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional standards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensi~
tive as this, depend in large measure upon the public's perception of~
fairness. St>e Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53; J . H . Wilkin son III, From
Bmwn to Bakke, 264-266 (1979); M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049
(1979). It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people
that the congressional action is just .
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IV
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classifica.tion is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classification only when necessary to accomplish a compelling
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The conclusion that Congress found a compelling governmental interest in redressing identified discrimination against minority
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10%
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually
Impossible to satisfy. A& I nofled in BBlcl.,e, 438 U. ~ . , at ~gs,
~R . 2'7,1 _£nly two of this Court's modern cases have held the
use of racial classifications to be constitutional. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi
v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the failure of
legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some to
wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been
strfct in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).

A
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue.
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference.
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra,
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious
~
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a non~
racial means should be available to further the legitimate
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311.
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compelling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination.
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any
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affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely
to affect persons differently depending upon their r3ice. See,
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Although federal courts may not order or approve remedies that
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 (1977); Dayton v. Brinkman,
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v.
United States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring),
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial
discrimination is ua balancing process left, within appropriate
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of
racia.l discrimination. The legielative history of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate,
J111 aJ
described § 5 as "a direct affirmative delegation of power to
-Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees " oP § J ~ ~ 111t.4l
•
....., r~Qntai!'lBQ in SliiQti9H One]
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
&.lis., 2766 (1866). Furthermore, he stated that§ 5
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are
~
carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes th~
rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon
the Congress this power and this duty." I d., at 2768.

A

.r

Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congressional action to effectuate the goals of the Fourteenth

,,
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Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress.
Representative Stevens, also a member of h Reconstruc-'
"allows Congress to correct
tion Committee, said that
the unjust legislation of the tates," id., at 2459, and Senator
Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the power of Congress
to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all republican government. . . ." !d., at 2961. See id., at 2512513 (remarks of ReplQi!eJ;,J,ta±iw/ Raymond); id., at 2511
(R ep~en:ta,ti?el Miller). See also Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S., at 345. 9
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the
- - - - - - - - . .,..-F.o urteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, The OliveF Wsn:deH
Devi:!!e History of the Supreme Court of the United
J
I(t.c.dlA siftuc d'k t Holmgil
States:
1295 1296 (1971), they did not
tWJl. Reon16Yt...) believe that congressional action would be unreviewable by
this Court. Several Members of Congress emphasized that a
pt. /
primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place
I the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "in the eternal
firm fl ment of the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.
1st Sess. 2462 1866) (remarks of Repr~tative Ga.rfield). _ti(Md.llkoSJ
See id., at 24
epFt~tlttive Steohe~s); id., at 2462 ~ep. x.:
....____
.J:eeerrttt.tiv~ Thayer); id., at 2498 ~ep~esen+ativ~ Broomall) . J;.MtYtk.S DF'
By 1866, Members of Congress fully understood that judicial l~
review was the means by which action of the Legislative and
Executive Branches would be required to conform to the
----Constitution. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737
(1 03).
----I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Con-

t

See also Jon es v. Alfred May er & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting
Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., 1st Sess., 322 (1866) (rema.rks of Sen. Trumbull
on Cong<e$ ' outhority undec the Thirteenth Amendment).
~
9
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gress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments.
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a raceconscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of
a remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial review of racial classifications.

B
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a raceconscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon
which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974);
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387,
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy.
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F . 2d, at
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46,
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force,
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d
306, 311 (CA2 1979) ; Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 50~
__F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CA11974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910____.-(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421
tJ. S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CA8)

...
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(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legisiation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong.
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threat~
ened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f)
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new
public construction. Since the emergency public construction funds were to be distributed quickly/ 0 any remedial provision designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover,
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for
----11
continued success without federal assistance.
And Congres~
10

The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30,
1977. 42 U.S. C. A,§ 6707 (h) (1) (Supp, 1978). Action on applications
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application,
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of
project approval, id., § 6705 (d).
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight commiUee addressed the "complex
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of
~
racial bias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Selec~
Committee on Small Business). The committee explained how the effects
of discrimination translate into economic barriers:
"In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major prob-
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knew that the ability of minority group members to gain
_____experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering
12
the construction trades.
The set-aside program adopted ~
!ems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of
past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group.
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs.
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and
a track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority businessmen usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is
often turned down.
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also the internal
functions of management." !d., at 3-4.
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set~aside in the Senate,
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate problems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment discrimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated by the
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use
hiring goals in order to redress past discrimination. See Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971). The House of
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969). The Senate, which had approved
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. 115 Cong.
~
Rec. 40749 (1969).
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementation of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ensure equal opportunity.
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott); id., at 40741 (remarks
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Senator Percy
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks
in the construction industry. !d., at 40742-40743. The day following the
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78-1007-CONCUR
FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

19

as part of this emergency legislation served each of these
concerns because it took effect as soon as funds were expended
under PWEA and because it provided minority 'Contractors
with experience that could enable them to compete without
governmental assistance.
Th~ § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of federal contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program
concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2).
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have approved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the percentage of minority group workers in a business or governmental
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minorBoston
ity group members in the relevant population.
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are members of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members constitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractors
-------Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp.
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978)~
The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway
between the present percentage of minority contractors and
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation.
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades.
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of
minorities." /d., at 41072.
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Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its
effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the
country where minority group members constitute a small percentage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2). The factors
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qualified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce,
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW
Grants, App. 165a-167a. We have been told that 1261
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37.

c
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the petitioners contend with some force that they have been asked
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are innocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved:
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors.
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would
reserve about .25% of all the funds expended yearly on con-----struction work in the United States for approximately 4%
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority~
group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view,

..
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the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness. 13
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the set·aside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination
'that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently significant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the governmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise discretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the
set-aside in this ca.se.14'
13 Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contrac•
tors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrelevant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no setaside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976)
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971)
(';To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment").
Similarly, I cannot accept the suggestion that the set-aside should be
considered a "technique to induce governments and private parties to
cooperat e voluntarily with f.edcral policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners,
contractors who wish to compete for all federal funds, certainly have not
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside.
14
Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that couf~
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction
industry. My view that this set-aside is withln the discretion of Congress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy
or that the selection of a set-aside by any other governmental body would
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v
In the history of this Court and this country, few questions
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions
played no small part in the tragic legacy of governmentsanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.)
(1857). At lea.st since the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court ha.s been resolute
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envisions a Nat:on where race is irrelevant. The t~me cannot
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based
npon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin.
B'· t in our quest to achieve a society free from racial classification, we cannot irrnore the cla.ims of those who still suffer
from the effects of iden t' fia ble discrimination.
Dist-inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When
we firt:t confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that
the Regents of the University of California were not competent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of ra.cial classifications, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve transient social or political goals, however worthy they may be.
~
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power~
and Congress has been given a unique constitutional role
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of
specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature anc!
authority of a governmental body.
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this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determination that minority contractors were victims of purposeful
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably necessary means to effectuate its purpose, I find no constitutional
reason to invalidate § 103 (f) (2). 15

15 Petitioners also contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil
l{ights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the
~et-aside is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not Yiolate
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id.,T~~
348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MAHSHALL, and BLACKMUN,
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I write to apply the analysis set forth by my opm10n
in University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978),
to the issue presented in this case. We are asked to decide
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
is violated by the requirement in § 103 (f) (2) of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA), 42 U. S. C. A.
§ 6705 (f)(2) (Supp. 1978), that 10% of federal grants for
local public works projects funded by that Act be set aside
for minority business enterprises. I conclude that this setaside enacted by Congress is justifiable as a remedy that
serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating
the continuing effects of past identifiable discrimination.

I
Review of the constitutionality of this set-aside involves
two 9.is~inet~nquiries: (i) Did Congress have the authority
to enact § 103 (f) (2) , and (ii) Do the terms of § 103 (f) (2)
violate the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I regard the answer to the
:first question as relatively easy. As the opinion of the Court
demonstrates, this legislative act can be justified by several
explicit grants of power to Congress. I cannot, however, join
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the analysis of the Court. It does not address explicitly tha
second, and in my view the most importa11t, question raised by
this case. The Court's opinion fails to apply traditional equal
protection and due process analysis to decide whether this racial
classification comports with constitutional requirements.' To
be sure, isolated passages in the opinion rely on language from
our cases that have reviewed the use of racial classifications.
See, e. g., ante, at 28, 37, 38. But the recitation of general
language untied to any constitutional provision is not illumi~
nating in this case. 1
Section 103 (f) (2) employs a racial classification that is
constitutionally prohibited unless its use is a necessary means
of advancing a compelling governmental interest. University
of Caltfornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 291, 305 (1978)
(opinion of PowELL, J.) (hereinafter Bakke); see In re
1 One cannot identify the standard of review applied in the Court's
opinion. It is possible that-for the first time in the jurisprudence of
this Court-a racial classification has been reviewed under the "rational
basis" test. Near the end of its opinion the Court quotes Mr. Justice
Jackson's discussion of judicial review. Ante, at 38. But the Court does
not recognize that the situations described by him were very diff~rent
from this case. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "After the forces of conservatism and liberalism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of
self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and averaged and
come to rest in some compromise measure such as the Missouri Compromise, theN. R. A., the A. A. A., a minimum-wage law, or some other legislative policy, a decision striking it down closes an area of compromise in
which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been composed." R. H.
Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 321 ( 1941) (emphasis
added). The analysis of those cases reviewing the enactment of economic
legislation, see United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941), is simply
not applicable to review of this racial classification.
Nor do I agree that Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), is instructive.
In that case "the 'preference' approved did not result in the denial of
the relevant benefit-'meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program'-to anyone else." University of California v. Bakke, 438;
U. S. 2f:i5, 304 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J.),
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Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721- 722 (1973) ; Loving v. Virginia,
388 U . S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184,
196 (1964) . Racial preference does not constitute such an
interest. " 'Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestory' [are] 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the set-aside
merely expresses a congressional desire to prefer one racial or
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499
(1954) .
The Government does have a legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District
No . 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S.
39, 41 (1971) ; Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43,
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430,
437- 438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination justifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful . . . discrimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 418 (1975) . A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such discrimination. ~ this Court has never approved race-conscious remedies abs~nt judicial, administrative, or legislative
findings of constitutional or statutory violation. Bakke, 438
U. S., at 307; see, e. g. , Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 367- 376 (1977) ; United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 155- 159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE , J.); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-315 (1966).
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of
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a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the governmental body must make findings that demonstrate the
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with
educational functions, and they made no findings of past discrimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310.
Our past cases also establish that even if the government
proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.,
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse student body. But the method selected to achieve that end,
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not an appropriate
means. The Regent's quota system eliminated some non-.
minority applicants from all consideration for a specified number of seats in the entering class, a1though it allowed minority
applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S., at
275-276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an applicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in diversity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and
competitive consideration. I d., at 317-318.
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f) (2), we must
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings
of unlawful discrimination; (ii} if so, whether sufficient find-.
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lngs have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and
(iii) whether the 10% set-aside is a permissible means for
redressing identifiable past discriminatiOn. None of these
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that
we are reviewing an Act of Congress.

II
The history of this Court's review of congressional action
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations.
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress
properly may-and indeed must--address directly the problems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this·
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants
op the basis of its ''findings that [such discrimination] had a
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
epmmerce."
Similarly, after hearing 11overwhelming" evidence of private
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963) , Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order 11to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) .
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that
" 'persons aggrieved by the consequences and ·effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored
to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.' " Franks v. Bowman Transportation
f).o., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) ,' quoting Section-by-Section :
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Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec.
7166, 7168 (1972).
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 At an
early date, the Court stated that "[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339, 345 (1879). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968) , the Court recognized Congress'
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the
right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimination forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179
( 1976), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial
discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v.
Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-296 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460
(1975) .
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court
considered whether § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to enact § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section 4 (e) provides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write
the English language. The Court held that Congress was
empowered to enact § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment , which abolished slavery, pro~
vides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to
· t~nforce the provisions of those Amendments.
2
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·against the Puerto Rican community. ld., at 652-653. Implicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination.
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases construing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966),
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding
"ster[n] and .. . elaborate" measures. ld., at 309. Most
relevant to our present inquiry was the Court's express approval of Congress' decision to "prescrib [ e] remedies for voting discrimination which go into effect without the need for
prior adjudication." I d., at 328.8
It is beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to
8 Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa
et seq., temporarily banned the use of literacy tests in all jurisdictions.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), this Court, speaking through
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exereise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. Se&
id., at 117 (Black, J .) ; id., at 135 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 152 (Harlan,
J .) ; id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281
{STEWART, J ., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN, J ., concurred) .
J,1R. JusTICE STEWART said that :
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning . .. actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself'
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon
individual records. . . . The findings that Congress made when it enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide b.an
qn literacy tests." ld., at 284 (citation omittedl.
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prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradi~
cate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether
Congress has made findings adequate to support its
determination that minority contractors have suffered exten~
sive discrimination.

III
A

The petitioners contend that the legislative history of
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no ·congressional finding of statutory or
constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Congress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination.
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial barrier to
full understanding of the legislative process.
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve
specifiJ disputes between competing adversaries. Its constitutionui role is to be representative rather than impartial, to
make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law.
The petitioners contention that this Court should treat the
debates on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of congressional dccisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court.
But Congress is not expected to act as though it were duty
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. · The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress l1as no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions ·that may be
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation.
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After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national
concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congrest'l
again considers action in that area.
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legislative action. Such a requirement would mark an unprecedented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor
our democratic tradition warrants such a ·c onstraint on the
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not confined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of
§ 103 (f)(2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with
the problems of racial discrimination against minority business
enterprises.
B
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f)(2) demonetrates that Congress reasonably concluded that private and
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4
The opinion of the Court provides a careful overview of the
4

I cannot accept the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f)
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing
court can "perceive a ba~Si s" for legislative action. 588 F . 2d 600, ti0'4605 (CA2 1978) , quoting Kat zenbach v. M01·gan, 384 U. S., at 656 . The
"perceive a ba~ is" standarrl refers to c ongre.::t:~ ional authority to act, not
to the di~ tinct, qu e~S tion whether that action violates the Due Precess
Clause of t he Fifth Amendment . See text, at pp. 1- 2, supm .
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonable congressional finding
of discrimination. A mo re stringent standard of review would impinge
upon C01;,g_re~;s' abili1 y to addre;;;; problems of discrimination , oee pp . 5-8,
supr-a ; af'standard requiring a court to "perceive a basis" i:o e;;sentially
m eaningl es~ in this context. That standard might allow a court to justify
legislative action even in the absence of affirmative evid ence of congressional findin gs .

n/
7

78- 1007-MEMO

10

FULLILOVE v. KLUTZNICK

relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to which only
a few words need be added.
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced
on the floor of the House of Representatives by Representa. .
tive Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal
Government was already operating a set-aside program under
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Act of 1958, 15
U.S. C. § 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensible way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that
we are going to eventually be able to ... end certain pro-.
grams which are merely support survival programs for people
which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. Rec.
H1436- H1437 (daily ecl. Feb. 24, 1977). 5 Senator Brooke,
who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, reminded
the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted into
§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act and the Railroad Revitalization Act
of 1976, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated
the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-10
(daily ed. March 10, 1977) .
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Business Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal
Government and subcontract them out to small businesees.
The Small Business Administration has been directed by
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and economically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.fl The opera3 During subsequent debate in the House, Repre:sentative Conyers emphasized that minority busine::;::;es "through no fault of their own simply
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H1440
(daily eel. FPb. 24, 1977); see ibid. (re!TUlt'k:s of Rep. Biaggi).
6 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders directing federal aid for minority busine::;s enterprises. See Exec. Order 11458,
34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969) ; Exec. Ordf'r 11518, 35 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1970) ~
Exec. Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg . 19967 (1971) . The President noted
that "mPmbers of certain minority groups through no fault of their own
pave !Jeen denied the full opportunity to participate in the free enterpriilll'
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tion of tl1e 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional
committPes between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the House Subcommittee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found
that miuority businessmen face ecouomic difficulties that "are
the result of past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d
Gong., 2d Sess., 3 (1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee
on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that
' 1 [t]he eft'ect of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by
minorities in the economy was the result of "past discriminatory systems." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1-2 (1975). In 1977, the House Committee on Small Business
found that
"over the years, there has developed a business system
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority
participation. In the past more than the present, this
system of conducting business transactions overtly precluded minority input. Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its
face, but because of past overt social and economic discrimination is presently opera.ting, in eft'ect, to perpetuate
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th
Coug., 2d Sess., 124 (1977).
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced
§ 103 (f)(2) into the House of Representatives. 7
ay~tem, " Exec . Order 11518, supra, aL 4940, and that the "opportunity
for full participation iu our free enterpri~e system by socially and economically disadvantaged persons is e..."'tiential if we are to obtain social and
economic justice." Exec. Order 11625, supra., al 19967. Assi8tance to
minority busine:s:s enterpri8es through the § 8 (a) program ha8 been de@igned to promote the goals of these ExPcutive Order~. Ray Baillie Trash
Hauling, htc. v. Kleppe, 447 F . 2cl 696, 706 (CAS 1973) , cert. denied, 415
U S. 914 (1974) .
r Two sections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress' '
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In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of
legislative history contained in the Court's opinion, I believe
that a court must accept as established the conclusion that
purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the
small pereentage of federal contracting funds that minority
business enterprises have received. Refusals to subcontract
work to minority contractors may, depending upon the identity of the discriminating party, violate· Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, or 42 U.S. C. § 1981,
or the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the discriminatory
activities were not identified with the exactitude expected in
j udwial or· administrative adJudication, it must be remembered
that "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than
may this Court . . . ." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284
(1970) (Sn:WART, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).8
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses.
Section 803, 45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity
funded by the Act, and § 906, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minorit
Re:,;ource Center to assist minority businessmen o tam contracts and
but:~iness opportunities related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of
railroads. The provisions were enacted by a Congress that recognized the·
" et:~tablished national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights
Aet of 1964, to encourage and ass1st in the development of minorit busine;>.'".l enterprise." S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Con ., st Sess., 44 (1 5)·
(Commerce Committee) . In January 1977, the Department of Transportation issued regulations pursuant to 45 U. S. C. § 403 that require cont ractor~ to formulate affirmative action programs to ensure that minority
bwsine&~e::; receive a fair proportion of contract opportunities. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 4290-4291 (1977) (codified at 49 CFR Part 265). See also pp. 1719, rm. 11 and 12, infra.
8 Although this record suffices to support the congre.;sional judgment
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress·
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional standards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensitive as this, depend in ·large measure upon :the public's perception . of·
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IV
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classification is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny!'\ As
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classification only when necessary to accomplish a compelling
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The conclusion that Congress found a compelling governmental interest in redressing identified discrimination against minority
_contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10%
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually
impossible to satisfy. Only two of this Court's modern cases
have held the use of racial classifications to be constitutional.
See Korerna.tsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hirab(Jyshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the fa.ilure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some
to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been
strict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
A
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue.
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference.
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra,
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a nonfairness. See Bakke, 438 U.S., at 319, n. 53; J. H. Wilkinson III, From
Brown to Bakke, 264-266 (1979); M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Apprallial, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049
(1979) . It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people
that the congressional action is just.
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racial means should be available to further the legitimate
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311.
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compelling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination.
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See,
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Although federal courts may not order or approve remedies that
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 (1977); Dayton v. Brinkman,
433 U. S 406 (1977); Austin Independent School District v.
United States, 429 U. S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring),
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial
discrimination is "a balancing process left, within appropriate
eonstitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of
the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J ., concurring in part and distenting in part).
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator
Howard, who was a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and who introduced the Amendment into the Senate,
described § 5 as "a direct affirmative delegation of power to
Congress to carry out all the principles of all these guarantees'~
of § 1 of the Amendment. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2766 ( 1866) . Furthermore, he stated that § 5
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are
cttrried out in good faith , and that no State infringes the·
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right8 of persons or property. I look upon this clause
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon
the Congress this power and this duty." I d., at 2768.
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congressional action to effectuate the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment was echoed by other Members of Congress.
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruction Committee, sa.id that the Fourteenth Amendment "allows
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States," id., at
2459, and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the
power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very
foundation of all republican government. . . ." !d., at 2961.
See id., at 2512-2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511
(Rep. Miller) . See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 345. 9
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal
courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and
Reunion, pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971), they did not believe that
congressional action would be unreviewable by this Court.
Several Members of Congress emphasized that a primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place the provisions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of
the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2462
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id.,
at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866. Members of
Cougre~s fully understood that judicial review was the means
by which action of the Legislative and Executive Branches
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 737 (1803).
9 See also Jones v, Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull
on Cong:ress' authority under the Thirteenth Amendment).
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I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of dis.,
crimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments.
The Judicial Bra,nch has ~he special responsibility to make a
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a raceilonscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of
& remedy should be upheld, however, if the means selected
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safe'uard of judicial review of racial classifications.

B
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a race-.
conscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon
·which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974);
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387,
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy,
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at
399; United States v. ·wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local1,.6,
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939
(1973) , (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
· group members in the relevant population or work force,
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d
306, 311 (CA2 1979) ; Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CAl 1974) , cert, denied, 421 U. S. 910'
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(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421
U. S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS)
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legislation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority
businesses, the fact remained that minority contractors were
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong.
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threatened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f)
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new
public construction. Since the emergency public construction funds were to be distributed quickly, 10 any remedial provision designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover,
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had
to provide minority contractors the experience necessary for
continued success without federal assistance.11 And Congress
10 The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) provided that
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30,
1977. 42 U. S. C. A. § 6707 (h) (1) (Supp. 1978) . Action on applications
for funds was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application,
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90 days of
project approval, id., §6705 (d) .
11 In 1972, a congressional oversight committee addressed the "complex
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of
tacia.l hias." See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Select
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knew that the ability of minority group members to ga.in
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering
the construction trades.12 The set-aside program adopted
Committee on Small Business) . The committee explained how the effects
of discrimination translate into economic barriers :
"In attempting to increase their participation as ·entrepeneurs in our
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major problems. There problems, which are economic in nature, are the .result of
past social standards which linger as characteristics o'f minorities as a group.
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs.
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require ·substantial security and
s track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority businessmen usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is
often turned down.
"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also· the internal
functions of management." !d., at 3-4.
12 When Senator Brooke introduced the PWEA set-aside in the Senate,
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate problems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment ·discrimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the
"Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated · by the
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contra.ctors to use
hiring goals in order to redress past ·discrimination. See Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F . 2d
159, 163 (CA3), cert. denied , 404 U. S. 854 (1971) . · The House of
Representatives refused to adopt an amendment to an appropriations
bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor Department's
order. 115 Cong. Rec. 40921 (1969) . · The Senate, which had approved
such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position. U5 Cong.
Rec. 40749 (1969) .
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that . implementation of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ens.ure equal oppor~unity.
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part of this emergency legislation served each of these
because it took effect as soon as funds were expended
under PWEA and because it provided minority contractore
with experience that could enable ·them to compete without
.governmental assistance.
The § 103 (f)(2) set-aside is not a permanent part of fed. eral contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program
, concludes, this set-aside program ends. ·The temporary nature
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine
the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or
re-enacts § 103 (f)(2).
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope
of congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have approved temporary hiring remedies insuring that the peroent-age of minority group workers in a business or governmental
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population.
Boston
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport
.(]uard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are members of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members conetitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractor8
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp.
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978).
-1LB

~~oncerns

flee 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks
of Sen. Griffith); id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacq
in the construction industry. Id., at 40742-40743. The day following the
Senate Yote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades.
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of'
.minorities." Id., at 41072.
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The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway
between the present percentage of minority contractors and
the percentage of minority group members in the Nation.
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its
effect might be unfair if i,t were applied rigidly in areas of the
country where minority group members constitute a small percentage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f) (2) . The factors
governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qualified minority contractors in a particular geographic area, the
size of the locale's minority population, and the efforts made
to find minority contractors. Department of Commerce,
Guidelines for 10% Minority Business Participation LPW
Grants, App. 165a- 167a. We have been told that 1261
" waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. :-Brief,.for
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37.

c
A race-conscious remedy should not be approved without
consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the petitioners contend with some force that they have been asked
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are innocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, that their
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved.
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors.
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would
reserve about .25% of all the funds expended yearly on construction work in the United States for approximately 4%
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority
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·group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view,
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed
that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness. 18
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the setaside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination
that affects minority contractors. Nor is any marginal
unfairness to innocent nonminority contractors sufficiently significant-or sufficiently indentifiable-to outweight the governmental interest served by § 103 (f)(2). When Congress
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise discretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary ·to
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the
eet-aside in this case.a
ts Although I believe that the burden placed upon nonminority contractors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrelevant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no setaside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce
argues that "[n)onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976)
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971)
(''To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment").
Similarly, I cannot accept the suggestion that the set-aside should be
considered a " technique to induce governments and private parties to
cooperate voluntarily with federal policy." Ante, at 22. The petitioners,
contractors who wish to compete for all federal funds, certainly have not
accepted voluntarily the adoption or the implementation of the set-aside.
14 Petitioners have suggested a variety of alternative programs that could
be Used in order to aid minority business eP.terprises in the construction
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Con•
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In the history of this Court and this country, few questions
have been more divisive than those arising from governmental
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions
played no small part in the tragic legacy of governmentsanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.)
(1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute
in its dedication to the principle that the Constitution envisions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The t:me cannot
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin.
But in our quest to achieve a society free from racial classification, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer
from the effects of identifiable discrimination.
Dist.inguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from
racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that
the Regents of the University of California were not competent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of ra.cial classifications, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal'
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve transient social or political goals, however worthy they may be.
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power;
r,ress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor
·do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy
PI that the selection of a set-aside by any other p:overnmental body would
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of
specificity required in the findings of discrimination and · the breadth of
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and ·
authcrity of a governmental body.
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ttnd Congress has been given a unique constitutional role
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In
this case, where Congress acted on the basis of its determination that minority contractors were victims of purposeful
discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably necee..
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find no constitutionfil
reason to invalidat-e § 103 (f) (2),1~

15 Petitioners also contend the § 103 (f) (2) violates Title VI of the Civil·
Hights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000d et seq. Because I believe that the
P.ct-r.side is constitutional, I also conclude that the program does not violate
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. 8., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.); id., at
348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WliiTF.l, MARSliALL, and BLACKMVN 1 JJ.).
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MH. Jvt;nn: PuwJn. L, concurri11g.
Although r would p]aC(' grt>atrr cmphai>iS than THE CHH~F
on th!:' IH:•t>d to articulate judicial standards of review
in conventional terms. I view hiR opinion announcing the judgment as substantially i11 accord 'vvith my own views. Accordingly. I join that opinion and write sPparately to apply the
analysis set forth by my opinion in UniverS'ity of California v.
Bakke, 438 r. fl. :205 (HI78) (hereinafter Bakke).
The questio11 i11 this case is whether Congress may enact
the requireme11t in ~ 103 (f) (:2) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWE.\.). that 10!{ of federal grauts for
local public work projPcts funded by tht> .-\.ct be set aside fur
minority busi11ess euterprises. Section lOa (f) (2) employs a
racial classifieation that is constitutionally prohibitPd u11less
it is a necessary means of advancing a compelling govermneutal interest. Bakke, at 2!:)9, 305; see In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.
717. 7:21- 7:22 (1!:)73); Loving v. l"irg·inia, 388 F. R. 1. H
(HH17); McLa'Ughlin '. Florida, 379 F. S. 184. 196 (1964).
For the reasons stated in my Ra.kke opinion. I consider adherence to this standard as important and consistent with
prececlen t.
The Equal Protection C'lause. and thP equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, demand that any governmental distinction among
JllsTICE

~ S 1~RO
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groups must be justifiable. Different stm1dards of review
applied to differeut sorts of classificatious simply illustrate
the principle that some classifications are less likely to be
legitimate than others. Racial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent level of review because immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual
merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental
decision. See, e. g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399, 402404 (1964). In this case. however. I believe that § 103 (f)
(2) is justified as a remedy that serves the compelling governmental interest in eradicating the continuing effects of
past discrimination identified by Congress. 1

I
Racial preference never call coustitute a compelling state
interest. "(Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestory' [are] todious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' " Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S., at 11, quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Thus, if the .set-aside
merely expresses a congressional desire _to prefer one racial or
ethnic group over another, § 103 (f) (2) violates the equal protection component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth _
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. · 497, 499
(1954).
The Government does have a legitimate interest in amelioTating the disabling effeete of identified discrimination.
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Keyes v. School District
Although racial cla s~ifications require strict judicial ;scrutiny, I do
not agrep that. thP Con~titution prohibits all racwl clas~ification. Mn .
.TUiS'l'JCE S·mWAH'J' recognizes thr principlP that. 1 urli(•yp i~ applicable:
"Under our Con:,:titution, any official action that treat:s a l>rr:;on differently on ateount of hi~ nu.'(' or (•thnie origin i:,; inherent!~ · HUlSpect and
pre::;umptiVl'ly. invalid." Pu&t, at. 2. But, in narrowly defined circumstall('('S, that pre,;umption may UP rebut!Pd. Cf. Lee v. Washington , 390
U. S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan , and STEWAHT, JJ., concurring).
1

,,
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No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 236 ( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S.
39, 41 (1971); Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43,
45-46 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430,
437-438 (1968). The existence of illegal discrimination justifies the imposition of a remedy that will "make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful . .. discrimination." Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 418 (1975). A critical inquiry, therefore, is whether
§ 103 (f) (2) was enacted as a means of redressing such discrimination. But this Court has never approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative
findi11gs of constitutional or statutory violations. Bakke, 438
U. S., at 307; see, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S.
324, 367-376 (1977) ; United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 155-159 (1977) (opinion of WHITE, J.); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , 308-315 (1966).
Because the distinction between permissible remedial action
and impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of
a constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate interest
in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless
an appropriate governmental authority has found that such
a violation has occurred. In other words, two requirements
must be met. First, the governmental body that attempts to
impose a race-conscious remedy must have the authority to
act in response to identified discrimination. Cf. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103 (1976). Second, the governmental body must make findings that demonstrate the
existence of illegal discrimination. In Bakke, the Regents
failed both requirements. They were entrusted only with
educational functions, and they made no findings of past discrimination. Thus, no compelling governmental interest was
present to justify the use of a racial quota in medical school
admissions. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310.
Our past cases also establish that even if the government
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proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a sus.
pect classification, the means selected must be narrowly drawn
to fulfill the governmental purpose. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S.,
at 721-722. In Bakke, for example, the state university did
have a compelling interest in the attainment of a diverse student body. But the method selected to achieve that end,
the use of a fixed admissions quota, was not appropriate.
The Regent's quota system eliminated some nonminority
applicants from all consideration for a specified number of
seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority applicants to compete for all available seats. 438 U. S., at 275276. In contrast, an admissions program that recognizes
race as a factor, but not the sole factor, in assessing an applicant's qualifications serves the University's interest in di·
versity while ensuring that each applicant receives fair and
competitive consideration. I d., at 317-318.
In reviewing the constitutionality of § 103 (f)(2), we must
decide: (i) whether Congress is competent to make findings
of unlawful discrimination; (ii) if so, whether sufficient findings have been made to establish that unlawful discrimination
has affected adversely minority business enterprises, and
(iii) whether the 10% set-aside is a permissible means for
redressing identifiable past discrimination. None of these
questions may be answered without explicit recognition that
we are reviewing an Act of Congress.

II
The history of this Court's review of congressional action
demonstrates beyond question that the National Legislature
is competent to find constitutional and statutory violations.
Unlike the Regents of the University of California, Congress
properly . may-and indeed mustr-address directly the prob·
lems of discrimination in our society. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). In Katzenb'ach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964), for example, this
Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce

,,
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,Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in public restaurants
on the basis of its 11findings that [such discrimination] had a
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate
commerce."
Similarly, after hearing 11overwhelming" evidence of private
employment discrimination, see H. R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1963), Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order 11 to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
Acting to further the purposes of Title VII, Congress vested
in the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that
11 1
persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored
to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976), quoting Section-by-Section
Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec.
7166, 7168 (1972) .
In addition, Congress has been given the unique constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 2 At an
early date, the Court stated that 11 [i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged" by the enforcement provisions
of the post-Civil War Amendments. Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345 (1879) .. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441-443 (1968), the Court recognized Congress'
competence to determine that private action inhibiting the
2 Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." In virtually identical language, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress the power to
enforce the provisions of those Amendments.
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right to acquire and convey real property was racial discrimi~
nation forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, we held that Congress' enactment of 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981 pursuant to its powers under the . Thirteenth Amendment, see Runyon v. McCrary, .42.7 U. S. 160, 168-170, 179
( 19~6), provides to all persons a federal remedy for racial
.discrimination in private employment. See McDonald v.
Bante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 295-::296 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459-460
(1975).
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court
considered whether § 5 of -the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress the power to enact .§ 4 (e) of .the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b)(e). Section4 (e) provides that no person educated in Puerto Rico may be denied
the right to vote in any election for failure to read or write
the English language. . The Court held that Congress was
empowered to enact- § 4 (e) as a remedy for discrimination
against the Puerto Rican community. Id., at 652-653. Implicit in its holding was the Court's belief that Congress had
the authority to find, and had found, that members of this
minority group had suffered governmental discrimination.
Congress' authority to find and provide for the redress of
constitutional violations also has been confirmed in cases construing the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308 (1966),
for example, the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., as an appropriate remedy for violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. It noted that Congress
had found "insidious and pervasive" discrimination demanding
"ster[n] and . . . elaborate" measures. Id., at ·309. Most
relevant to our present inquiry was -the Court's express approval of Congress' decision to "prescrib[e] remedies for vot.. ing discrimination which go into effect without the need for
-prior adjudication." Id., at 328.3
8

Among the remedies approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 38S
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It is beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the
authority to identify unlawful discriminatory practices, to
prohibit those practices, and to. prescribe remedies to eradicate their continuing effects. The next inquiry is whether
Congress has made findings adequate to support its
determination that minority contractors have suffered exten!ive discrimination.

III
A

The petitioners contend that the legislative history of
§ 103 (f)(2) reflects no congressional finding of statutory or

constitutional violations. Crucial to that contention is the
assertion that a reviewing court may not look beyond the
legislative history of the PWEA itself for evidence that Congress believed it was combatting invidious discrimination.
But petitioners' theory would erect an artificial ·barrier to
full understanding of the legislative process.
Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve
specifi\1 disputes between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to
U. S. 301 (1966), was the temporary suspension of literacy tests in some
jurisdictions. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa
et seq., temporarily banned the use of lit·eracy tests in all jurisdictions.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 ( 1970), this Court, speaking through
five separate opinions, unanimously upheld the action as a proper exercise of Congress' authority under the post-Civil War Amendments. See
id., at 117 (Black, J.) ; id., at 13'5 (Douglas, J.) ; id., at 1'52 (Harlan,
J .) ; id., at 229 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) ; id., at 281
(STEWART, J ., with whom BURGER, C. J ., and BLACKMUN 1 J ., concurred).
·MR. JusTICE STEWART said that :
"Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning . . . actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access
to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint
with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself
to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon
individual records. . . • The findings that Congress made when it enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban
on literacy tests." / d., at 284 (citation omitted ) .
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make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law.
The petitioners' contention that this Court should treat the
debates on § 103 (f) (2) as the complete "record" of congressional decisionmaking underlying that statute is essentially
a plea that we treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court.
But Congress is not expected to act as though it were duty
bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and
evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special
attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be
relevant to the resolution of an issue. One appropriate
source is the information and expertise that Congress acquires
in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation.
After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national
_concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the
need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress
again considers action in that area.
Acceptance of petitioners' argument would force Congress
to make specific factual findings with respect to each legislative action. Such a requirement would mark an unprece·dented imposition of adjudicatory procedures upon a coordinate branch of Government. Neither the Constitution nor
·our democratic tradition warrants such a constraint on the
legislative process. I therefore conclude that we are not con-.
fined in this case to an examination of the legislative history of
§ 103 (f)(2) alone. Rather, we properly may examine the
total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with
the problems of racial discrimination against minority businese
enterprises.
B
I
In my view, the legislative history of § 103 (f) (2) demon-
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.strates that Cong~:ess reasonably concluded that private and
governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible
percentage of public contracts awarded minority contractors. 4
rrhe opinion of THE CHIEF JusTICE provides a careful overview of the relevant legislative history, see ante, at 4-16, to
which only a few words need be added.
Section 103 (f) (2) originated in an amendment introduced
on the floor of the House of Representa.tives by Representative Mitchell. Congressman Mitchell noted that the Federal
Government was already operating a set-aside program under
§ 8 (a) of the Small Business Administration Act of 1958, 15
U.S. C.§ 637 (a). He described his proposal as "the only sensible way for us to begin to develop a viable economic system for
minorities in this country, with the ultimate result being that
we are going to eventually be able to ... end certain progr-ams which are merely support survival programs for people
which do not contribute to the economy." 123 Cong. Rec.
Hl436-H1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). 5 Senator Brooke,
who introduced a similar measure in the Senate, reminded
the Senate of the special provisions previously enacted into

I

4
I cannot accept the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that § 103 (f)
(2) must be viewed as serving a compelling state interest if the reviewing
court can "perceive a basis" for legislative acticn. 588 F. 2d 600, 6Q4605 (CA2 1978), quoting Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U. 8., at 656. The
''perceive a basis" standard refers to congressional authority to act, not
to the distinct question whether that action violates the Due ProeesB
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
[
In my view, a court should uphold a reasonable congressional tl.ndlng
of discrimination. A more stringent standard of review would impinge
upon Congress' ability to address problems of discrimination, see pp. 5-8,
supm; a standard requiring a court to "perceive a basis" is essentially
meaningless in this context. Such a test might allow a court to justify
legislative action even in the absence of affirmatiYe eYidence of congressional findings.
~During subsequent debate in the House, Representative Conyers em~ •
phasized that minority businesses "through no fault of their own simply
have not been able to get their foot in the door." 123 Cong. Rec. H144()
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) ; see ibid. (retnarks of Rep. Biaggi),

J
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§ 8 (a) of the SBA Act and the Ra.ilroad Revitalization Act
of 1976, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a, which, he stated, demonstrated

the validity of his amendment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3909-10
,(daily ed. March 10, 1977).
Section 8 (a) of the SBA Act provides that the Small Business Administration may enter into contracts with the Federal
Government and subcontract them out to sma.Il businesses.
The Small Business Administration has been directed by
Executive Order to employ § 8 (a) to aid socially and economically disadvantaged persons. Ante, at 12.6 The operation of the § 8 (a) program was reviewed by congressional
committees between 1972 and 1977. In 1972, the House Subcommittee on Minority Small Business Enterprise found
that minority businessmen fa.ce economic difficulties that "are
the result of past social standards which linger as characteristics of minorities as a group." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1972). In 1975, the House Subcommittee
on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise concluded that
"[t]he effect of past inequities stemming from ra.cial prejudice
have not remained in the past," and that low participation by
minorities in the economy was the result of "past discriminatory systems." H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
8 In 1969, 1970, and 1971, the President issued Executive Orders directing federal aid for minority business enterprises. See Exec. Order 11458,
34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969); Exec. Order 11518, 35 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1970);
Exec. Order 11625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 (1971) . The President noted
that "members of certain minority groups through no fault of their own
have been denied the full opportunity to participate in the free enterprise
system," Exec. Order 11518, supra, at 4940, and that the "opportunity
for full participation in our free enterprise system. by socia.lly and economically disadvantaged persons is essential if we are to obtain social and
economic justice." Exec. Order 11625, supra, at 19967. Assistance to
minority business enterprises through the § 8 (a) program has been de·signed to promote the goals of these Executive Orders. Ray Baillie Trash
Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 447 F . 2d 696, 706 (CA5 1973), cert, denied, 415
914 (1974).
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In 1977, the House Committee on Small Business

found that
"over the years, there has develOped a business system
which has traditionally excluded measurable minority
participation. In the past more than the present, this
system of conducting business transactions overtly precluded minority input. Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its
face, but because of past overt social and economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate
these past inequities." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 ( 1977).
The Committee's report was issued on January 3, 1977, less
than two months before Representative Mitchell introduced
§ 103 (f) (2) into the House of Representatives. 7
In light of these legislative materials and the discussion of
legislative history contained in THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion,
I believe that a court must accept as established the conclusion that purposeful discrimination contributed significantly
to the small percentage of federal contracting funds that
minority business enterprises have received. Refusals to sub7 Two sections of the Railroad Revitalization Act also reflect Congress'
recognition of the need for remedial steps on behalf of minority businesses.
Section 803, 45 U. S. C. § 803 prohibits discrimination in any activity
funded by the Act, and § 906, 49 U. S. C. § 1657a establishes a Minority
Resource Center to assi~t minority busine::;smen to obtain contracts anp
business opportunities related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of
railroads. The provisions were enacted by a Congress that recognized the
"established national policy, since at least the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, to encourage and assist in the development of minority business enterprise." S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Conf., 1st Sess., 44 (197~)
(Commerce Committee). In January 1977, the Department of Transportation issued regulations pursuant to 45 U. S. C. § 403 that reqvire contractors to formulate affirmative action programs to ensure .that minority
businesses receive a fair proportion of contract opportunities. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 4290-4291 (1977) (codified at 49 CFR Part 265). See alflo pp, 17...
19, nn. 11 and l2, infra.
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contract work to minority contractors may. depending upon
the identity of the discriminating party. violate Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. R. C. § 2000cl. or 42
U. S. C. § 1981 , or the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
the discriminatory activities were not identified with the
exactitude expected in judicial or administrative adjudication,
it must be remembered that "Congress may paint with a
much broader brush than may this Court. . . ." Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 284 (1970) (8'l'EWAR.1', J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).8

IV
Under this Court's established doctrine, a racial classification is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. As
noted in Part I, the Government may employ such a classification only when necessary to accomplish a compelling
governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 305. The conclusion that Congress found a compelling governmental interest in redressing identified discrimination against minority
contractors therefore leads to the inquiry whether use of a 10%
set-aside is a constitutionally appropriate means of serving
that interest. In the past, this "means" test has been virtually
impossible to satisfy. Only two of this Court's modern cases
have held the use of racial classifications to be constitutional.
1 Although this record suffices to support the congressional judgment
that minority contractors suffered identifiable discrimination, Congress
need not be content with findings that merely meet constitutional standards. Race-conscious remedies, popularly referred to as affirmative action
programs, almcst invariably affect some innocent persons. See infra, at
16-18. Respect and support for the law, especially in an area as sensitive as this, depend in large measure upon the public's perception of
fairness . See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 319, n. 53 ; J . H. Wilkinson III, From
Brown to Bakke, 264-266 (1979) ; M. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1048-1049
(1979) . It therefore is important that the legislative record supporting
race-conscious remedies contain evidence that satisfies fair minded people
that the congressional action is just.
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See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Hirabaysh-i v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Indeed, the failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has lead some
to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has been
!trict in theory, but fatal in fact. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrjne
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) .
A
Application of the "means" test necessarily demands an
understanding of the type of congressional action at issue.
This is not a case in which Congress has employed a racial
classification solely as a means to confer a racial preference.
Such a purpose plainly would be unconstitutional. Supra,
at 2. Nor has Congress sought to employ a racially conscious
means to further a nonracial goal. In such instances, a nonracial means should be ava.ilable to further the legitimate
,governmental purpose. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 310-311.
Enactment of the set-aside is designed to serve the compelling governmental interest in redressing racial discrimination.
As this Court has recognized, the implementation of any
affirmative remedy for redress of racial discrimination is likely
to affect persons differently depending upon their race. See,
e. g., Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S., at 45-46. Although federal courts may not order or approve remedies that
exceed the scope of a constitutional violation, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280-281 ( 1977) ; Dayton v. Brinkman,
433 U. S. 406 (1977) ; Austin Independent School District v.
United States, 429 U. S. 991 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring) ,
this Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial
,discrimination is "a balancing process left, within appropriate
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound qiscretion of
;the trial court." Frank v. Bowman Transportation Co., 4.24
.

.
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U.S., at 794 (1976) (PowELL, J., concurring in part and dissen ting in part) .
I believe that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a similar measure
of discretion to choose a suitable remedy for the redress of
racial discrimination. The legislative history of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is particularly instructive. Senator
Howard, the member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction who introduced the Amendment into the Senate, described
§ 5 as "a direct a.ffirmative delegation of power to Congress
to carry out all the principles of all [the] guarantees" of § 1
of the Amendment. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766
( 1866). Furthermore, he stated that § 5
"casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to
it, for the future, that all sections of the amendment are
carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes the
rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause
as indespensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon
the Congress this power and this duty." /d., at 2768.
Senator Howard's emphasis on the importance of congressional action to effectuate the goa.Js of the Fourteenth
Amendment was echoed by other. Members of Congress.
Representative Stevens, also a member of the Reconstruction Committee, said that the Fourteenth Amendment "allows
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the Sta.tes," id., at
2459, and Senator Poland wished to leave no doubt "as to the
power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very
foundation of all republican government. . . . " !d., at 2961.
See id., at 2512-2513 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id., at 2511
(Rep. Eliot); Ex parte Virrrinia, 100 U. S., at 345. 9
Although the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may
have contemplated that Congress, rather than the federal
9 See also Jones v. Alfred Mayer & Co., 392 U. S., at 440-441, quoting
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull
·on Congress' authority under the Thirteenth Amendment).
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eourts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see C. Fairman, History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and
Reunion, pt. 1, 1295, 1296 (1971), they did not believe that
congressional action would be unreviewable by this Court.
Several Members of Congress emphasized that a primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to place the provisions of the Civil Rights of 1866 "in the eternal firmament of
the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2462
(1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See id., at 2459 (remarks
of Rep. Stephens); id., at 2462 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id.,
at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall). By 1866, Members of
Congress fully understood tha.t judicial review was the means
by which action of the Legislative and Executive Branches
would be required to conform to the Constitution. See, e. g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 7 Cranch (5 U. S.) 737 (1803) .
I conclude, therefore, that the enforcement clauses of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance
the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination. But that authority must be exercised in a manner that does not erode the guarantees of these Amendments.
The Judicial Branch has the special responsibility to make a
searching inquiry into the justification for employing a raceconscious remedy. Courts must be sensitive to the possibility
that less intrusive means might serve the compelling state
interest equally as well. I believe that Congress' choice of
a remedy should be uphf'ld, however, if the means selected
are equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of identified discrimination. Such a test allows the Congress to
exercise necessary discretion but preserves the essential safeguard of judicial review of racial classifications.

B
When reviewing the selection by Congress of a race<;onscious remedy, it is instructive to note the factors upon' ·
~
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which the Courts of Appeals have relied in a closely analogous
area. Courts reviewing the proper scope of race-conscious
hiring remedies have considered (i) the efficacy of alternative
remedies, NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 619 (CA5 1974);
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d 387,
398 (CA2 1973), (ii) the planned duration of the remedy.
Vulcan Society Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F. 2d, at
399; United States v. Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Local 46,
471 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 12 (CA2), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 939
(1973), (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force,
Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F. 2d
306, 311 (CA2 1979); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504
F. 2d 1017, 1026-1027 (CAl 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service
Comm'n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1341 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 331 (CAS)
(en bane), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 950 (1972), and (iv) the
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be
met, Associated General Contractors Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.
2d 9, 18-19 (CA11973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974).
By the time Congress enacted § 103 (f) (2) in 1977, it knew
that other remedies had failed to ameliorate the effects of
racial discrimination in the construction industry. Although
the problem had been addressed by antidiscrimination legislation, executive action to remedy employment discrimination
in the construction industry, and federal aid to minority
businesses, the fact remained tha.t minority contractors were
receiving less than 1% of federal contracts. See 123 Cong.
Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke). Congress also knew that economic recession threatened the construction industry as a whole. Section 103 (f)
(2) was enacted as part of a bill designed to stimulate the
economy by appropriating $4 billion in federal funds for new
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public construction. Since the emergency public construction funds were to be distributed quickly.' 0 any remedial provision designed to prevent those funds from perpetuating past
discrimination also had to be effective promptly. Moreover,
Congress understood that any effective remedial program had
to. provide minority contractors the experience necessary for
continued success without federal assistauce.' 1 And Congress
knew that the ability of minority group members to gain
experience had been frustrated by the difficulty of entering
The Public Works Employmrnt Act of 19ii (PWEA) provid~ that
federal monies be committed to state and local grantees by September 30,
1977. 42 U.S. C. A. § 6707 (h) (1) (Supp . 1978). Action on applications
for funcis was to be taken within 60 days after receipt of the application,
id., § 6706 (1978 Supp.), and onsite work was to begin within 90. days of
project approval, id., § 6705 (d) .
11 In 1972, a congn':s.~ioual ovcr,;ight committee addre:s:sed the "complex
problem-how to achieve economic prosperity despite a long history of
racial bias." See H . R. Rep. No. 92-1615, 92d Cong.l 2d Sess., 3 (Select
Committee on Small Business). ·. The committee explained how the effects
of discrimination translate into economic barriers :
. "In attempting to increase their participation as entrepeneurs in our
economy, the minority businessman usually encounters several major problems. These problems, which are economic in nature, are the result of
past social standards which linger as characteristics o'f minorities as a group.
"The minority entrepeneur is faced initially with a lack of capital, the
most serious problem of all beginning minorities or other entrepeneurs.
Because minorities as a group are not traditionally holders of large amounts
of capital, the entrepeneur must go outside his community in order to
obtain the needed capital. Lending firms require substantial security and
s track record in order to lend funds, security which the minority businessmen usually cannot provide. Because he cannot produce either, he is
often turned down .
10

"Functional expertise is a necessity for the successful operation of any
enterprise. Minorities have traditionally as~umed the role of the labor
force in business with few gaining access to positions whereby they could
learn not only the physical operation of the enterprise, but also the internal
functions of management." /d ., at 3-4.
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the ronstruction tradC'S. ~ The set-aside program adopted
as part of this emergency legislation serves each of these
concerns because it takes effect as soon as funds are expended
under PWEA and because it provides minority contractors
with experience that could enable them to compete without
governmental assistance.
The § 103 (f) (2) set-aside is not a permanent part of federal contracting requirements. As soon as the PWEA program
concludes, this set-aside program ends. The temporary nature
of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to
eliminate. It will be necessary for Congress to re-examine
12 Whrn Srnator Brookr introclurt>d the PWEA l"e t-n~ide in the Senate,
he stated that aid to minority businesses also would help to alleviate problems of minority unemployment. 123 Cong. Rec. S3910 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1977) Congress had considered the need to remedy employment discrimination in the construction industry when it refused to override the
~'Philadelphia Plan." The "Philadelphia Plan," promulgated by the
Department of Labor in 1969, required all federal contractors to use
hiring goals in order to redress past discrimination. See Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d
11\9, 163 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) . Later that year, the
House of Repre::;entative::; refu::;ed to adopt an amendment to an appropriations bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Labor
Department's order. 115 Coug. Rec. 40921 (1969). The Senate, which
lmd approved such an amendment, then voted to recede from its position.
115 Cong. Rec. 40749 (1969).
During the Senate debate, several legislators argued that implementatiOn of the Philadelphia Plan was necessary to ensure equal opportunity.
See 115 Cong. Rec. 40740 (remarks of Sen. Scott) ; id., at 40741 (remarks
of Sen. Griffith) ; id., at 40744 (remarks of Sen. Bayh) . Senator Percy
argued that the Plan was needed to redress discrimination against blacks
in the construction industry. /d., at 40742-40743. The day following the
Senate ,·ote to recede from its earlier position, Senator Kennedy noted·
''exceptionally blatant" racial discrimination in the construction trades.
He commended the Senate's decision that "the Philadelphia Plan should:
be a useful and necessary tool for insuring equitable employment of·
U'linorities." Id., at 41072.
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the need for a race-conscious remedy before it extends or
·re-enacts § 103 (f) (2).
The percentage chosen for the set-aside is within the scope
<>f congressional discretion. The Courts of Appeals have approved tempo;rary hiring remedies insuring that the percentage of minority group workers in a business or governmental
agency will be reasonably related to the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population.
Boston
Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F. 2d, at 1027, Bridgeport
Guard Inc. v. Bridgeport, 482 F. 2d, at 1341; Carter v. Gallagher, 452' F. 2d, at 331. Only 4% of contractors are members of minority groups, see Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d
600, 608 (CA2 1978), although minority group members constitute about 17% of the national population, see Contractors
Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp.
936, 951 (WD Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978).
The choice of a 10% set-aside thus falls roughly halfway
between the present percentage of minority contractors and
'the percentage of minority group members in the Nation.
Although the set-aside is pegged at a reasonable figure, its
~•effect might be unfair if it were applied rigidly in areas of the
country where minority group members constitute a small per. . centage of the population. To meet this concern, Congress
enacted a waiver provision into § 103 (f)(2). The factors
·~governing issuance of a waiver include the availability of qualified minority contractors in.! a particular geographic area, the
size of the locale's mi'nority populatio~, and the efforts made
to find minority contractors. Department .of Commerce,
<;;uidelines for 10% Minority Bu~iness Participation LPW
Grants, App. 165a-f67a. We haye been told th"at 1261
waivers had been granted by September 9, 1979. Brief for
the Secretary of Commerce 62, n. 37.

c
A race-conscious remedy should. n~t be. approved. without
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consideration of an additional crucial factor-the effect of
the set-aside upon innocent third parties. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U. S., at 374-375. In this case, the petitioners contend with some force that they have been asked
to bear the burden of the set-aside even though they are innocent of wrongdoing. I do not believe, however, tha.t their
burden is so great that the set-aside must be disapproved.
As noted above, Congress knew that minority contractors
were receiving only 1% of federal contracts at the time the
set-aside was enacted. The PWEA appropriated $4 billion
for public work projects, of which it could be expected that
approximately $400 million would go to minority contractors.
The Court of Appeals calculated that the set-aside would
reserve about .25 % of all the funds expended yearly on construction work in the United States for approximately 4%
of the Nation's contractors who are members of a minority
group. 584 F. 2d., at 607-608. The set-aside would have
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors
to compete for 99.75% of construction funds. In my view,
the effect of the set-aside is limited and so widely dispersed
that its usP. is consistent with fundamental faimess. 13
Consideration of these factors persuades me that the setaside is a reasonably necessary means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in redressing the discrimination
13 Although I h(·lil'vr fhaf 11H· hunlf'n pla(·ptJ upon nonminority contractors is not unconstitutional, I reject the suggestion that it is legally irrelevant. Apparently on the theory that Congress could have enacted no setaside and provided $400 million less in funding, the Secretary of Commerce
argues that "[n]onminorities have lost no right or legitimate expectation
by the addition of Section 103 (f) (2) to the 1976 Act." Brief for the
Secretary of Commerce 61. But the United States may not employ
unconstitutional classifications, or base a decision upon unconstitutional
considerations, when it provides a benefit to which a recipient is not
legally entitled. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 210-212 (1976)
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)
f'To characterize an Act of Congress as conferring a 'public benefit' does
not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment").
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that affects minority contractors. Any marginal unfairness
to innocent nonminority contractors is not sufficiently significant-or sufficiently identifiable-to outweigh the gov~rnmental interest served by § 103 (f) (2). When Congress
acts to remedy identified discrimination, it may exercise dis~retion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to
accomplish its purpose. Whatever the exact breadth of that
discretion, I believe that it encompasses the selection of the
set-aside in this case. 11

v

In the history of this Court and this country, few questions
been more divisive than those arising from governmental
action taken on the basis of race. Indeed, our own decisions
played no small part in the tragic legacy of governmentsanctioned discrimination. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.
537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (60 U. S.)
(1857). At least since the decision in Brown v. Board of.
E,ducation, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court has been resolute
i~ its ded.ication to the principle that the Constitution envisions a Nation where race is irrelevant. The time cannot
come too soon when no governmental decision will be based
upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or origin.
But in our quest to achieve a society free from radal classi:fipation, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer
from the effects of identifiable discrimination.
Distinguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from

~ave

P.rtitionrr..: hnvr ~~~~gr~t('(l n vnriPt~· of alternntivr prognum thnt could
be used in order to aid minority business enterprises in the construction
industry. My view that this set-aside is within the discretion of Congress does not imply that other methods are unavailable to Congress. Nor
do I conclude that use of a set-aside always will be an appropriate remedy
Ill that the selection of a set-aside by any other governmental body would
be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 309-310. The degree of
specificity required in the findings of discrimjna,tion and the breadth of
dis.rretiofl . in the choic{l of r~medies may .varY, with· the nature .(,a.nd, •
authority of a governmental body.
11
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racial classifications from the rights of some citizens to be made
whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task. When
we first confronted such an issue in Bakke, I concluded that
the Regents of the University of California were not competent to make, and had not made, findings sufficient to uphold
the use of the race-conscious remedy they adopted. As my
opinion made clear, I believe that the use of racial classifications, which are fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a
democratic society implicit in the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, cannot be imposed simply to serve transient social or political goals, however worthy they may be.
But the issue here turns on the scope of congressional power,
and Congress has been given a uniqne constitutional role
in the enforcement of the post-Civil War Amendments. In
this case, "·here Congress determined that minority contractors were victims of purposeful discrimination and where
Congress chose a reasonably necessary means to effectuate
its purpose, I find no conetitutional reason to inv~lidate
i 103 (f) ( 2) •J G

Petitioners abo contenq I hnt § 103 (f) (2) violate:; Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. Because I bcJie,·e that the
~et-aside is constitutional, l11lso conclude that the program docs not 'iolate
Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (opinion of PowELL, J.) ; id., at
.'348-350 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MAHSHALL, and BLACKMON, JJ.).
13

